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“Think manager, think male” (Schein and Davidson, 1993) 
 
This devastating title of 1993 still seems to hold true 23 years later. Women around the 
world are largely under-represented at the highest levels of organizations (Catalyst, 
2011; UN Women, 2014), and although the number of women in top positions within 
business, politics and organizations is increasing, corporate boards seem to be the one 
last bastion that women are having difficulties reaching (Brammer, Millington and 
Pavelin, 2007; Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella, 2007). 
 
In some countries politicians and legislators have instituted quotas requiring a certain 
percentage of women representation (Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz, 2014). In 2013, 
EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding requested large publicly held companies in 
Europe to voluntarily pledge to achieve a 30% level of women directors by 2015. 
Although some improvements have been recorded, most European countries have not 
yet fulfilled this request (European Commission, Factsheet WOB, 2014).  
 
In the academic world the interest in gender diversity has been varying over the last five 
decades, since the issue started to gain volume in the 1970´s (Joshi, Neely, Emrich, 
Griffiths and George, 2015). Recent corporate scandals, such as Ahold, Enron, Parmalat 
and Skandia, and the 2008 financial crisis seem to have sparked the interest in corporate 
governance, renewing the attention to the composition of upper management and to 
gender diversity on boards and top management teams (TMTs) (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2010; Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010). Just in 2015 two 
prestigious journals, Corporate Governance: An International Review and Academy of 
Management Journal published thematic issues contributing to this discussion (Adams, 
de Haan, Terjesen and van Ees, 2015; Joshi et al., 2015).  
 
The motivation for this dissertation is inspired by our interest in adding to this 
discussion, and to the conviction that gender diversity in upper management positions 
makes a positive contribution to firm´s performance. When analyzing previous research, 
we find that although some studies report a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and firm´s financial performance, no all-conclusive results in favor of the 
business case for women on boards have been proved. Furthermore, diversity, in the 
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literature, has often been characterized as a ―double-edged sword‖ or a ―mixed 
blessing‖ (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998), reporting both 
positive and negative effects. We believe that if we can move forward in the concept 
that having more women on the board affects positively the firms´ financial 
performance, this could be a strong argument for incrementing the ratio of women to 
boards and to top management positions in companies. 
 
The underlying belief in our work is that women directors differ from their male 
colleagues in many aspects; in personal and professional characteristics, in perspectives, 
information, skills, and backgrounds, and in their links and relations to stakeholders and 
society. 
 
Women offer unique contributions of task relevant information to the board´s processes 
of information-elaboration and decision-making. Their different expertise, opinions, 
ideas and viewpoints produce unique information sets, leading to enhanced innovation 
and creativity (Horwitz, 2005; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Wiersema and Bantel, 
1992). In this way, gender diverse boards will outperform homogeneous boards drawing 
on a broader range of task-relevant information and knowledge. Furthermore, due to the 
nature of the boards´ tasks, being those of a complex, strategic, and knowledge-
intensive nature, it is likely to believe that this enhanced information-elaboration, 
creativity, and collaborative decision-making will positively impact final performance 
(Bowers, Pharmer and Salas, 2000; Jehn, Northcraft and Neale, 1999; van Knippenberg, 
De Dreu and Homan, 2004a).  
 
Another crucial contribution of women directors is found in their distinct management 
style and behavior, much more adequate to the needs and the ways of doing in the 21
st
 
century. Women exhibit an interactive leadership style that emphasizes inclusion and 
participation (Rosener, 1995; Pearce and Zahra, 1991), they are more oriented towards 
interpersonal relationships, they tend to be more democratic and less autocratic, and are 
more cooperative and collaborative (Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Eagly, Johannesen-
Schmidt and van Engen, 2003). They are also more likely to accept other people´s 
positions and contribute to the solution of conflicts. Hence, when potential for conflict 
arises, women are more able to avoid them based on their higher sensitivity and ability 
to resolve interpersonal and task-related disagreements (Huse and Solberg, 2006).  
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With respect to women´s role in board work and board development, researchers 
suggests that women have higher expectations of board task performance than their 
male colleagues (Fondas, 2000). They tend to ask more questions than men (Huse and 
Solberg, 2006), and add diverse ways of thinking into male-dominated boards 
(Bilimoria, 2000). Furthermore, women, not being part of the ―old-boys network‖, are 
less subject to groupthink and add an independent voice to the decision-making 
processes (Brennan and McCafferty, 1997), leading to better understanding and higher 
quality decisions (Amason, 1996). We recognize the existence of some studies arguing 
that a weakness in women´s appointment to top management positions lies in their 
younger age and their lesser experience in senior management, possibly leading to 
negative or not as positive as expected effects upon firm performance (Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2012). However, we argue that in such cases, these effects are not caused by 
the women´s gender, but by their youth and their lack of experience, a condition that 
would also be a weakness in the apoointment of young and less experienced men to 
similar positions. 
 
Research has also found that women‘s presence in board-rooms lead to a more civilized 
behavior and higher sensitivity to other perspectives (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). They 
tend to be better prepared than men, are more egalitarian and caring in nature (Huse, 
2007), and enhance an effective debate on governance issues (Fondas, 2000). They are 
also more attentive to stakeholders, creating goodwill, and focus top management 
attention to ―soft‖ issues and concerns (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997). They encourage a 
larger number of board meetings and have less attendance problems (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2004).  
 
With respect to board functions, studies have shown that the participation of women on 
corporate boards benefit the board´s monitoring role in protecting shareholders‘ 
interests due to higher control of managers (Watson, Kumar and Michaelsen, 1993; 
Fondas and Sassalos 2000). Women are particularly valued in the service and strategy 
function, as providers of strategic input and generators of productive discourse 
(Bilimoria, 2000). Finally women directors provide differential and important resources 
and relations to the board, and project an image to society as a ―modern‖ company, 
complying with good practices and social responsibility.  
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However, and in spite of the evident contributions of women directors to corporate 
boards, we also recognize a potential negative side of gender diversity on boards. A 
possible threats can arise due to the processes of social categorization (Tajfel, 1981; 
Turner, 1975, 1987; Tajfel, Billing, Bundy and Flament, 1971; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) 
suggesting that people prefer ―similar others‖ and divide into ―in-groups‖ and ―out-
groups‖ disrupting information sharing, communication, coordination and cohesion 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996; Brewer, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and 
Wetherell, 1987). Through such processes boards with both men and women can split 
into male and female subgroups, giving rise to relational conflicts, reduced cohesion 
and less effective information sharing and decision-making (Jehn et al., 1999; Milliken 
and Martins, 1996; Tsui, Egan and O‘Reilly, 1992). Gender subgroup formation 
combined with intergroup bias against women provoke distrust, frustration, discomfort, 
hostility, anxiety and annoyance (Choi and Sy, 2010; Homan, van Knippenberg, van 
Kleef and De Dreu, 2007; Pearsall, Ellis and Evans, 2008; Pickett and Brewer, 2001; 
Lipponen, Helkama and Juslin, 2003; Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa and Kim, 2006; Amason 
and Schweiger, 1997; Amason, 1996; Pelled, 1996). Possible bias on boards may range 
from subtle social competition for status and prestige, to outright discrimination 
(Brewer and Brown, 1998) and include unequal status and competitive interdependence 
between subgroups (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2014). This hinders effective board 
functioning, causing lack of coordination, cooperation, and cohesion (Brewer, 1995, 
1996; LaBianca, Brass and Gray, 1998).  
 
The probability of subgroup division on the board is higher if the board is split into two 
relatively homogeneous gender subgroups based on board members‘ alignment along 
multiple attributes alongside gender; this in research is called faultline division 
(Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto and Thatcher, 2009; Lau and Murnighan, 1998, 2005; Li and 
Hambrick, 2005). Research has found that board faultlines, based on education level, 
tenure, functional background and type of directorship, have negative effects on firm 
financial performance (Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012b).  
 
Women on corporate boards are usually minority, and perceive this as a hindrance to 
their work and their influence on board´s decisions (Ferreira, 2010). This can finally 
lead to reduced contribution to the board´s information-elaboration and decision-making 
processes on behalf of the minority group of women directors (Carter, D´Souza, 
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Simkins and Simpson, 2010). However, as the size of the female group increases, it 
gains in support, voice and trust, leading to increased contribution to the board. This is 
the underlying idea of critical mass theory, much discussed in Kanter´s work of 1977, 
proposing that in a group with majority and minority members, the dominant type 
(usually men) control the few (usually women), until a certain proportion of 
representation of women is reached. 
 
In accordance with the above findings in literature we predict that gender diversity on 
corporate boards is positively related to firm financial performance, and that critical 
mass of women on boards further enhance this positive relation. At the same time we 
predict that strong gender-based board faultlines have a negative impact on firm 
financial performance, and that this negative impact is less pronounced with increased 
overlapping board tenures or increased chair-boardmembers shared experience.  
 
In this way we integrate into the same model both the positive and the negative effects 
of diversity, explained by the information-elaboration perspective and the social 
categorization perspective. We further include three concepts affecting gender diversity 
and firm´s financial performance; namely women ratio, critical mass and gender 
faultlines. The model is based on the Categorization-Elaboration Model (CEM) of van 
Knippenberg et al., (2004a), hence contributing to a holistic, original and realistic 
discussion on the factors involving gender diversity on corporate boards.  
 
Our empirical study, including 184 public listed firms, is cross-national comparing two 
countries in Europe; Norway and Spain. These two countries represent radical opposites 
in terms of women´s participation on boards, in business and in society in general, 
which allows us to analyze the importance of cultural contexts upon the effects of 
gender diversity on firm´s performance. 
 
Norway represents a bench-mark for board gender diversity as the country has the 
highest representation of women on boards in the world. In 2003, Norway passed its 
controversial quota law, mandating that by 2008, 40% of all public companies´ board 
directors should be women. The law was backed by the threat of non-compliant firms 
being closed down. At the expiry of the deadline five years later virtually all companies 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange had complied with the law, resulting in almost 38% 
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of all board members being female - a quadrupling of the number over this period, 
going from 6.8% to 38% in 5 years (SSB, 2012). 
 
Spain was the second European country to pass a gender equality act; Ley de Igualdad, 
2007, with the objective of increasing women´s participation in all public and private 
organizations, establishing the objective of achieving 40% women ratio by 2016, a 
significant jump from the 5% level which prevailed in Spain at that time. The law, a 
weaker imitation of the Norwegian law, aspirational in nature, has proved to be too 
ambitious for the Spanish context. The Unified Code of Good Corporate Governance of 
Listed Companies approved by the CNMV (National Securities Markets Commission) 
included in its January 2015 update, the objective of reaching 30% female 
representation by 2020. However, as Spanish corporations follow the ―comply or 
explain principle‖ an explanation seems to be sufficient justification for maintaining the 
status quo.  
 
Board composition in Norway and Spain report substantial differences in terms of 
numbers, indicating different realities for the female directors participating on the 
boards. While in Norway women´s participation is ―normalized‖, in Spain women 
directors still represent a small minority, still questioned by many. This minority status 
most likely affects the perception of the ability to effectively influence the male 
dominant group, reducing in this way women´s contribution to the board´s information-
elaboration and decision-making (Konrad, Kramer and Erkut, 2008; Kanter, 1977).  
 
We propose that the cultural context contribute positively to the relationship between 
gender diversity and firm financial performance in Norway. On the contrary, in Spain, a 
country with lower gender parity and high male dominance, the cultural context might 
have penalized this relation, as male board members may not leverage equally on the 
knowledge, experience and leadership behavior of their female directors. Further to that, 
our firm financial performance, measured by Tobin´s Q, depend upon investors‘ 
confidence in the future earning potentials of the firms, and these investors might not, in 
the best case, value firms with higher women ratio better than those without women 
directors.  
 
Introduction 
 
9 
 
We strongly argue in favor of increasing the numbers of women on boards, an argument 
supported by our reporting of positive impact of critical mass upon the relation gender 
diversity and firm performance. Numbers affect ―normalization‖, and critical mass will 
eventually change the perception of women on boards, and turn the earlier minority 
status into a more balanced and accepted representation of women directors.  
 
We have seen that culture affects numbers and that numbers affect culture. However, 
numbers are much easier and faster to change than culture…. We believe that if we do 
not insist on increasing the numbers, but let culture evolve without ―help‖, we will still 
have to wait decades, judging from contrasted historical evolution, before women 
occupy the board seats at the same level as their male colleagues in many board rooms 
around the world  
 
In order to successfully increase the representation of women on corporate boards we 
recommend firms to expand their search beyond the traditional talent pools, recruit 
more women to all levels of management, include female directors on the nomination 
committees, instore quota requirements and mentoring programs, and promote a general 
pro-diversity training within their organizations. 
 
This dissertation is structured in seven chapters. Chapter two is a review of the diversity 
literature, and includes an introduction to why board composition is important and a 
description of the board´s functions. Chapter three reviews the literature related to 
women in upper management positions, critical mass theory, social categorization, 
intergroup bias and gender faultline. Chapter four presents our research model and our 
hypotheses, chapter five the research design, the methodology, the data collection and 
the variables, and chapter six report the results. Finally, chapter seven presents the 
discussion and the final conclusions of our study. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter starts out by clarifying the functions of the board of directors and elaborate 
on why the board´s functions are relevant when discussing their composition. The 
principal argument is that due to the board´s function, which is of a strategic, complex 
and non-routine nature, members contributing with different backgrounds, ideas and 
knowledge will contribute positively to the elaboration of task relevant information and 
decision-making processes. After this introduction to board functions, the chapter goes 
on reviewing the previous literature on diversity. 
 
2.2. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND DIVERSITY 
 
The research area of corporate governance englobes studies of Top Management Teams 
(TMTs) and Board of Directors (BOD), and its principal focus is on how these two 
governing bodies influence organizational processes and outcomes (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999).  
 
Issues around corporate governance have, over the last few years, seen a growing 
interest and attention from both business actors as well as from academics (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010). Recent corporate scandals, such as Ahold, Enron, Parmalat and 
Skandia, and the 2008 financial crisis, have sparked this interest, and increased the 
academic debate around the board´s functions, responsibilities and composition (Bøhren 
and Strøm, 2010; Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011). 
 
However, before further elaborating on the board´s composition, which is the area of 
interest in this dissertation, it is essential to clarify the principal functions that the 
boards perform in the organizational context. Only after having clarified the board´s 
―job description‖, meaning their principal functions, can we proceed to discuss the 
knowledge, skills and human capital necessary to perform the board´s collective work. 
 
Recent research in corporate governance shows that the board´s principal functions are 
founded on three different theoretical perspectives, and should therefore be analyzed 
separately (Bennet and Robson, 2004).  
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These three perspectives are (1) Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) arguing in favor of board´s monitoring of top 
management, (2) Stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) proposing the 
function of support, guidance and advice, and (3) Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 
1972) arguing that board members offer crucial access to external networks important 
for the company´s survival. 
 
Figure 2.1. Board functions and their respective theoretical perspectives 
 
 
Source: Working paper, Barroso-Castro y Villegas-Periñan (2015)  
 
Agency theory constitutes the fundamental perspective supporting the monitoring 
function. This theory has its roots in the study of Berle and Means (1932) arguing in 
favor of a separation between the owners of the company (shareholders) and the 
management of the company. The agency theory describes the relationship between a 
principal (shareholders) and the agent of the principal (directors and managers), and 
define this relationship as a contract regulating the services that the agent should 
perform on behalf of the principal. This relationship is called ―agency‖. As each part of 
the agency is expected to consider the issues from their own point of view, and act in 
line with their own interests, these might not always align. It can therefore be expected 
that the agent, in occasions, might act pursuing his or her own benefit, maximizing 
wealth and power at the expense of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
FIRM PERFORMANCE
MONITORING 
FUNCTION AGENCY THEORY
SERVICE AND STRATEGY 
FUNCTION 
RESOURCE PROVISION
FUNCTION 
STEWARDSHIP THEORY
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
THEORY
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The monitoring function of the board is based on the agency theory, and proposes that 
the board controls the CEO and the rest of the top management team, making sure that 
they operate in line with the shareholders‘ interests (Dalton, Daily, Johnson and 
Ellstrand, 1999; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; 
Gore, Matsunaga and Yeung, 2011). The board of directors has direct influence over the 
top management team (Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005; Daily and Schwenk, 1996). It is 
believed that the board of directors can only fulfil this monitoring function when it 
provides impartial evaluations of the top management team. It is therefore consider that 
outside directors are more independent (and impartial) than inside directors, and 
therefore better monitors of shareholders‘ interest than their insider counterparts.  
 
Subsequent authors within the area of corporate governance have argued that limiting 
the board´s function to that of control and monitoring the top management might be in 
the best case insufficient, and that the board can contribute more efficiently through 
functions aimed at supporting the top management team in their performance. In this 
line, Ginsberg (1994) argue that the board can better protect shareholders‘ interests 
contributing with information and expertise aimed at enhancing understanding, 
creativity and improved decision-making, than just exercising control over the 
management team.  
 
Stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998), nurtured 
by insights from psychology and sociology, proposed a completely different vision of 
the roles of the owners, the board and the directors of a company. Based on the 
assumption that the ownership may be very fragmented, often in the hands of groups of 
investors seeking different objectives, the role of the managers is that of the guardian 
protecting the interests of the majority of the owners, pursuing the company´s success 
and maximizing its final results. In contrast to the agency theory, which expects that 
managers seek their own opportunistic benefits, this theory argue that managers are 
committed to the interests of the shareholders and worthy of their trust; managers are 
believed to seek different types of motivation, not only material and monetary, but also 
intrinsic motives, such as job enrichment, development, recognition and challenges 
(Herzberg, Mauser and Snyderman, 1959; McClelland, 1961). This places the board in a 
completely different role, as they will seek to support and help the committed managers, 
sharing the common goal of doing what is best for the company and its owners. This 
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function of the board is called both ―the service function‖ (Johnson et al., 1996; Zona 
and Zattoni, 2007) and ―the strategy function‖ (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1991) and corresponds to the function of providing the top management with 
advice, counsel and strategic direction. Under this perspective the board participates not 
only in the revision of the strategy, but in its formulation, helping and guiding the 
management in setting objectives and in planning and decision-making. An active 
board, participating in the strategy direction of the company will, according to various 
authors subscribing to the stewardship theory, bring multiple benefits to the company 
and its owners (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Ruigrok, Peck, 
Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). 
 
1. The management team will show higher commitment to a profound analysis and 
definition of strategic objectives and plans proposed to the board.  
2. The company will better benefit from the board members´ human capital; 
knowledge, experience and skills. 
3. The discussion on strategic issues on the board will bring forward different 
perspectives and points of view, contributing in this way to more ideas and new 
opportunities. 
4. As the board and the management share common objectives, there might be less 
power struggles and more collaboration between the two groups. 
5. The active participation of the board in the strategy direction of the company 
seems to be related to improved performance of the company as a whole. 
 
The principal idea behind the resource dependence theory (Hillman, Cannella and 
Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1991) is that the board constitutes a valuable resource for the 
company, and that its members can provide the firm with important relations, networks 
and links to the external environment and to important stakeholders.  
 
A key point of this theory is that organizations are open systems, dependent upon 
external entities for survival, and that the resulting uncertainties pose significant 
challenges and costs to the organizations (Pfeffer, 1972). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
argue that a company should form links with elements of its external environment upon 
which it depends, in order to reduce dependency and obtain resources.  
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In their work they suggest that the board´s function of resource provision can be defined 
by four primary activities that benefit the company:  
 
1. Provision of resources such as information and expertise.  
2. Creation of channels of communication with constituents of importance to the 
firm.  
3. Provision of commitments of support from important organizations or teams in 
the external environment; and  
4. Creation of legitimacy for the firm in the external environment.  As board 
members of large corporations are highly visible to societal actors who grant 
legitimacy (Certo, 2003; Davis and Mizruchi, 1999), they provide channels of 
communication to external entities in order to gain influence, support, 
commitment, or favorable access to resources. 
 
According to the resource dependence theory, board directors should be selected in 
order to maximize access to critical resources. By selecting a director with valuable 
skills, influence or connections to these external sources of dependency, the firm can 
reduce dependency and gain valuable resources. As environmental dependencies 
change, so do the resources needed by organizations and thus the needs for specific 
types of directors (Hillman et al., 2000). Implicit in this view is the assumption that 
firms that are better able to deal with environmental uncertainty and interdependence 
will perform better (Dalton et al., 1999).  
 
Hillman et al., (2000) expanded the four benefits argued by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
into taxonomy of director types that provide various resources to the firm: insiders, 
business experts, support specialists and community influentials. Hillman et al.,‘s 
(2000) extension of resource dependence theory suggests that different types of 
directors will provide different beneficial resources to the firm.  
 
Todays increased globalization, border breaking technology, sophisticated and 
demanding customers and investors are just some of the critical challenges that boards 
of directors and their organizations face today. In this complex and uncertain 
environment it seems crucial to count on competent boards, assuming all three functions 
described above. Being these functions of a non-routine, complex and strategic nature, 
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involving ―big-picture-issues‖ rather than day-to-day operational tasks (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), the cognitive resource provision of the board 
becomes very important. Thus, board members contributing with a breadth of resources, 
including prestige, legitimacy, financing, knowledge and industrial/functional/ 
geographic business experience will provide valuable advice and counsel crucial for the 
formulation of strategy and the establishment of long-term priorities for the company 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).  
 
In order to foster better understanding and dealing with such complex challenges as 
mentioned above, companies are increasingly turning to the establishment of diverse 
work-groups, from top management levels (BOD and TMT), throughout the lower 
levels of the organizations (Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford and Melner, 1999). 
Hackman (1987) define work-groups as a group of individuals who both see 
themselves, and are seen by others as an independent entity embedded in a larger 
organization. The work-groups share one or more common goals, interact socially and 
exist to perform organizationally relevant tasks; being task interdependence among 
group members a necessary condition. Work-groups operate in an organizational 
context that influences their functioning, sets boundaries, constrains the group, and 
influences exchanges with other units in the broader entity (Kozlowski and Bell, 2003).  
 
Embedded in this work-group definition, the board is a work-group, situated at the apex 
of the organization, in that it acts as a whole and as an inseparable unit, have common 
goals, social interaction, task interdependence and collective responsibility over certain 
areas. However, as a work-group, the board of directors have some specific 
characteristics that are common to most boards, and that condition their collective work 
situation (Forbes and Milliken, 1999);  
 
1. Boards are typically large groups. 
2. Boards have episodic functioning and part-time responsibility. 
3. The board members consist typically of a large proportion of outsiders  
 
Due to these characteristics, boards of directors are particularly vulnerable to ―process 
losses‖; the interaction difficulties that prevent groups from achieving their full 
potential (Steiner, 1974). As a conclusion one can derive that boards´ outcome is 
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heavily dependent on social-psychological processes, like group participation and 
interaction, information exchange and critical discussion (Milliken and Vollrath, 1991).  
In order for boards to perform effectively, they must therefore cooperate in the 
exchange of information, in the evaluation of competing alternatives and reach well-
reasoned strategic decisions. This in practice represents a big challenge, as board 
members have minimal time for quality and quantity interactions.  
 
Having described the principal functions and the nature of board work, and having 
defined the board as a work-group, we now turn to the question of group composition. 
Composition is defined in work-group research as the configuration of its members´ 
attributes (Levine and Moreland, 1990). Work-group composition is found to have a 
direct impact on organizational outcomes (Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 2004; 
Patzelt, Zu, Knyphausen-Aufseß and Nikol, 2008), as a broader set of perspectives, 
ideas and viewpoints becomes available for the complex decision-making (Sawyer, 
Houlette and Yeagley, 2006), and is therefore considered crucial for task elaboration 
and work processes (Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Harrison, Price, Gavin and Florey, 
2002; van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007). It therefore seems logical to propose that 
a board will benefit from having diverse and complementary board members, 
contributing with different experience, skills and knowledge, as proposed by Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1996). In this same line of reasoning, Hambrick and Mason´s upper 
echelon´s theory (1984) proposes that the background and the attributes of the upper-
level managers (understood as TMT and BOD) are directly related to the organization´s 
outcome, turning therefore the composition of the board into an important antecedent 
for organizational performance.  
 
Since Hambrick and Mason´s theory in 1984, numerous researchers have been studying 
board composition and how different diversity attributes of board members affect the 
board´s processes and decisions, and how this finally has an effect on organizational 
outcomes (Carpenter et al., 2004; Patzelt et al., 2008).  
 
In our organizational context, diversity refers to the degree to which there are 
similarities and differences between the members of a work-group (Jackson, Joshi and 
Erhardt, 2003). Blau (1977: 276) define diversity as ―the great number of different 
statuses among which a population is distributed‖, and Williams and O‘Reilly (1998) 
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refer to diversity as the differences between individuals on any attribute that may lead to 
the perception that another person is different from one self. 
 
Diversity can apply to any attribute of differentiation, however, regardless of the 
attributes under consideration, the primary question of diversity research has always 
been how diversity affects performance. In practice, most diversity studies have focused 
on diversity in gender, age, race, nationality, tenure, and functional and educational 
background (Milliken and Martins, 1996; van Dijk, van Engen and van Knippenberg, 
2009).  
 
As the number of women on boards is slowly increasing, so is the number of studies 
devoted to board gender research. This dissertation, studying diversity on boards, has a 
specific focus on gender diversity and its relation to firm performance. 
 
Reviewing the broad diversity literature, one comes to the intriguing conclusion that in 
spite of the large amount of time and effort that has been dedicated to study diversity 
effects upon performance, no final conclusion has been reached. Diversity in the 
literature has often been characterized as a ―double-edged sword‖ or a ―mixed blessing‖ 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996; Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998) as it has not proved to have 
only positive or only negative effects, but simultaneously can have both. Milliken and 
Martins (1996) in their comprehensive review of the diversity literature, concluded that 
diversity appeared to increase the opportunity for creativity, as well as the likelihood 
that group members will be unsatisfied and fail to identify with the group (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996). 
 
Two main perspectives contribute to these positive and negative effects of diversity, 
corresponding to the information/decision-making perspective and the social 
categorization perspective.  
 
The information/decision-making perspective suggests that diversity on board of 
directors leads to an increased pool of skills, knowledge and information that enhances 
overall decision-making (Watson et al., 1993). The social categorization perspective 
(Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1975, 1987) suggests that diversity has a negative influence on 
performance in that people prefer ―similar others‖ and divide into ―in-groups‖ and ―out-
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groups‖ disrupting information sharing, communication, coordination and cohesion 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996). Such negative effects are highly pronounced for gender 
and race diversity, indicating that these attributes might be victims of deep-rooted bias 
and stereotypes. 
 
2.3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY 
 
Williams and O‘Reilly´s (1998) comprehensive review of the diversity literature of the 
last 40 years marked a definite starting point for successive diversity research. They 
identified two main lines of research relating the concepts; (1) the information/decision-
making perspective and (2) the social categorization perspective.  
 
These two perspectives relate to the positive and to the negative effects of diversity. The 
information/decision-making perspective is more related to the cognitive aspects of 
group-work and emphasizes the positive effects of diversity, in that it argues that an 
increased pool of skills, knowledge and information enhance overall decision-making 
(Watson et al., 1993). In contrast, according to the social categorization perspective, 
(Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1975, 1987) more related to the social-relational aspects of group-
work, diversity is problematic, as it can introduce social divisions that hinder effective 
teamwork and disruptions to information sharing, communication and cohesion 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996).  
 
2.3.1. The information/decision-making perspective  
 
The main proposal of the information/decision-making perspective is that diverse work-
groups will outperform homogeneous work-groups.  
 
The principal foundation of this argument is that diverse groups are more likely to offer 
a broader range of task-relevant knowledge, skills and abilities. According to the 
cognitive resource perspective, it is due to variety by pooling diverse cognitive 
resources into the group that groups improve performance (Horwitz, 2005: 224). 
Members who bring different expertise, perspectives and viewpoints relevant to the task 
at hand, will very likely produce unique information sets, which again will lead to 
enhanced innovation and creativity (Watson et al., 1993; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; 
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Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In this line, Watson and Michaelsen (1988) found that 
groups performing intellectual tasks perform better when their interaction behavior 
feature the inclusion of multiple viewpoints and the exchange of positive and negative 
comments. In the same line, Wanous and Youtz (1986) found that diversity had a 
positive influence on the quality of group decisions. 
 
Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) examine the role of an individual‘s accumulative 
stock of education, skills and experience and proposes that the exposure to diverging 
and new perspectives leads to a higher level of creativity and innovation, which again 
benefit final decision-making (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; 
De Dreu and West, 2001). Diversity and quality decision-making have been a focus of 
many diversity researchers. Bantel (1993) investigated the relation between the 
demographics of top management work-groups and their strategic clarity in retail banks. 
The findings demonstrated that greater education and functional background diversity 
lead to better strategic decision-making. Simons and Pelled (1999) reported similar 
results in their study on executive diversity; finding that both education level and 
cognitive diversity are associated with positive effects on organizational performance.  
 
In this same line, Argote, Gruenfeld and Naquin (2001), Ilgen, (1999) and Hinsz, 
Tindale and Vollrath (1997), also found that work-groups outperform individuals in 
terms of the quality of the decisions they reach, when group members differ in respect 
to the knowledge and expertise they bring to the group.  
 
With respect to the board´s monitoring function, Ararat, Aksu and Cetin (2015) 
investigated the indirect effects of a board‘s demographic diversity on firm performance 
via board monitoring, and found a positive and non-linear relationship between 
demographic diversity and performance, mediated by the board‘s monitoring efforts.  
 
These findings seem intuitive from a business point of view and organizations have 
therefore, to an increasingly higher degree, relied on cross-functional work-groups in 
their attempts to stimulate innovation, solve problems and make better decisions.  Firms 
have also employed quality circles of cross-functional employees, representing all levels 
and disciplines in order to develop the organization and to work on complex projects. 
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As corporations move to more projects and matrix structures, the variety of input and 
different expertise and backgrounds prove to be increasingly important.  
 
These positive effects of diversity on group performance are more likely to emerge in 
work-groups performing relatively complex, knowledge-intensive tasks that require 
information-elaboration, creativity, and collaborative decision-making, and where the 
exchange of diverse task-related information and perspectives may stimulate a thorough 
consideration of the task at hand (Bowers et al., 2000; Jehn et al., 1999; van 
Knippenberg et al., 2004a). It is therefore often argued that diversity is a value for work-
groups that perform complex rather than routine tasks (van Knippenberg and Schippers, 
2007).  
 
Having defined the functions and the tasks of the board of directors and having 
concluded that these are of a complex, strategic, and non-routine nature, it is therefore 
consequent to believe that board members´ diversity in expertise, knowledge and 
perspectives will benefit the overall board´s decision-making and finally the firm´s 
performance. Corroborating with this we have seen that the complex issues of today´s 
environment is placing a premium on having heterogeneous top management team 
compositions and flexible processes (Barrick, Bradley and Colbert, 2007). Research 
within this area (TMT) shows that in environments with high velocity and turbulence, 
heterogeneous TMTs achieve better performance, whereas less heterogeneous TMTs are 
more successful in stable contexts (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990, Hambrick, Cho 
and Chen, 1996). Similarly, in board research, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) found that 
diverse board composition and wider breath of human capital affect performance in a 
positive way (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). 
 
Finally, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) propose that corporate directors should be selected 
in order to maximize access to critical resources. By selecting a director with valuable 
skills, knowledge, experience and influence, the firm reduces dependency and gain 
valuable resources. Hillman et al.,‘s (2000) extension of resource dependence theory 
suggests that different types of directors will provide different beneficial resources to 
the firm. As a result, a more diverse board will provide more valuable resources, which 
would in turn produce better firm performance. In this lies the best arguments for board 
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diversity, as diverse board members are assumed to produce unique information sets 
allowing the board to take better decisions. 
 
Innovation has become one of the key strategies of firms for gaining competitive 
advantage (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1996), expanding market share 
(Franko, 1989) and increasing firm performance (Morbey, 1988). Corporate innovation 
strategies are defined as those strategies that provide new strategic opportunities for the 
firm to create new services or product lines. Watson et al., (1993) suggest that diversity 
leads to a greater knowledge base, creativity and innovation, and therefore becomes a 
competitive advantage. Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson, (2010) argue that a board‘s 
ability to discuss entrepreneurial issues depends upon the diversity of the board 
members´ tenure, functional background and industry experience, and Barkema and 
Shvyrkov (2007) in their study of TMT diversity, found that both diversity in tenure and 
education background was positively related to strategic innovation and expansion into 
new geographical territories. This argument is basically founded on the argument that 
increased diversity promotes more open discussion and create more and better ideas 
(Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007).  Kim and Rasheed (2014) in their study of corporate 
boards in the US, found that diversity in tenure and functional background contribute to 
improved firm performance, as corporations engage in higher levels of unrelated 
diversification.  
 
2.3.2. The social categorization perspective  
 
As earlier commented, and in contrast to the information/decision-making perspective, 
the social categorization perspective emphasizes the negative effects of work-group 
diversity.   
 
The social categorization perspective argues that similarities and differences among 
people serve as a basis for a categorization of one self and others into different groups. 
Through this process a group might be divided into different subgroups, and thereby 
give rise to conflicting inter-subgroup relations. People distinguish between their own 
in-group (―us‖), and one or more out-groups (―them‖), and have the tendency to like and 
trust their in-group members more than the out-group members (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel 
and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987).  
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Researchers argue that homogeneous groups develop higher member commitment 
(Riordan and Shore, 1997; Tsui et al., 1992) higher group cohesion (O‘Reilly, Caldwell 
and Barnett, 1989) fewer relational conflicts (Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled, Eisenhardt and 
Xin, 1999), and that as a result of this, homogeneous groups will have higher overall 
performance (Jehn et al., 1999; Simons, Pelled and Smith, 1999). 
 
Social categorization is built upon the conclusions and findings from three previous 
theories; self-categorization theory, social identity theory and similarity attraction. 
 
Self-categorization theory (Turner, 1975, 1982, 1987) proposes that individuals classify 
themselves and others into categories on the basis of visible attributes such as gender, 
age, race and nationality, in order to make predictions about subsequent interactions 
(Carpenter et al., 2004; Joshi, Liao and Roh, 2011). It implies the self-identification 
with a particular role and/or social category or group, salient for that particular 
individual or group of individuals. 
 
This categorization into social groups, based on these salient attributes, serves the 
purpose of cognitively segmenting the social environment, providing a systematic mean 
of defining others and one self in the relation to others. A self-categorization subgroup 
can therefore only exist when individuals‘ identity with certain groups and categorize 
themselves as belonging to these particular groups. This will have an effect on the 
individual‘s behavior within the in-group and towards the out-group. These 
categorization groupings (female, young, white....) are used in defining an individual´s 
social identity (Turner, 1987), thus relating social identity and self-categorization 
theory.  
 
Social identity theory argues that individuals tend to classify themselves and others 
based on various social categories, and seek to surround themselves with people who 
share similar demographic profiles, perspectives, and values (Tajfel, 1978, 1981).  
 
An individual has many different identities that vary in salience and importance (Crisp 
and Hewstone, 2007) each responding to the different roles he or she plays within 
society. These identities provide meaning for the self because they relate to specific 
behavioral expectations with each role and distinguish the different roles from one 
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another (Hogg, Terry and White, 1995). This phenomenon is referred to by Ashforth 
and Mael (1989:29) as ―an amalgam of identities‖. Furthermore, each social group to 
which an individual belongs provides a definition of self, based on the attributes of that 
given social group, which again underpins his or her self-esteem (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000). Each social group is underpinned by norms and 
stereotypes of social group membership, which again impact behavior (Hogg et al., 
1995; Hogg and Turner, 1987).  
 
The theoretical basis for this multi-dimensionality of social identity stems from Tajfel´s 
often-quoted definition of social identity as ―that part of an individual´s self-concept 
which derives from his or her knowledge of his or her membership of a social group (or 
groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership‖ (1981: 63).  
 
Social identity provides a conceptual bridge between the individual level and the group 
levels of analysis; and it is, in other words, a representation of the ―group in the 
individual‖ and is therefore considered an important variable in research on intergroup 
relations (Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 17). 
 
Social identity theory is related to relational dissimilarity theory. This approach uses a 
framework suggesting that individuals compare themselves to other members of their 
social unit. Individuals can easily compare visible attributes of the members of a group 
(Harrison, Price and Bell, 1998). These are ―given‖ attributes not chosen by the 
individuals themselves, they are difficult to change, and they are immediately 
observable as physical attributes (e.g., gender, age, race and nationality) (Harrison et al., 
2002). These visible attributes play an important role as above mentioned, as they often 
serve as the basis for self-categorization and social identity processes (Harrison et al., 
1998; Jehn, Chadwick and Thatcher, 1997; Tsui et al., 1992; Tajfel, 1981). 
 
Other less visible attributes, like tenure, education background and education level can 
also can serve as attributes for self-categorization and social identity  processes (Jehn et 
al.,  1999), however visible attributes are particularly salient (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990) 
and are thus more likely to exert a strong influence on potential sub-groupings (Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998). 
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The self-categorization and social identity theories is complemented by the 
similarity/attraction perspective (Byrne, 1971; Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998), not 
concerning social groups but interpersonal similarity (primarily in attitudes and values) 
as determinants of interpersonal attraction (Berscheid and Reis, 1998; Byrne, 1971).  
 
The similarity/attraction perspective arrives at the same basic prediction; that people 
prefer to work with similar others, and find interaction and communication easier with 
individuals with similar backgrounds (Byrne, 1971). Similarity is likely to enhance 
interpersonal attraction, mutual reinforcement and consensual validation. In contrast, 
individuals tend to apply negative assumptions to those with whom they are dissimilar. 
Lincoln and Miller (1979) demonstrated that similarity between individuals lead to 
more frequent communication and a desire to remain in the group.  
 
Network theorists support the similarity/attraction perspective in that they suggest that 
people with similar visible attributes tend to socialize together (Ibarra, 1993). 
Furthermore, individuals are likely to form coalitions when they have numerous 
similarities across a variety of visible attributes as they tend to have pleasure interacting 
with each other (Byrne, 1971; Stevenson, Pearce and Porter, 1985). The similarity 
inherent in this type of coalition formation is expected to lead to less conflict within the 
subgroup, and potentially more conflict between or across subgroups (Hogg, Turner and 
Davidson, 1990). 
 
Diversity research has typically pointed to the negative effects of social categorization 
processes dividing a group into two or more subgroups. The similarities and differences 
among the members of a board serve in this way as a basis for categorization of 
members into different subgroups. The subgroup members distinguish between their 
own in-group (―us‖), and the other out-group (―them‖), and have the tendency to like 
and trust ―us‖ more than ―them‖ (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 
1987). Through this process a board of directors can become divided into different 
subgroups, giving rise to relational conflicts, reduced cohesion and less effective 
information sharing and elaboration/decision-making; so important for boards´ overall 
performance (Jehn et al., 1999; Milliken and Martins, 1996; Tsui et al., 1992).  
 
Literature review: Diversity 
28 
 
The alignment of diversity attributes can result in faultline division between subgroups 
within the overall group; a process that has proven to affect group processes (e.g., 
conflict, cohesion), affective outcomes (e.g., satisfaction), and performance outcomes 
(e.g., decision-making, group performance) (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Bezrukova 
et al., 2009; Choi and Sy, 2010; Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 2005; 
Polzer et al., 2006; Rico, Molleman, Sánchez-Manzanares and van der Vegt, 2007; 
Sawyer et al., 2006; Thatcher, Jehn and Zanutto, 2003). Faultlines are hypothetical 
dividing lines that split a group into relatively homogeneous subgroups based on group 
members‘ alignment along multiple attributes (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 2005). (Explained under Faultline concept). 
 
Strong faultlines have negative effects on behaviors, finally affecting performance, such 
as group learning (Jehn and Rupert, 2008; Lau and Murnighan, 2005), information-
elaboration (Meyer, Shemla and Schermuly, 2011), group functioning (Molleman, 
2005), riskiness of decision-making (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Rico et al., 2007), 
creativity (Pearsall et al., 2008), and organizational citizenship behaviors (Choi and Sy, 
2010). 
 
Research within boards has found that board faultlines, based on education level, tenure, 
functional background and type of directorship have negative effects on firm financial 
performance (Kaczamarek et al., 2012b). Tuggle et al., (2010) found that faultlines 
based on tenure, functional background and industry experience decrease the attention 
paid to entrepreneurial issues, and decrease the geographical expansion into new 
markets. 
 
Table 2.1. Theories supporting the information/decision-making perspective and the 
social categorization perspectives. 
 
  
Information/decision-making perspective Social categorization perspective
Cognitive resource perspective Self categorization theory
Resource dependence theory Social identity theory
Human capital theory Similarity attraction paradigm
Source: Prepared by the author
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2.4. TYPES OF DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE 
 
The main concern for diversity researchers over the years has been to prove the link 
between diversity of group members and their overall performance. However, in spite of 
numerous studies, no consistent and all-inclusive conclusion has been made about the 
link. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, diversity in the literature has often been 
characterized as a ―double-edged sword‖ or a ―mixed blessing‖ (Milliken and Martins, 
1996; Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998) as it has not proved to lead to only positive, or only 
negative effects, but simultaneously can lead to both. In this line, Milliken and Martins 
(1996) in their comprehensive review of the diversity literature, concluded that diversity 
seem to increase the opportunity for creativity, while at the same time increased the 
likelihood that group members would be unsatisfied and fail to identify with the group. 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996). 
 
Thus, as it seems to be no clear-cut conclusion about the link between diversity and 
performance, some researchers propose that the effects upon performance depend upon 
the type of diversity in question. Consequently, a great deal of effort has been done in 
classifying diversity attributes into different typologies, proposing different cause-
effects relations depending on the typology. 
 
Although there are many typologies defined and used in the literature, there are 
basically one main distinction differentiating between readily observable visible 
attributes (e.g., gender, age, race/ethnicity and nationality) that may be less job- or task-
related, also called social category diversity, and less easily discernable and more job- 
or task-related attributes such as differences in education or functional background, also 
called informational diversity or cognitive diversity (Jehn et al., 1999; Milliken and 
Martins, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999; Tsui et al., 1992; Harrison et al., 1998). 
 
The main argument is that informational diversity, defined as ―differences in knowledge 
bases and perspectives that members bring to the group‖ (Jehn et al., 1999: 743), based 
upon the information/decision-making perspective, has a stronger positive impact on 
work-group processes and performance (Pelled, 1996; Pelled et al., 1999) than social 
category diversity. It is also argued that informational diversity is more likely to become 
salient in work situations (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jehn et al., 1999).  
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Visible and readily detectable diversity attributes, also so-called social category 
diversity, are considered to lead to social categorization processes, causing negative 
effects upon group performance (Jehn et al., 1999; Milliken and Martins, 1996; Tsui et 
al., 1992). 
 
However, and although this reasoning makes intuitive sense, it has not been supported 
by research. Pelled et al., (1999) argue that informational diversity would be positively 
related to group performance, whereas social diversity would be negatively related to 
group performance, but found no proof for either in his research. Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe (2002) found both positive and negative relationships with respect to team 
processes and performance for different forms of informational diversity. Other studies 
report positive effects of social diversity (Bantel and Jackson, 1989) and negative 
effects of informational diversity (Simons et al., 1999), while again other studies report 
no relation between typologies of diversity and performance (Dahlin, Weingart and 
Hinds, 2005; Schippers, Hartog, Koopman and Wienk, 2003; van der Vegt and 
Bunderson, 2005). 
 
As a final point in this direction, meta-analyses up to date do not support the notion of 
type of diversity as moderator of the positive versus the negative effects of diversity. In 
their meta-analysis of 13 studies, Bowers et al., (2000) distinguished gender, 
personality, attitude and ability diversity and found no reliable relationship between any 
form of diversity and group performance, while Webber and Donahue (2001), in their 
meta-analysis of 24 studies distinguishing between highly task-related vs. less task-
related diversity found no reliable link for either form of diversity, neither with group 
performance nor with group cohesiveness. 
 
The actual distinction itself between the different typologies is also under debate. Van 
Knippenberg et al., (2004a) suggest that research abandon this attempt to explain the 
effects of diversity through typologies of diversity. The distinction between social 
category diversity and informational diversity is not as clear as it seems in the first run. 
Some typologies of diversity are obviously more task-relevant, such as differences in 
education and functional background. However, social differences that initially do not 
appear as task-related can also incorporate informational differences and be associated 
with task-relevant information and perspectives (Cox, Lobel and McLeod, 1991; Tsui 
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and O‘Reilly, 1989). As an example consider the task of developing marketing 
strategies for specific products for specific market niches. Whether the integrant of the 
team involved are women or men, or young or old may make a big difference upon the 
final decision, as their task-relevant perspectives is expected to be different. Social 
category differences are in this case integrated with informational differences and, as a 
result, dimensions of diversity that are typically conceptualized as social category 
diversity (e.g., gender, age) may elicit the positive effects implied in the 
information/decision-making perspective (Cox et al.,  1991). And, on the other hand, 
what seem to be informational differences can also give rise to social categorization 
processes (Homan and van Knippenberg, 2003) in that informational differences can be 
visible through, for instance, differences in dress, (e.g. nurses versus doctors, factory 
workers versus white collar workers). What seem to appear as clear informational 
differences may in practice work as social category differences, acting as a basis for 
social categorization processes. 
 
The conclusion of these findings suggests that the distinction between diversity 
typologies should not be associated with differential relationships with performance 
variables, and that it is therefore not possible to link uniquely the negative or the 
positive effects of diversity to specific subsets of diversity attributes (van Dijk et al., 
2009). 
 
Following this same reasoning, van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose that all 
dimensions of diversity may elicit social categorization processes as well as 
information/decision-making processes, as all dimensions of diversity in principle both 
provide a basis for differentiation as well as differences in task-relevant information and 
perspectives. The authors propose a model which makes possible the integration of both 
perspectives, and allow for all types of diversity to have both positive as well as 
negative effects upon performance. Their Categorization-Elaboration Model is a 
complex model that integrate both diversity perspectives (information/decision-making 
and social categorization) and propose the study of important moderators that affect the 
relation between diversity and performance (The CEM is explained in more detail later 
in the chapter). 
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2.5. DIFFERENT WAYS TO MEASURE DIVERSITY AND ITS 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Although there are different ways to measure diversity, there is one important 
distinction between the different diversity measures; whether it focuses on separate 
diversity attributes or the alignment of multiple diversity attributes. In this line, and 
according to Pham, Metoyer, Bezrukova and Spell (2014), the different diversity 
measures can be defined as diversity patterns concerning separate attributes and 
diversity patterns concerning interactions among multiple attributes. 
  
2.5.1. Diversity patterns concerning separate attributes  
 
Group composition research rooted in diversity patterns concerning separate attributes 
focuses on the degree of diversity of one single attribute within a population at a 
specific time (Blau, 1977; Milliken and Martins, 1996). They base their predictions of 
group processes and outcomes upon the distribution of independent diversity attributes 
(e.g., gender, age, race and tenure), but do not take into account the inter-dependence 
and the combined effect of multiple diversity attributes among the members. 
 
Even when researchers take into account more than one diversity attribute, combining 
the effects of various attributes, for example age, gender and race, they use an additive 
model and aggregate the effects of the single-attribute diversity pattern. Although these 
aggregate diversity patterns indicate the degree to which a group is different on race and 
gender and age, they do not reflect adequately the degree of interdependence between 
the different diversity attributes. 
 
In order to understand the difference between taking into account singular diversity 
attributes versus aligned diversity attributes, consider this example: 
 
Imagine two boards of directors with four members on each board: 
Board A is composed of two male members with secondary schooling and high board 
tenure, and two female members with PhD and low tenure.  
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Board B has one male member with secondary schooling and low tenure, one male 
member with PhD and high tenure, one female member with PhD and low tenure, and 
one female member with secondary schooling and high tenure. 
 
In terms of the overall diversity both boards score the same; both consist of two 
members with secondary schooling, two members with PhD, two females, two males, 
two members with high tenure and two membes with low tenure. However, the 
distribution of the diversity attributes differ between board A and B, and it is therefore 
expected that the group dynamics will differ.  
 
Conceptualization and operationalization of the diversity  
Diversity research has typically conceptualized diversity as the distribution of a separate 
diversity attribute at the group level, and has referred to this distribution as the 
heterogeneity or the concentration of this given attribute within a given group. 
 
Harrison and Klein (2007) propose three different conceptualizations of diversity; 
variety, separation, and disparity.  
 
Variety reflects differences in kind or category, primarily in information, knowledge or 
experience, separation refers to the distribution of attributes based on differences of 
position or opinion and reflects horizontal distance along a single continuum in a 
particular attitude or value, and disparity indicates differences in concentration of 
valued social assets or resources such as pay and status among group members. 
However, regardless of whether diversity is conceptualized as variety, separation or 
disparity, the diversity measure focuses on the distribution of separate diversity 
attributes.  
 
In order to illustrate the different conceptualizations of diversity attributes, consider the 
attribute of gender, and how this can be conceptualized as variety, separation and 
dispersion: 
 
 When female and male board members contribute to the board with different 
information, knowledge, skills, experience, ideas, perspectives and networks, 
gender can be conceptualized as variety.  
Literature review: Diversity 
34 
 
 When female and male board members have different opinions or positions with 
respect to an issue on the board, or stand for different values along a single 
continuum, gender can be conceptualized as separation.  
 When board member´s gender is associated with higher or lower status or power 
within a board, the attribute of gender can be conceptualized as disparity.  
 
It is important to choose the adequate way of conceptualization, as this will condition 
the way of operationalization; referring to the way of measuring the diversity concept 
(Harrison and Klein, 2007). Each of the three conceptualization of diversity (variety, 
separation and dispersion), is matched with measures that fits the specific diversity 
concept, what it pretends to measure, and the way it can be done adequately. For 
example, ratios, percentages and the Blau index are measures that are adequate for 
measuring diversity as variety, standard deviation and the Euclidian distance are 
measures adequate for measuring diversity as separation, and the coefficient of variation 
is a diversity measure used to measure diversity as dispersion. (Tsui et al., 1992; 
Nielsen, 2010).  
 
When diversity on a demographic attribute is believed to positively benefit team 
performance as a result of an increased number of perspectives or task-relevant 
information, diversity is conceptualized as variety (Harrison and Klein, 2007). When in 
this study we look at the diversity of gender, tenure, education level and education 
background of board members, it is diversity as variety we intend to measure.  
 
Empirical studies of diversity concerning separate attributes. 
Tenure has been a widely used diversity attribute in board research (Kaczamarek et al., 
2012b; Tuggle et al., 2010). Tenure can be a source of information as different 
―generations‖ within the group may develop different perspectives through different 
experiences, however, such differences may also feed into subgroupings (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2004a). Tuggle et al., (2010) found that diversity in board tenure has 
a positive relationship with the attention paid to entrepreneurial issues. 
 
Functional and education background diversity has also been studied extensively inside 
and outside the board domain, and is the dimension of diversity most often associated 
with the informational benefits of diversity (Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007; Joshi and Roh, 
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2009). However, functional background diversity can also represent a basis for 
subgroupings (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a). The previously mentioned study of 
Tuggle et al., (2010) looked at the relation between functional background and the 
board‘s ability to discuss entrepreneurial issues and found a positive relation. 
 
Research on board gender diversity is abundant, and many studies argue that women 
directors on boards have an impact on firm financial performance  (Wellalage and 
Locke, 2013; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Smith, Smith and Verner, 2006; 
Carter, Simkins and Simpson 2003; Carter et al., 2010; Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 
2003; Singh, Vinnicombe and Johnson, 2001; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski and 
Atkins, 2010; Rose, 2007, Randøy, Oxelheim and Thomsen, 2006). Just as tenure and 
education-functional background, gender can also be associated with valuable 
differences in experience, information and perspectives, and form a basis for sub-
groupings (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a).  
 
A meta-analysis of the team-performance relationship realized recently (Bell, Villado, 
Lukasik, Belau and Briggs, 2011) studied a series of diversity attributes separately 
(functional background, education background, tenure, race, age and gender), 
conceptualized as variety, separation and disparity, and the effects of these diversity 
attributes upon team performance, team creativity and innovation. They found that 
functional background variety has a small positive relationship with general team 
performance as well as with team creativity and innovation, and that education 
background variety diversity was related to team creativity and innovation for teams in 
general, and to team performance for top management teams. They further found that 
tenure variety diversity (hardly ever conceptualized as such) was unrelated to team 
performance, although the mean tenure was related to team performance in terms of 
efficiency. Race and gender variety diversity had small negative relation to team 
performance, while age diversity had no effect on team performance.    
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2.5.2. Diversity patterns concerning interactions among multiple attributes 
 
In contrast to the above, the diversity patterns concerning interactions among multiple 
attributes take into account the simultaneous alignment of multiple diversity attributes 
across group members. These models base their predictions of processes and 
performance on the reasoning that the compositional dynamics of multiple attributes has 
a greater effect on processes than separate individual attributes (Lau and Murnighan, 
1998; Thatcher et al., 2003). One such diversity pattern is the faultline model (Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998), which will be explained in more detail later.  
 
In the organizational, sociological and social psychological literature diversity patterns 
concerning interactions among multiple attributes has produced four main lines of 
research; group faultlines (Lau and Murnighan, 1998), factional groups (Hambrick, Li, 
Xin and Tsu,  2001; Li and Hambrick, 2005), multiform heterogeneity (Blau, 1977) and 
cross-categorization (Brewer, 2000).  
 
Table 2.2. Four main lines of research on diversity patterns concerning interactions 
among multiple attributes. 
  
Faultline researchers base their predictions of work-group processes on the argument 
that the compositional dynamics of multiple attributes and their alignment have a 
greater effect upon work-group processes and outcomes than separate demographic 
attributes (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; Thatcher et al., 2003). Faultline theory is 
probably the alignment theory with highest impact and application in recent diversity 
research.  
 
―Factional groups are groups where the members are representatives or delegates from a 
small number (often just two) of social entities, and are aware of, and find salience in 
Alignment theories
Theoretical basis Group Factional Multiform Cross-
faultlines groups heterogenity categorization
Disciplinary foundation Organizational Organizational Sociology Social 
Behavior Behavior Psychological
Focal unit Demographic Demographic Parameters of Social 
characteristics dimensions social structure identity
Source: Jehn, Bezrukova and Thatcher (2007)
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their delegate status‖ (Li and Hambrick, 2005:794). In order to illustrate what exactly 
are factional groups, consider the example of a board of a family-owned company, 
consisting of members from the owner family and members from management (who are 
not part of the family). On this board two factional groups will exist, as members 
perceive they are either representatives of the family or of the management, and they are 
aware of this fact. Another example of factional groups are executive and non-executive 
directors on the board. Both types of directors come as delegates of specific interest 
groups, and could therefore be considered as belonging to pre-existing factional groups. 
In both these cases a pre-existing faultline exists, as the representatives (or delegates) 
identify with the group they ―represent‖, providing them social identity and 
categorization. This separates the group into two different factions where a faction is 
relatively homogeneous, or tightly clustered around its own central tendency (Hambrick 
et al., 2001; Li and Hambrick, 2005). 
 
The main difference between factional groups and faultlines is that in factional groups 
the members represent a small number of social entities, and that a pre-existing dividing 
line already exists between the members of these social entities, based on their salient 
―delegate status‖. Factional group theorists (Hambrick et al., 2001; Li and Hambrick, 
2005) argue that in factional groups, a compositional split along multiple attributes 
(e.g., gender, age and tenure) may accentuate managerial coalitions and influence group 
functioning.  
 
Multiform heterogeneity is rooted in sociological tradition and stresses the importance 
of focusing on multiple parameters of social structure. This refers to overlapping groups 
and subgroups generated by different diversity attributes (Blau, 1977). Highly 
correlated parameters strengthen in-group bonds and reinforce group barriers, whereas 
low correlation between them indicates the intersection of parameters, and promotes 
cross-over integration among all members. 
 
The cross-categorization model (Sawyer et al., 2006) refers to situations whereby 
diversity attributes are not so clearly distinguishable across subgroup, and where the 
presence of even one similar attribute across all subgroups acts as a mechanism for 
bridging inter-subgroup differences. As an example consider a board with three younger 
female directors and five older male directors. There is a clear faultline aligning gender 
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and age on the board. However, all board members graduated from the same 
engineering school, and so the education background serve as a bridging attributes for 
cross-categorization.  
 
It is important to understand the value of the diversity patterns concerning interactions 
among multiple attributes over and above the diversity patterns concerning separate 
attributes. If the inclusion of interacting attributes of diversity do not contribute to 
further understanding on how diversity affects group processes, there would be no 
reason to complicate the studies with these aligned and complex relations. 
 
The Faultline concept 
In 1998, Lau and Murnighan´ s seminal work proposed the concept of faultline to 
capture multi-attribute categorization. This concept contributes with insights about team 
diversity in two different ways:  
 
1. They focus on the alignment of multiple attributes and not just on one separate 
diversity attribute between members of a diverse group, and how this alignment 
can lead to the formation of subgroups.  
2. They propose that these subgroups affect overall group processes. 
 
The ideas behind group faultlines are analogous to geological faults. ―Faults‖ are 
fractures in the earth's crust which, without external forces, can be dormant for years 
without being observed from the surface. Following this simile group faultlines are 
defined as hypothetical dividing lines that split a work-group into relatively 
homogeneous subgroup based on group members‘ alignment along multiple diversity 
attributes (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lau and Murnighan, 1998, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 
2005).  
 
For the theoretical foundation of faultline theory in explaining the faultlines and the 
potential of subgroup formation, Lau and Murnighan (1998) used the theoretical 
dynamics of self-categorization (Turner, 1975, 1987; Turner et al., 1987), social identity 
(Tajfel, 1986), and similarity attraction (Byrne, 1971). Social categorization, typically 
based on easily detectable, social category diversity attributes, lead to in-group and out-
group categorizations (Webber and Donahue, 2001). Lau and Murnighan (1998) 
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proposed the concept of faultlines to capture multi-characteristic categorization, which 
makes the subgroup division stronger, as more attributes are aligned for division. This 
concept allows predictions about subgroup dynamics that cannot be generated by 
focusing on lone characteristics describing group heterogeneity. 
 
Consistent with the initial studies on diversity, the first studies of faultlines focused on 
diversity attributes like tenure, functional background, education background, gender, 
age, race, and nationality (Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Shaw, 2004; Thatcher et al., 
2003). As in dispersion research, some studies distinguished between faultlines based 
on social category diversity (e.g. race, gender, age) and informational diversity (e.g., 
function, education background, tenure) (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Molleman, 2005; 
Zimmermann, 2011). 
 
According to Thatcher and Patel´s (2012) meta-analysis of group faultlines, the most 
commonly used attributes in faultline composition are age, education background, 
gender, race, functional background and tenure. One of the issues brought up by this 
meta-analysis, and which was not defined by Lau and Murnighan (1998), was attribute 
alignment clarity. Thatcher and Patel (2012) suggest that attribute alignment clarity is 
the extent to which alignment on a particular attribute is unambiguous, for example 
what occurs with the attribute of gender; all group members are either male or female.  
 
There are also some studies involving faultlines based on other attributes such as 
personality characteristics or types (Gratton, Voigt and Erickson, 2007; Molleman, 
2005), work location (Gratton et al., 2007; Polzer et al., 2006) and the level of 
―familiness‖ in family-owned firms (Minichilli, Corbetta and MacMillan, 2010), 
however these studies are less frequent. 
 
As faultlines are focused on the simultaneous alignment of different diversity attributes, 
it is possible to investigate and combine the alignment of different diversity attributes at 
the same time, being the diversity of a social or informational nature. In spite of the fact 
that many studies have combined different diversity attributes in faultline studies, no 
proof has been found of any combination of diversity attributes producing stronger 
faultline effects than others. As an example of this, consider a faultline based on gender 
aligned with education background, and a faultline based on gender aligned with age. 
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As no conclusion from research report that one faultline produce stronger effects than 
the other, one cannot draw any conclusions about which combination of diversity 
attributes creates the stronger faultline effects (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). Although the 
faultline theory is based on some of the same theoretical foundations as the rest of the 
diversity literature, the measure of faultlines and its conceptual emphasis on the 
formation of subgroups enable us to gain a better understanding of the group, its context 
and the influences on group processes and outcomes.  
 
Let us go back to the previous example of board A and B: 
Board A is composed of two male members with secondary schooling and high board 
tenure, and two female members with PhD and low tenure.  
Board B has one male member with secondary schooling and low tenure, one male 
member with PhD and high tenure, one female member with PhD and low tenure, and 
one female member with secondary schooling and high tenure. 
 
As seen earlier, in terms of overall diversity and variety, both boards score the same; 
both boards consist of two members with secondary schooling, two members with PhD, 
two females, two males, two members with high tenure and two membes with low 
tenure. However, the distribution of the diversity attributes differ between board A and 
B.  
 
We can observe that board A has a strong faultline that board B does not have, as the 
alignment of the diversity attributes of gender, education and tenure on board A create 
two relatively homogenous subgroups. In order to illustrate this, please see the below 
figure.  
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Figure 2.2. Faultline strength. 
 
Source: Thatcher and Patel (2011)  
 
Board members have multiple identity structures (e.g., gender, education, age, tenure); 
depending on the similarity and the salience of board members' attributes, boards of 
directors may therefore have many potential faultlines, each of which may activate or 
increase the potential for particular subgroups. Furthermore, individuals have certain 
self-concepts and identity motives that lead them to identify with particular groups of 
people. Gender is considered to be one of the most common trigger for faultline division 
and subgroup formation (Thatcher and Patel, 2011).  
 
In this dissertation, analyzing gender diverse boards, the potential for gender faultlines 
will be studied. The attributes included in the study in combination with gender, are 
tenure, education level (the level of studies achieved) and education background (the 
mayor of the university degree (in those cases where the board member have university 
studies)).  
 
Measure of faultlines 
Just as diversity can vary within a team, so can its faultlines. In previous research 
faultlines have either been empirically inferred or created in lab settings. In lab settings, 
researchers create groups where there is an alignment of attributes based on individual 
diversity attributes. In these situations, the presence of faultlines is typically inferred 
through manipulation checks. In field settings, subjects cannot be assigned to groups by 
researchers; therefore, the measure of faultlines is empirically derived and results may 
be influenced by how faultlines are operationalized.  
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Following Lau and Murnighan‘s (1998, 2005) work, subsequent researchers have 
focused on developing different ways of measuring faultlines. The empirical approaches 
can be divided into two principal measures; faultline strength and faultline distance.  
 
The strength of faultlines is measured by the alignment of diversity attributes, making 
the faultline stronger when more attributes align themselves in the same way within 
their subgroup, thereby increasing the homogeneity of the resulting subgroup (Thatcher 
et al., 2003). As an extreme example, if a team has five young, white, male engineers 
who have worked for the company for less than a year, and five middle-aged, black, 
female BBAs who have been with the company for twenty years or more, the group's 
faultline measure would be extremely strong, because all of the listed attributes are 
perfectly correlated. The faultlines are weakest when attributes are not aligned and 
multiple subgroups can form.  
 
The strength of faultlines, then, depends on three compositional factors: (1) the number 
of individual attributes apparent to team members, (2) their alignment, and, as a 
consequence, (3) the number of potentially homogenous subgroups.  
 
Faultline distance was not part of Lau and Murnighan´s seminal work of 1998, and it is 
therefore logical that most faultline studies have focused on measuring faultline 
strength. However, recent researchers have incorporated the concept of faultline 
distance when measuring faultlines (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Zanutto, Bezrukova and 
Jehn, 2010).  
 
Faultline distance is the extent to which subgroups diverge as a result of accumulated 
differences between subgroups (Bezrukova et al., 2009) and reflects how far apart the 
subgroups are from each other. Faultline distance can be measured by the Euclidean 
distance between the two sets of averages. In order to illustrate this, please see below 
illustration. 
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Figure 2.3. Faultline distance. 
 
Source: Thatcher and Patel (2011)  
 
Groups may have multiple faultlines that remain dormant until they are activated (Lau 
and Murnighan, 1998; Pearsall et al., 2008). Dormant faultlines are potential or latent 
faultlines based on some set of attributes, which differ among members, but are not 
perceived within the group. Active faultlines are attributes, which exist, and are 
perceived by members as differentiating them into subgroups based on those sets of 
attributes.  
 
In order to illustrate the difference between active and dormant faultlines consider the 
example of a board consisting of eight members; four young women lawyers who are 
outside directors, three older women lawyers who are inside directors, and five older 
men engineers who are inside directors. This board has two possible faultline splits; (1) 
gender combined with education and (2) age combined with outsider/insider status on 
the board. However, faultline is not activated, as board members are not aware of, or do 
not find salient the attributes that could stimulate subgrouping. One day the board 
engages in a hot discussion about an expensive pension policy for the top management 
of the company. This acts as a faultline trigger creating two different subgroups, one of 
outside directors and the other of inside directors, and the dormant faultline has become 
activated. 
 
Faultlines that are dormant may thus become active via a ―faultline trigger‖; an event or 
a situation that turns a previously dormant faultline into an active faultline (Rink and 
Jehn, 2010). A recent multi-country, multi-organization qualitative study by Chrobot-
Education
Gender
Education
Tenure
FemaleMale
PhD
Master s 
Degree
34
Male
Secondary
school
10
Female
PhD
2
Board B: Low faultline distanceBoard A: High faultline distance
Tenure
Gender
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Mason, Ruderman, Weber and Ernst (2009) found that most faultline triggers could be 
described as one of the following types; differential treatment, different values, 
assimilation, insult or humiliating action, or simple contact.  
 
Several empirical measures of faultlines have been proposed over the years, however no 
agreement on a universal measure has been reached. The different measures can be 
classified into variance decomposition approaches (Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003; Li 
and Hambrick, 2005), clustering approaches (Thatcher et al., 2003; Barkema and 
Shvyrkov, 2007; Bezrukova et al., 2009; Meyer and Glenz, 2013), and cross-
classification approaches (Shaw, 2004; Trezzini, 2008; van Knippenberg, Dawson, 
West and Homan, 2011). 
 
Table 2.3. Authors and faultline measures 
 
The Fau index of Thatcher et al., (2003) is one of the mostly used measure of faultline 
strength (for dormant faultlines). This index is based on a clustering approach and is 
used to measure the percentage variance explained by attribute alignment across the 
strongest group split.  
 
Among the different faultline researchers there is a lack of agreement upon the number 
of subgroups that can co-exist in a faultline setting. Thatcher et al.,‘s (2003) measure 
approach is designed to maximize faultline strength that exists when there are two 
subgroups in a group (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). Although much of the prior empirical 
and experimental work assumes two subgroups, Shaw (2004) and Trezzini (2008) 
Author(s) and Year Faultline measurement
Lau & Murnighan, 1998 Faultline strenght
Thatcher et.al., 2003 Clustering approaches 
Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007 Clustering approaches 
Bezrukova et. al.,  2009; Clustering approaches 
Meyer & Glenz, 2013 Clustering approaches 
Gibson & Vermeulen, 2003 Variance decomposition approaches
Li & Hambrick, 2005 Variance decomposition approaches
Shaw, 2004 Cross-classification approaches
Trezzini, 2008 Cross-classification approaches
van Knippenberg et. al., 2011 Cross-classification approaches
Source: Prepared by the author
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suggest that there could be multiple subgroups, and their approach allows for the 
presence of more than two subgroups. 
 
Empirical studies of faultlines 
Faultline research focuses on the effects of faultlines upon group performance and other 
group outcomes such as satisfaction, cohesion and commitment, and predicts that these 
effects goes beyond those predicted by diversity alone (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). The 
main proposal of faultline alignment is that, in a diverse group, members split into 
subgroups, based on social categorization, resulting in perceived ―in-group members ‖ 
and ―out-group members‖, which again influences the overall performance of the group. 
 
Research has shown that strong faultlines influence group performance in a negative 
way (Homan, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, van Knippenberg, Ilgen and van Kleef, 2008; 
Jehn and Bezrukova, 2010; Li and Hambrick, 2005; Thatcher et al., 2003; Zanutto et al., 
2010). Faultlines are found to cause increased intra-team conflict and group process 
losses, leading to decreased group performance (Li and Hambrick, 2005). As subgroups 
become more competitive with one another, time and energy are used to bridge the 
divisions created by faultlines, and less time and energy is spent on working towards the 
group‘s objectives (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Brewer, 1996; Halevy, 2008; Hornsey and 
Hogg, 1999). In this way communication difficulties prevent necessary knowledge 
exchange (Halevy, 2008; Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Sawyer et al., 2006). 
 
Lau and Murnighan (2005) found that the effectiveness of communication is dependent 
on the faultline strength. They wrote that ―the key underlying mechanism for these 
effects is likely to be communication; with strong faultlines, communication between 
subgroups can generate conflict, scorn, and/or poor performance; with weak faultlines, 
communication should facilitate performance‖ (Lau and Murnighan, 2005:646). They 
warned that exclusivity in subgroup communication fuels the tendency for activated 
faultlines to result in polarization, but communication between subgroups limits it.  
 
Strong faultlines have been found to have negative effects upon information-elaboration 
(Meyer et al., 2011), group functioning (Molleman, 2005), riskiness of decision-making 
(Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Rico et al., 2007), creativity (Pearsall et al., 2008) and 
group-level organizational citizenship behaviors (Choi and Sy, 2010). 
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However, most of these findings are drawn from research on student teams and 
experimental settings (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Homan et al., 2008; Molleman, 2005; 
Pearsall et al., 2008; Rico et al., 2007; Sawyer et al., 2006). Only recently has faultlines 
been applied to the studies of TMTs (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Georgakakis and 
Ruigrok, 2014; van Knippenberg, Dawson, West and Homan, 2011; Cooper, Patel and 
Thatcher, 2014) and boards of directors (Tuggle et al., 2010; Kaczamarek et al., 2012b; 
Veltrop, Hermes, Postma and De Haan, 2015).  
 
As examples of studies on board faultlines, Tuggle et al., (2010) found that boards with 
strong faultlines, in comparison to board with weak faultlines, presented behavioral 
disintegration and conflict, prohibiting the board to benefit from the variety of director 
attributes and perspectives, resulting in less attention to the discussion of 
entrepreneurial issues. Kaczamarek et al., (2012b) found that faultlines affected 
negatively the firm´s financial performance, and Veltrop et al., (2015) found that 
factional faultlines, based on gender, age and factional belonging, resulted in reduced 
perceived board effectiveness and reduced financial return on investment. 
 
Faultlines predict connection between members of the ―in-group‖ but negative relations 
towards the members of the ―out-group‖ (Hornsey and Hogg, 2000; Pickett and Brewer, 
2001). It is here that faultline division influence the level of information sharing and the 
internal processes of elaboration and decision-making of the board. Subgroups may 
engage in power struggles, with the objective of ―winning‖ instead of finding consensus 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). And even  though all board members have the same 
responsibility and are equally liable, some groups of board members may have more 
power than others, affecting inter-group relations (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Huse, 
Minichilli and Schøning, 2005). 
 
Chrobot-Mason et al., (2009) emphasize that increased salience of subgroup identities 
on boards makes power struggles and conflict among subgroups more likely to occur. 
As commented, gender diversity is considered to be one of the most common trigger for 
faultline division and subgroup formation, due to its faultline clarity and salience 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2011), thus leading to possible power conflicts between gender 
subgroups on the board. With faultlines and strong awareness of the ―out-group‖ on the 
board, individuals tend to assume an even greater ―in-group‖ homogeneity. As a result, 
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the identification with subgroups becomes more salient for board members than the 
identification with the board as a whole, to the detriment of the cohesiveness of the 
board. (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000). 
 
Relative subgroup sizes and/or a disparity in subgroup power generate a variety of 
group dynamics that affects the likelihood of its members voicing their opinions. 
Unbeknownst to the members of the powerful subgroups, a seemingly smooth board 
process may mask considerable relational conflict and disagreements. Larger subgroups 
tend to reduce the vocalization of minority opinions within the group, and to create 
infrequent, latent, and covert conflicts that, when they surface, last longer than members 
of the larger subgroup might expect (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). 
 
Studies investigating the link between faultlines and group satisfaction have found the 
relationship to be negative (Cronin, Bezrukova, Weingart and Tinsley, 2011; Jehn and 
Bezrukova, 2010; Rico et al., 2007; Zanutto et al., 2010). This is supported by Thatcher 
and Patel‘s (2012) meta-analysis, demonstrating that groups with strong faultlines have 
lower levels of group satisfaction than groups with weak faultlines. In groups with 
strong faultlines, members will have pleasant interactions with the members of their 
own ―in-group‖ (Jehn and Bezrukova, 2010; Stevenson et al., 1985), but experience an 
increase in conflict and distrust towards the ―out-groups‖ (Choi and Sy, 2010; Greer and 
Jehn, 2007; Hogg et al., 1990; Homan et al., 2007; Pearsall et al., 2008).  
 
Some studies have investigated the link between faultlines and different types of 
conflicts (relational, task and process conflicts) and found positive and significant 
relationships (Bezrukova, Thatcher and Jehn, 2007; Li and Hambrick, 2005; Pearsall et 
al., 2008; Polzer et al., 2006; Thatcher et al., 2003; Zanutto et al., 2010). Faultline 
strength is found to be positively correlated with all conflict types, and negatively 
correlated with group performance and satisfaction Faultline distance also reflects 
negatively on group performance and satisfaction (Thatcher and Patel, 2012).  
 
Overall, empirical studies on faultlines reflect that faultline strength and distance tend to 
have negative effects on group outcomes, as corroborated by Thatcher and Patel´s 
(2012) quantitative aggregation results demonstrating that faultline strength and 
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faultline distance have significant effects on group outcomes above and beyond the 
effects of group diversity. 
 
With the objective of further understanding the faultline antecedents and implications, 
subsequent research on faultlines draw on the categorization-elaboration model (CEM), 
the optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT), the cross-categorization model and the 
distance theories (social, psychological and cultural distance). These theories have all 
been used to emphasize the relevance of intra-subgroup solidarity and inter-subgroup 
differentiation, crucial to the faultline concept. 
 
Table 2.4. Subsequent theoretical research on faultlines. 
 
 
2.6. CATEGORIZATION-ELABORATION MODEL (CEM) 
 
Over the years diversity researchers have not been fully able to explain the inconsistent 
findings of the effects of diversity on work-group performance. They have typically 
focused on either the information/decision-making processes or the social categorization 
processes. In an attempt to integrate both the positive as well as the negative effects of 
Theory or Model Description
Categorization-Elaboration Model The elaboration of task-relevant information is the primary process underlying 
the positive effects of diversity. Social categorization processes and
intergroup bias undermine these effects.
Optimal distinctiveness theory Describes the tendency to seek a balance of uniqueness and similarity
Social, psychological, and         
cultural distance theories 
Explain that the degree of distance (or difference) between subgroup has an
impact on group outcomes 
Cross-categorization model Cross-categorization refers to a situation whereby diversity attributes that is
not clearly distinguishable across subgroups works to reduce the strength of
the faultline alignment
Social network and social 
cohesion 
Network theorists suggest that people with similar demographic attributes
tend to socialize together
Source: Prepared by the author
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diversity, van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) introduced the Categorization-Elaboration 
Model (CEM), suggesting that the two processes interact.  
 
The CEM has been chosen for this study for various reasons. The principal reason is 
that the underlying idea of the CEM, that diversity engenders elaboration of task-
relevant information that benefit performance, matches our value-in-gender-diversity-
on-boards-proposition. Furthermore, the CEM considers both positive and negative 
effects of diversity occurring simultaneously, and integrate the two diversity 
perspectives (information/decision-making and the social categorization), thus 
representing a more realistic and holistic vision of diversity and its effects. It further 
introduces a series of moderating factors to the relation diversity-elaboration processes, 
and the relation diversity-social categorization processes, and demonstrate through this, 
the very complex reality of work-groups. Finally, intergroup bias, according to CEM, 
constitute the principal cause for the negative effects of social categorization, an 
argument that seems interesting when analyzing women on boards. 
 
2.6.1. Theoretical foundation of the CEM 
 
Van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose that the primary process underlying the 
positive effects of diversity on group performance lies in the process of elaboration of 
task-relevant information, defined in their work as the exchange of information and 
perspectives, the individual-level processing of the information and perspectives, the 
process of feeding back the results of this individual-level processing into the group, 
and the discussion and integration of its implications. 
 
They argue that previous researchers have paid insufficient attention to information 
processing. For the CEM authors, it is this process that may be engendered by work-
group diversity, leading diverse groups to outperform more homogeneous groups. Van 
Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose three main moderators of the relationship between 
diversity and elaboration processes, pretending to explain when diversity is more likely 
to engender elaboration of task-relevant information and benefit performance. These 
moderators are task-requirement, task motivation and task ability. 
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The first moderator of the relation diversity and elaboration processes is task 
requirement. It is considered that the diversity in member´s composition per se is not 
sufficient to lead to a superior performance. Diversity is related to superior performance 
in that the exposure to more diverse information and perspectives favor the process of 
elaboration of task-relevant information, which in turn, leads to more thorough and 
creative elaboration, problem solving, analysis and decision-making. Complex and non-
routine tasks, involving this elaboration processing is expected to invite more elaborate 
information processing in the first place (Stewart and Barrick, 2000), setting the stage 
for the potentially positive effects of diversity of information and perspectives. In 
contrast, there appears little reason to expect that simple and routine tasks (e.g., 
repetitive production tasks) require extensive information processing and decision-
making. 
 
The second moderator of the relation diversity and elaboration processes is group 
members´ task motivation. Van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) suggest that diversity is 
more likely to engender elaboration of task-relevant information and benefit 
performance when group member task motivation is high rather than low.   
 
The third moderator of the relation diversity and elaboration processes is group 
members´ task ability, and as above the CEM authors suggest that diversity is more 
likely to engender elaboration of task-relevant information and benefit performance 
when group members´ task ability is high rather than low (van Knippenberg et al., 
2004a). 
 
In previous diversity research, as studies on information/decision-making perspective 
and social categorization perspective have largely developed along separate lines, little 
theoretical work has analyzed how the social categorization processes affect the 
principal value of diversity which comes alive through the elaboration processes. Van 
Knippenberg et al., (2004a) identify these social categorization processes not only 
undesirable in themselves, but also disrupting to the valuable processes of elaboration 
and decision-making integrating in this way both perspectives.   
 
Van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) also argue that diversity research too often has worked 
from a somewhat oversimplified conceptualization of social categorization. This has led 
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to a reduced understanding of important moderators of the relation between diversity 
and social categorization, and between social categorization and its negative 
consequences upon group processes. The CEM´s focus on moderators is important not 
only to identify when diversity may be expected to have positive or negative effects, but 
also because it is informative about the processes underlying work-group diversity (i.e., 
moderator effects observed may corroborate conclusions about the processes in 
operation).  
 
Social categorization, as previously explained, is rooted in the theories of social identity 
(Tajfel, 1986; Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Capozza and Brown, 2000), self-categorization 
(Turner, 1975, 1987) and similarity-attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971; Byrne and 
Neuman, 1992). Diversity research has typically pointed to the negative effects of social 
categorization processes dividing a group into two or more subgroups, distinguishing 
between in-groups as ―us‖ and out-groups as ―them‖. However, within one same group 
there might be many potential bases for such distinction between ―us-versus-them‖, for 
example men vs. women, old vs. young, inside vs. external, engineers vs. lawyers etc. 
Not all of these potential categorizations do necessarily make the same sense for an 
individual in a particular situation, under a particular circumstance.  
 
An important issue in this study, as well as for other faultline studies, is therefore to 
determine which attributes have more subjective meaning to a board member, or in 
other words, which attributes are more ―salient‖, meaning more likely to evoke in a 
board member the view of oneself versus others. This question is important for our 
understanding of the diversity effects upon the board, as it indicates the probability of 
the surging of a social categorization process, based upon a certain diversity attribute, 
considered relevant for the board members. 
 
Building on theory and research in social categorization, Knippenberg et al., (2004) 
propose that the extent to which a specific diversity attribute make subjective sense to 
group members, and therefore engender social categorization, is contingent on three 
moderating factors: comparative fit, normative fit, and cognitive accessibility of the 
categorization (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987). 
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The first moderator upon the relation diversity-social categorization is comparative fit. 
This refers to the extent to which the social categorization provides a good reflection of 
similarities and differences between people, and as a consequence of this, yields 
subgroups with high intragroup similarity and high intergroup differences. The more a 
categorization results in subgroups with high within-category-similarity and high 
between-category-differences, the higher is its comparative fit, and the more likely the 
social categorization is to be salient.  
 
The faultline model pretends to measure this comparative fit by determining the 
alignment of multiple diversity attributes between group members, thus establishing the 
intragroup similarity and the intergroup differences interacting in determining the 
salience of social categorizations (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). When people differ on 
more than one attribute, differences may either be correlated or unrelated. When 
differences correlate (all the male members on the board are engineers, while all the 
female board members are lawyers), social categorization (male engineers vs. female 
lawyers) is more likely to occur than when differences along the diversity attributes 
cross-cut each other (engineers and lawyers are equally likely to be either male or 
female) (Homan and van Knippenberg, 2003).  
 
The second moderator upon the relation diversity-social categorization is normative fit. 
This refers to the extent to which this categorization makes sense within an individuals‘ 
subjective frame of reference; his or her beliefs, expectations, and stereotypes (Turner et 
al., 1987). The more an individual believes that within a given context differences along 
a certain diversity attribute are meaningful, the more salient the categorization based 
upon these differences will be. This is important to understand, as not all diversity 
attributes have the same importance. Consider as an example the diversity attributes of 
gender and body length; the first (gender) seems important as societal gender 
stereotypes tend to give subjective meaning to a gender categorization (Pearsall et al., 
2008), while the latter (body length) seems meaningless in most organizational contexts, 
even though it capture differences between group members equally well as gender; i.e. 
given similar comparative fit. 
 
In line with this view, van Knippenberg, Haslam and Platow (2007) proposed that the 
extent to which group identification is affected by diversity on a particular diversity 
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attribute is contingent on the belief about the extent to which this attribute is relevant to 
the task at hand (has normative fit). They found that it is not difference per se but rather 
the belief that a difference is meaningful that leads diversity to affect the categorization 
processes.  
 
The third moderator upon the relation diversity-social categorization is cognitive 
accessibility. This refers to the readiness with which the categorization comes to mind 
(men vs. women, old vs young), and the likelihood of the perceiver to use the 
categorization. Accessibility depends on earlier experience, beliefs and expectations, but 
also on contextual factors (van Knippenberg and van Ginkel, 2010). 
 
Well-learned social categorizations that people have used throughout their lives, 
(gender, age and race) should therefore be more accessible than non-obvious 
categorizations (Fiske, 1998). In this respect, the concept of self-schema supports the 
cognitive accessibility of categorization. Self-schema is an individual‘s psychological 
construction of self. Gender is one of the most commonly used attribute for the 
definition of self-schemas. Gender self-schemas are developed from childhood and 
serve as mental models through which information is processed. Female gender self-
schemas are largely based on roles, norms, values and beliefs held about women such as 
homemaker, affiliation to others, nurturance, deference, and abasement (Konrad, Ritchie 
and Corrigal, 2000). 
 
Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) proposes that the salience of a social 
categorization requires that all three components, comparative fit, normative fit and 
cognitive accessibility exists and interacts;  the higher the comparative fit, the normative 
fit and the cognitive accessibility, the more likely a categorization is to be salient. 
 
In this study, in which gender is the primary diversity attribute, we assume, for the 
reasons described under normative fit and cognitive accessibility, that gender complies 
with both, thus fulfilling two of the required moderators of the relation diversity-social 
categorization. The third moderator, comparative fit, pretending to establish the inter-
group similarities and intergroup differences on boards between the female and the male 
subgroups, is one of the principal objects of this study, and will be analyzed using the 
faultline model. 
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Research in intergroup relations suggests that social categorization is the root of 
problematic intergroup relations. Van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) however, propose that 
it is not the social categorization in itself that disrupts the elaboration processes. Social 
categorization merely refers to the perceptual grouping of people (Turner et al., 1987), 
which is a condition for the formation of subgroups, however not necessarily sufficient 
to disrupt the group´s elaboration processes. The authors emphasize the importance of 
distinguishing between the two concepts of social categorization and intergroup bias. 
They argue that the potentially negative effects of diversity is more linked to intergroup 
bias between different group members, than to social categorization per se. The authors 
argue that only when there is a subjective reason to respond negatively to different 
attributes in other members in the group, for example, when different others are 
believed to pose a threat to effective group functioning or when individuals show more 
favorable responses to ―in-group members‖ than to ―out-group members‖ (Brewer, 
1979) - will social categorization disrupt group functioning. 
 
In order to understand the differentiation between the effects of social categorization 
and intergroup bias, consider the previous example of dormant versus active faultlines. 
In a board with twelve members, four are young women lawyers who are outside 
directors, three are older women lawyers who are inside directors, and five are older 
men engineers who are inside directors. Thus these diverse board members have various 
diversity attributes available for perceptual subgrouping of people - that is social 
categorization - based on gender, age, education and outsider/insider status on the 
board. However, as long as there is no subjective reason to respond negatively to the 
different attributes of the other members of the board, there is no disruption of the 
board´s processes. However the day the board engage in the hot discussion about the 
expensive pension policy for the top management of the company, an intergroup bias 
may emerge, as the inside directors feel threatened by the outside directors and vice 
versa. 
 
Brewer and Brown (1998) and Brown and Gaertner (2001) corroborate this as they 
point to the importance of distinguishing between the factors underlying social 
categorization, and the factors underlying intergroup bias. A key question then is under 
which conditions social categorizations make intergroup bias emerge.  
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Group memberships reflect on how individuals see the self (social identity). 
Accordingly, as individuals value a positive and distinctive self-image, group members 
also value a positive and distinctive group identity (Brewer, 1991; Hogg and Abrams, 
1988; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). As a result, intergroup bias is typically inspired by 
threats or challenges to the value or the distinctiveness of group identity (threats to the 
individuals‘ self-views in their group). In the absence of such threats or challenges, 
social categorization is less likely to result in intergroup bias (Branscombe, Ellemers, 
Spears and Doosje, 1999).  
 
Threats to the value of identity may take many different forms, but all share the fact that 
a favorable image of the group is perceived to be challenged. Such challenges may 
range from subtle social competition for status and prestige, outright derogation or 
discrimination of the group (Brewer and Brown, 1998), to unequal status of subgroups 
and competitive interdependence between subgroups (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2014).  
 
Centering on the issues related to women directors on boards of directors, intergroup 
bias is believed to threaten women directors‘ appointment to and influence on the board. 
Such bias may lead to the no-appointment of women to boards (Mateos De Cabo, 
Gimeno and Escot, 2011), thereby eliminating their potential contribution, and to a 
token or minority status, reducing women´s contribution and influence once on the 
board. In this line, society in general has traditionally associated positions of top 
management (like board members, presidents and CEOs) with stereotypic beliefs about 
gender, being this a sign of intergroup bias against women. Furthermore, on boards 
where both women and men are represented, intergroup biases can lead to activated 
faultlines and the formation of female and male subgroups, which again may lead to 
disruptive processes affecting the elaboration of task relevant information and finally 
affect performance. 
 
Following this line of argumentation, the low representation of women directors on 
board of directors is affected by the theories of social categorization and intergroup bias 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986;  Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Capozza and Brown, 2000; Turner, 
1975, 1987; Byrne, 1971; Byrne and Neuman, 1992), which argue that when board 
members (mainly men) make decisions about promotions to top management positions 
and board membership, they are influenced by the salience of their own gender identity, 
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combined with prejudice and bias against women, and tend to ―reproduce‖ the profiles 
already existing on the board, and favor candidates similar to themselves.  
 
Kanter (1977) in her analysis of a large Fortune 500 corporation, named such a 
preference "homo-social reproduction", and argued that the primary motivation for this 
was to minimize uncertainty, and one way of reducing uncertainty in the executive suite 
is to choose people who are similar to oneself. 
 
Finally, most diversity research has worked from the assumption that the elaboration 
processes and the social categorization processes are associated with particular 
typologies of diversity, namely informational diversity and social category diversity, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
 
However, van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose that diversity research abandon this 
attempt to explain the effects of diversity by differentiating between typologies of 
diversity. As seen earlier the distinction between social category diversity and 
informational diversity is not as clear as it seems in the first run. Social category 
differences can be integrated with informational differences and, as a result, elicit the 
positive effects implied in the information/decision-making perspective (Cox et al.,  
1991), as well as informational differences can give rise to social categorization 
processes (Homan and van Knippenberg, 2003). Following this reasoning, van 
Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose that all dimensions of diversity may elicit social 
categorization processes as well as information/decision-making processes, as all 
dimensions of diversity in principle both provide a basis for differentiation and may be 
associated with differences in task-relevant information and perspectives (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2004a). 
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Figure 2.4. The Categorization-Elaboration Model (CEM) 
 
 
Source: Van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) 
 
The CEM integrates the information/decision-making perspective, represented by the 
relation: 
Diversity - Elaboration of task-relevant information & perspectives - Performance  
 
and the social-categorization perspective, represented by the relation:  
Diversity - Social categorization - Intergroup bias - Relational conflict - Elaboration of 
task-relevant information & perspectives - Performance. 
 
The model also reflects the moderators of the relation Diversity - Elaboration of task-
relevant information & perspectives, which are Task Requirements, Task Motivation 
and Task Ability, and the moderators of the relation Diversity - Social categorization, 
which are Comparative fit, Normative fit and Cognitive accessibility.  
 
The CEM is a highly complex model with numerous variables, some of which are very 
difficult to measure. 
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2.6.2. Argumentation for a dissertation model based on the CEM 
 
We have built our dissertation model upon the CEM due to various considerations. The 
first considerations are of a more generic nature, and refers to the general advantages 
observed in the model: 
 
1. The underlying idea of the CEM is that diversity engenders elaboration of task-
relevant information that benefit performance. This underlying idea grants 
diversity a positive value, which is in line with our fundamental belief that 
diversity is positive, and our value-in-board-gender-diversity proposition. 
2. Further to the underlying idea of diversity as positive, the CEM fully accounts 
for both negative and positive effects of diversity. In considering these 
simultaneous  positive and negative effects, the CEM offer a much more holistic 
and credible way than most other diversity models, and a more plausible 
explanation to the earlier confusing and contracting results of diversity research.  
3. The CEM shows respect to previous diversity research developments by 
including both the information/decision-making and the social categorization 
perspectives into its model. It adds to earlier developments by showing how 
these two perspectives are inter-related and interact with each other, and in this 
way offers a broader understanding of both perspectives. 
4. The CEM introduces a series of moderating factors to the relation diversity-
elaboration processes, and the relation diversity-social categorization processes, 
and demonstrate through this the very complex reality of work-groups. This is 
fully in line with our thinking, as we have both seen and experienced the 
difficulties of working in diverse teams. 
 
The following considerations are of a more specific nature, and take into account the 
specific area of study and how the CEM model constitute an adequate base for 
developing our own model. 
 
5. One of the mayor contributions of the CEM is the focus on the elaboration of 
task relevant information as the principal process underlying the positive effects 
of diversity.  This is fully in line with our proposition, as we build our model 
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proposing that women directors on boards contribute to a more efficient 
elaboration and decision-making process leading to better overall performance. 
6. The CEM proposes that both dimensions of diversity (informational- and social 
category- diversity) can elicit both social categorization processes and 
information/decision-making processes. We believe that this is a more realistic 
way to consider the effects of diversity, than the theories proposing 
classifications in the line of informational diversity affects information/decision-
making processes and social category diversity affects social categorization 
processes. In this dissertation, studying gender diversity on boards, gender 
would, under restrictive classification, only be of social category contributing to 
social categorization processes. We do not believe that to be a reflection of 
reality, as women, contribute with social category as well as informational 
diversity, such as specific insights, skills and leadership behaviors. 
7. One of the CEM moderators of the relation diversity-elaboration of task-relevant 
information and perspectives is the task requirement. The CEM proposes that 
diversity in a work-group makes sense when the tasks of the group involves 
information procession, idea generation and high-quality decision-making. As 
this reflects the nature of board work, it is likely that board diversity engender 
elaboration that benefit performance. 
8. Intergroup bias, according to CEM, constitute the principal cause for the 
negative effects of social categorization, an argument that seems interesting 
when analyzing women  on boards, as it has been discussed that women board 
members suffer from being a minority, from gender stereotyping, from lower 
status values, and from male dominance; all leading to bias against women.  
 
Based on the above considerations we believe that the application of the CEM to our 
dissertation model will contribute to a broader and more sophisticated understanding of 
the information/decision-making processes, the social categorization processes and the 
intergroup bias related to gender diversity on boards, and their effects on the firm 
performance. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The principal proposition of this dissertation is that women directors add value to 
corporate boards.  
 
Building on the underlying idea of the CEM, that diversity engender elaboration of task-
relevant information that benefit performance, our main argument is that the different 
viewpoints, opinions, ideas, perspectives, information, knowledge, background, 
experience and links that women directors bring to the board contribute positively to the 
boards´ performance, and finally to the overall firm´s results.  
 
Furthermore, as the CEM focuses on the processes of the board; the elaboration- and the 
decision-making processes, thus emphasizing what goes on inside the boards, we 
include in our proposal, in addition to women´s diverse knowledge and information, 
their distinct contribution to the internal work-processes of the board, and their 
contribution due to their unique leadership style and behavior.  
 
However, recognizing the complexity of group-work with diverse members, we 
consider that the CEM´s way of taking into account both positive and negative effects 
of diversity is highly realistic for our proposal. The focus on moderating factors in 
explaining and recognizing the complex relation between diversity-performance, fully 
reflect our consent in that we also establish various moderating factors influencing this 
relation; being those (1) critical mass of women on boards, (2) overlap board tenure and 
(3) chair-board shared experience.  
 
Due to its faultline clarity and salience, gender diversity is considered to be one of the 
most common trigger for faultline division and subgroup formation (Thatcher and Patel, 
2012), we foresee the possible formation of faultline divisions into female and male 
subgroups on the board. Our faultline analysis, including the diversity attributes of 
gender, tenure, education level and education background, builds upon the CEM 
argument that both informational- and social category- diversity can elicit both social 
categorization processes and information/decision-making processes. Intergroup bias, 
according to CEM, is the main contributor to the negative effects of social 
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categorization and faultlines, and this seems like an interesting issue to explore taking 
into account women´s scarce participation on boards and their typical minority status. 
  
This chapter includes a review of the literature dedicated to the diverse contribution of 
women directors to corporate boards. It starts out with an introduction to previous board 
gender diversity research, and then goes on to review women directors‘ contribution to 
task-relevant information, to the internal processes of the board and to the specific board 
functions and tasks. Finally, and since women normally are minority on boards, the 
chapter include a description of the critical mass theory, a relation of the typical  
intergroup bias that threaten women‘s diversity contribution on boards, and a review of 
the possible effects of gender faultline formation.  
 
3.2. RESEARCH ON BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY  
 
Board diversity is defined as the ―variety in the composition of the members of the 
board‖ (Milliken and Martins, 1996) and it is broadly accepted that better corporate 
governance is achievable through broader and different range of experiences, 
perspectives, ideas and opinions, basically contributed through the diverse composition 
of the board members (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000).  
 
Within the general board diversity debate, gender diversity is one of the most studied 
diversity attribute. Research on women directors on corporate boards is situated within 
this broader literature, and the issues around female board members are getting 
increased attention (Daily, Certo and Dalton, 1999; Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009; 
Vinnicombe, Singh, Burke, Bilimoria and Huse, 2008).  
 
However, women directors remain a minority on corporate boards around the world, 
although in some countries, and in some industries and firms, the proportion of women 
directors has reached a better proportion (Brammer et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 2007). 
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Table 3.1. Percentage of Women Directors on European Boards 
 
 
Politicians and legislators in some countries have instituted quotas that require boards to 
include 30–50% of women (Terjesen et al., 2014). In other countries large institutional 
shareholders and corporate board rating systems seek to pressure companies to add 
diversity to the boardroom by rating positively diversity measures  (e.g., Institutional 
Shareholder Services; Thirty Percent Coalition) (Hillman, 2015). 
 
Norway was the first country in the world to pass a quota law, mandating that by 2008, 
40% of all public companies´ board directors should be women. At the time of this 
dissertation, the mean ratio of women directors included in our sample was 37.05%.  
 
Spain was the third European country (after Norway and Finland) to order the 
achievement of 40% women directors‘ level by 2016, a significant jump from the 5% 
level which prevailed in Spain at the time of the adoption of the law (2007).  However, 
the law is largely aspirational, and at the time of this dissertation, the mean ratio of 
women directors included in our sample was 12.65%.  
 
Spanish corporations typically follow the recommendations established in the ―Good 
governance code of listed companies‖ (CNMV, 2015), and in this code the 
Recommendation nº 14 states the following:  
  
Country Percentage of WOB
Belgium 16,7
Denmark 21,9
Finland 29,8
France 29,7
Germany 21,5
Italy 15
Netherlands 25,1
Norway 38
Spain 14,8
Sweeden 26,5
UK 21
Source: European Commision, Factsheet WOB, 2014
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The board of directors should approve a director selection policy that:  
a. Is concrete and verifiable;  
b. Ensures that appointment or re-election proposals are based on a prior analysis 
of the board‘s needs; and  
c. Favors a diversity of knowledge, experience and gender.  
 
The code indicates that the results of the prior analysis of the board´s needs should be 
recorded in the nomination committee‘s explanatory report, to be published when the 
general meeting is convened that will ratify the appointment and re-election of each 
director. Furthermore, the nomination policy should pursue the goal of having at least 
30% of total board positions occupied by women directors before the year 2020. The 
nomination committee should run an annual check on compliance with the nomination 
policy, and set out its findings in the Annual Corporate Governance Report.  
 
Reviewing previous research on gender diversity on corporate boards we find that such 
research has focused on: 
 
• The principle characteristics of women directors and their diversity attributes in 
respect to their male counterpart (Simpson, Carter and D´Souza, 2010; Singh 
and Vinnicombe, 2004; Virtanen, 2012; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Hillman, 
Cannella and Harris, 2002; Peterson and Philpot, 2007; Høygaard, 2002….) 
• The reasons for the low gender diversity on corporate boards (Burke, 1997; 
Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004….) 
• The women ratio on corporate boards in different countries (Burke, 1999; 
Sheridan and Milgate, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004….).  
• The predictors for women directors on boards (Burke, 2000; Gregoric, 
Oxelheim, Randøy and Thomsen, 2009; Hillman et al., 2007….).  
• The prerequisites women must fulfill to become a board candidate (Sheridan and 
Milgate, 2005; Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye, 2012a ….).  
• The impact of female representation on financial firm performance (Hillman, 
Harris, Cannella and Bellinger, 1998; Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 
2004; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter 
et al., 2010; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010……). 
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Further to this quantitative research, a few studies have addressed qualitative aspects, 
focusing on women directors‘ experiences, their perceptions and their role as board 
members (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997; Huse and Solberg, 2006). Accumulatively, the 
research suggests that the percentage of women directors on boards is growing, 
however, although women representation in top positions within business, politics and 
in organizations in general is increasing, corporate boards seem to be the one last 
bastion where women are having difficulties of being included. 
 
3.3. WOMEN DIRECTOR´S CONTRIBUTION TO TASK RELEVANT 
INFORMATION 
 
When referring to women´s contribution to task relevant information, one typically 
refers to the different viewpoints, opinions, ideas, perspectives, information, knowledge, 
background, experience and links women directors bring to the processes of 
information-elaboration and decision-making on the board.  
 
In this way women board members contribute with task relevant information which is 
necessary to fully examine complex issues of the board (Hillman et al., 2002). This lead 
to greater diversity of opinions and to more creative and innovative discussions on the 
board (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Gender is in this way 
associated not only with social differences, but also with informational differences, 
(Cox et al., 1991; Tsui and O‘Reilly, 1989). 
 
According to the upper echelon´s theory (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) gender can also 
be used as proxies for the more complex psychological dimensions of the directors´ 
personalities, and is therefore a representation of their cognitive biases, which in its 
turn, shape how directors understand the environment and its issues, as well as how they 
take decisions and solve problems, influencing the processes of elaboration with task-
relevant information and perspectives. 
 
A potential advantage of gender diverse boards over gender homogeneous boards lies 
therefore in the greater pool of task-relevant information that the female board members 
bring to the board, and the larger social networks which gives them better access to 
information and support for decisions (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).  
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Women directors´ board contribution can in this way be classified in personal 
characteristics, human capital (skills, competences, experience, business knowledge, 
and vision of industry, stakeholders and the general environment), and social capital 
(links, networks and relations) (Webber and Donahue, 2001).  
 
Many studies are concerned with the mapping of the specific personal and professional 
characteristics of women directors, some of these are shown in Table 3.2.  These try to 
demonstrate how women directors differ from their male counterparts. Some general 
conclusions have been drawn, but more so, specifics depending on the country, the 
industry and the company itself have been detected. 
 
Generally women directors are younger than male directors, are more independent 
(outside directors), have a higher level of academic preparation, and have more non-
traditional backgrounds compared to their male colleagues (Singh, Terjesen and 
Vinnicombe, 2008).  They are more likely to come from non-business backgrounds 
(Hillman et al., 2002), they rarely hold executive positions (Ruigrok, Peck and  
Tacheva, 2007), and those who do are seldom in a financial or an accounting function, 
but more frequently represent the ―soft‖ managerial issues, such as human resources, 
corporate social responsibility, marketing, advertisement etc. (Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria, 2006).  
 
Hence, women directors are likely to bring to the boardroom different backgrounds and 
experiences which have the potential to stimulate divergent thinking and enrich board 
decision-making (Burke, 1997). 
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Table 3.2. Principle characteristics of Women Directors on Corporate Boards 
 
 
Women directors` human capital (Becker, 1964) refers to the accumulative stock of 
education, skills and experience that an individual director bring to his or her 
organization. These can range from functional knowledge (marketing, finance, 
accounting, law, operations, IT, strategy etc.), to specific industry knowledge and 
experience (from industries like telecommunications, consumer goods, utilities, 
academic institutions, law firms, consulting, banking etc.), to familiarity with a specific 
event or a firm. Human capital affects what directors pay attention to, and how they 
frame their decisions (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). 
 
Women´s differential human capital enable women to make a different and valuable 
impact on strategic decision-making allowing boards to take better decisions (Westphal 
and Milton, 2000). Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000) and Mattis (2000) propose that 
women directors help foster competitive advantage by dealing effectively with 
Author(s) Study context Principal findings
Year
Simpson, et. al. US S&P's 1500 index WD are younger than MD (Male Directors)
2010 WD are more often outside directors than MD
WD are less likely to be CEO of the same company than MD
WD serve on the same number of additional boards as MD
Sealy et. al., UK FTSE 100 WD are younger than MD
2007 WD held more multiple-directorships than MD
Singh, et. al. UK FTSE 100 WD are more likely to have MBA degrees
2008 WD are more likely to have international experience 
Hillman, et. al. US Fortune 1000 WD more likely to have non-business background than MD
2002 WD are more likely to hold advanced degrees than MD
WD more likely to join boards at a faster rate than MD
Burgess & Tharenou US S&P's 1500 index WD have higher education level than MD
2002 WD are less employed in male-dominated hierarchies
WD have more years working with other women
WD have less mentor support than MD
Peterson & Philpot US Fortune 500 Inside WD are to a higher degree one of the founders 
2007 Inside WD are to a higher degree family member (in the
case of family-owned companies)
WD are as qualified than MD
WD come from various positions of power (public/
private/government, law firms, NGOs and academia)
Virtanen Finnish listed companies WD are younger than MD
2012 WD consider themselves o be more pro-team than MD
WD feel a higher need for more WD on boards
Hojgaard Danish listed companies WD have higher education level than MD
2002
Source: Prepared by the author
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diversity. They further see women directors as champions for change because they tend 
to be younger than their male counterparts, and are more open to relatively newer ideas 
and approaches to doing business. 
 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that the composition of the board and their 
accumulated human capital will affect the ability of the board to perform. The 
performance argument against board homogeneity is one of unused human capital and, 
by implication, reduced performance. If a segment of society‘s human capital is 
systematically excluded from board directorships, not because of talent, but because of 
gender, the company‘s board is suboptimal (Burke, 1997; Carver, 2002; Cassell, 2000). 
According to Burke (2000) there is not enough qualified male CEOs to go around. The 
continuing reliance on male CEOs results in lower quality men being appointed as the 
available pool of candidates shrinks. In addition, states Burke (2000), male CEOs 
serving on boards have indicated a variety of constraints on their ability to contribute, 
such as lack of expertise, little time for preparation and lack of information. Given this 
situation, Burke (2000) argues that it is necessary that the selection of board members 
go beyond the traditional search for male CEOs as candidates, and incorporate women 
directors to the board. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) further corroborate this argument in 
that they propose that corporate directors should be selected in order to maximize access 
to critical resources, such as skills, knowledge and experience, as well as influence and 
connections to external sources.  
 
A commonly held assumption of board selectors is that women lack adequate human 
capital for board positions (Burke 2000). Singh et al., (2008) dispelled this myth in their 
study of multiple human capital dimensions of new directors of the FTSE3 100 firms in 
the UK, finding that women are more likely to have MBA degrees and international 
experience. Studies by other researchers have corroborated these results, finding that 
women are equally, if not better qualified than men, based on professional background, 
occupation and directorships, although their tenure on corporate boards is shorter than 
men´s (Hillman et al.,  2002; Burke, 2000; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994).  
 
Women directors‘ combination of human capital assets might differ from traditional 
male combinations. However, regardless of the reality, several studies reveal that it is 
the perception of women that often represent a problem; for example, Mattis (2000) 
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cites a Catalyst 1993 survey in which CEOs told of their fear of appointing women to 
the board, believing that women were less qualified than men. In another study, CEOs 
reported concerns for appointing women who currently did not hold a directorship. 
However, they did not have the same concern when appointing men (Peterson and 
Philpot, 2007).  
 
Although Heilman and Haynes (2005) present evidence that prior work experience can 
counteract negative expectations of a woman‘s performance, women are, in a male 
dominated environment (Carli, 1999), presumed to be less competent than men (by both 
men and women).  So in order for a woman to be perceived as having equal ability as 
her male counterpart, she must provide more evidence of her ability (Biernat and 
Kobrynowicz, 1997).  
 
Women directors also differ in values from their male counterparts (Selby, 2000). A 
substantial body of research has revealed gender differences in values and attitudes 
(Eagly, 2005; Selby, 2000). Research has shown that men and women differ 
ideologically, especially in terms of women‘s greater compassion (Beutel and Marini, 
1995), and men‘s greater tolerance for ethical lapses (Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-
Schmidt and Koenig, 2004). Franke, Crown and Spake (1997) and Kennedy and Kray 
(2014) found strong differences in ethical behavior between women and men, and a 
meta-analysis by Franke et al., (1997) revealed that men were less likely to perceive 
specific business practices, such as insider trading, as unethical.  
 
Women are not only more ethical, but seem to spend more time going deeper into the 
issues than men (Knippen, 2014). By spending more time considering decisions, women 
are better able to foresee the possible consequences (Hillman, 2015). Hence, women 
directors joining predominantly male boards are likely to bring along different values 
and attitudes which may result in higher value diversity, thus increasing the level of 
debate and generation of alternatives in the board room. Such differences may also be 
crucial for the board‘s ability to steer corporate strategy and monitor management. As 
supporting this view, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that gender diverse boards are 
more effective in monitoring management.  
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Furthermore, from an information/decision-making perspective, diversity in values may 
bring a number of benefits to decision-making (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Harrison et al., 
2002). It helps enhance board decision-making by increasing the number of alternatives 
considered, the quality of ideas, and the different aspects of the issues at hand.  
 
Hillman et al.,‘s (2000) suggest that different types of directors will provide different 
beneficial resources to the firm. As a result, a more diverse board will provide more 
valuable resources, which would in turn produce better firm performance. One of the 
important resources referred to by the authors is women´s social capital; their 
professional networks, their ties to other firms, their links to the environment, their 
personal relationships and affiliations, and their social standing (Fondas, 2000; 
Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000). This social capital influences the advice that directors 
offer their corporations, which affects decision-making processes, and impacts the 
relationships within and outside the board.  
 
Having women directors on corporate boards facilitate the links between corporations 
and the civil society in ways appropriate for a society that is increasingly diverse, 
complex and gender sensitive (Sirianni and Friedland, 1995). As ―boards traditionally 
have been viewed as a homogenous group of elites who have similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds, hold degrees from the same schools, have similar educational and 
professional training, and, as a result, have very similar views about business practices‖ 
(Westphal and Milton. 2000: 366), boards need to modernize and adapt to the larger 
social context in which they are embedded. Adding women to the board represent such 
an adaption to the structure of the civil society, taking into account that women 
represent 50% of the world´s population, and that women now play a role in public 
administrations, academic institutions, organizations and private companies. Carpenter 
and Westphal (2001) further corroborate this arguing that boards need to examine how 
they can build better links reflecting the civil society. 
 
Women board directors serve as external links representing the company outward to 
external constituents, and serve as a two-way communication channel (Hillman et al., 
2007).  This idea is corroborated by the stakeholder theory that proposes the need to 
take into account the wider interests of the different groups of stakeholders as they 
might favor a higher degree of diversity (Hillman, Keim and Luce, 2001; Carter et al., 
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2003). One example is institutional investors who can compel companies to greater 
diversity (Gillan and Starks, 2000). In this line, Coffey and Fryxell (1991) in their 
study, found that many institutional investors have policies of investing only in firms 
with a commitment to gender representation. 
 
Women directors‘ social capital allows them to serve as links to other women in- and 
outside the organization representing their concerns and issues on the board (Mattis, 
1993). Where women occupy senior managerial positions, they have been found to 
focus more than men on the development and mentoring of their subordinates, 
encouraging them to reach their full potential, and rewarding them for good 
performance (Eagly et al., 2003).  
 
Another important contribution of women directors in terms of social capital is the link 
to consumers. It is critical for a firm to understand its culturally diverse customer base 
(Richard, 2000), and it is believed that a diverse board will better understand and 
develop corporate strategies for specific and culturally diverse markets (Amason, 1996; 
Arfken, Bellar and Helms, 2004).  
 
As women play a role in most consumer purchase decisions, scholars suggest that 
women should be represented on corporate boards of consumer goods as they would 
better represent the customer base (Wolfman, 2007). 
 
A final social capital many women directors bring to boards is their unique link to 
family considerations. Women, to a higher degree than men, consider the impact of their 
professional decisions on families and friends (Mainiero, 1994; Mainiero and Sullivan 
2005; Guillaume and Pochic, 2009), demonstrating in this way a higher consciousness 
for family issues.  
 
A final data on women directors, especially in boards of South European countries, is 
their family connection with the controlling shareholder. A recent study of publicly 
traded Italian companies found that 55% of all female board directors were family 
members, compared to only 20% in the case of the male directors (Bianco, Ciavarella 
and Signoretti, 2015).  
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3.4. WOMEN DIRECTORS´ CONTRIBUTION TO THE ELABORATION AND 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
3.4.1. Women directors´ distinct leadership behavior  
 
Just as women directors contribute with task relevant information, they also contribute 
with specific and unique leadership behavior. A crucial argument in favor of women 
directors on corporate boards lies in their distinct female leadership behavior, 
contributing to more efficient elaboration processes. 
 
However, as an underlying consideration, it must be stated that every woman is as 
different as every man, and that each and every leader will contribute in his or her own 
specific way, depending on his or her individual characteristics and circumstances. The 
argument of ―a standard diversity of women leaders‖ is therefore at least under debate, 
as there may be larger differences among women and among men, than the differences 
between some men and women (Arfken et al., 2004; McCabe, Ingram and Dato, 2006; 
Ruigrok et al., 2007).  
 
Another issue of debate, however not the objective of this study, is whether women 
directors modify their behaviors to male standards in order to avoid ―standing-out‖ in 
their leadership style; women learn what to do, and what not to do, in order to become 
an accepted member of the board. Some studies point in this direction when suggesting 
that women might act as conformists, and attempt to assimilate in a male-dominated 
board context, by suppressing any differences in opinions or attitudes (Huse, Nielsen 
and Hagen, 2009; Rose 2007).  
 
Sheridan and Milgate (2005) argue that women directors contribute unique skills, 
knowledge, and experience to their boards, but that their feminine attributes may be 
masked in boardroom cultures that do not allow expressive behaviors. This can lead to 
the board having female representation, but only masculine behaviors, losing the 
benefits of gender diversity.  
 
Berdahl and Anderson (2005) proposed that female managers are expected to be more 
likely to adopt men's preferences in leadership behavior than vice versa, since women 
Literature review: ―Value-in-board-gender-diversity-proposition‖ 
75 
 
are more able and motivated to do so. Again other studies provide evidence that women 
do assert in different positions, even on boards where there is one sole woman director 
(McInerney-Lacombe, Bilimoria and Salipante, 2008).  
 
Behavior refers to actions that are relevant to achieving goals, whereas outcomes are the 
consequences or results of performance behaviors. The differences in leadership 
behavior between women and men are to a large extent explained by the individual´s 
personality traits, motives, skills, and competencies (Yukl and Lepsinger, 2005), and 
not just by gender. Leadership behaviors will also depend on job characteristics, 
organizational design, and organizational culture. Organizational culture in turn is 
embedded in the societal culture, and there is ample evidence that societal culture has an 
impact on leadership behaviors (Smith, 2006). 
 
However, having stated these underlying considerations, without going into further 
discussion, the objective here is to explore whether there is an argument in favor of a 
specific contribution of women directors on corporate boards based on their unique and 
distinct leadership behavior.   
 
The gender differences perspectives (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; Eagly and 
Johnson, 1990) which focus on women´s distinct leadership style and behavior, offer an 
interesting contribution to this discussion. 
 
The gender differences perspective operate at the individual level. However it can also 
be applied in the context of boards in order to explain how board gender composition 
affects board effectiveness.  It can be expected that boards with higher ratios of women 
directors will have characteristics and behaviors typically associated with women 
leaders. Such arguments are in accordance with upper echelons theory, which postulates 
that individual backgrounds of executives influence strategic choices made by the entire 
top management team and thus affect team and firm level outcomes (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984).  
 
Research on female leadership has identified four aspects in which women seem to have 
a distinct management behavior than men, and therefore contribute in a different way; 
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consideration, participative management, effective treatment of conflict and reduced 
risk-taking. 
 
Consideration and initiating structure 
Leadership refers to the abilities of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable 
others to contribute towards the effectiveness and success of organizations of which 
they are members (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta, 2004). Although 
leadership can be conceptualized along various dimensions, much of their content can 
be captured using two constructs, consideration and initiating structure, originated in the 
Ohio State approach to leadership (Stogdill, 1963, 1977).  
 
Consideration refers to friendly and interpersonal supportive supervisory behavior 
(Yammarino, Dionne, Chun and Dansereau, 2005). Consideration is described as a 
leadership behavior that leaders apply to create a supportive environment of warmth, 
friendliness, and helpfulness. Being approachable, looking out for the welfare of the 
people, doing little things for subordinates, and giving advance notice of change are 
characteristics of considerate leadership behavior (House, 1971; Judge, Piccolo and 
Ilies, 2004).  
 
Initiating structure refers to task oriented and directive behavior (Yammarino et al., 
2005). This leadership behavior is demonstrated by an emphasis on assigning tasks, 
specifying procedures to be followed, clarifying expectations of subordinates, and 
scheduling work to be done (House, 1971). 
 
These two types of leadership behaviors are particularly relevant for the study of gender 
as people have stereotypes with respect to male and female leadership behavior (Eagly 
and Johnson, 1990). Men are perceived to be more forceful, dominant, and motivated to 
master their environment, and thus more inclined to use the initiating structure 
leadership behavior. In contrast, women are perceived to be more concerned with 
others, kinder, more helpful and understanding, and more inclined to use the 
consideration leadership behavior. 
 
In this same line, however using different terms, Nielsen and Huse (2010b), in their 
study of the contribution of women on boards described the differences in leadership 
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style in terms of agentic characteristics and communal characteristics. Agentic 
characteristics, which include being assertive, ambitious, aggressive, independent, self-
confident, daring, and competitive, are ascribed more strongly to men than to women. In 
work settings, agentic behavior might include speaking assertively, competing for 
attention, influencing others and making problem-focused suggestions. Communal 
characteristics, which are more strongly ascribed to women than to men, describe 
primarily a concern with the welfare of other people and being affectionate, helpful, 
kind, sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturing, and gentle. 
 
An explanation for these different behaviors, according to the gender differences 
perspectives, is that the leadership style of men and women is originated in the 
socialization processes, where individuals learn to conform to societal expectations 
about their gender role (Carless, 1998; Fagenson, 1990). Similarly, social role theory 
(Eagly, 2007) proposes that individuals behave in accordance with societal expectations 
about their gender role, and that this lead to the gender differences in their leadership 
behaviors. 
 
Although these stereotypes for men and women are rather strong (Glick, Lameiras, 
Fiske, Eckes, Masser and Volpato, 2004) and stable (Schein, 2007), there is limited 
support for these stereotypes in actual managerial behavior. In their 1990 review, Eagly 
and Johnson (1990) were not able to demonstrate the argument that men are more task 
oriented and that women are more relationship oriented. However, they did find, 
consistent with stereotype expectations, that women tend to adopt a more democratic or 
participative style, and a less autocratic or directive style than men. A review of the 
gender literature in 2000 by van Engen, van der Leeden and Willemsen (2001) 
confirmed these conclusions.  
 
In their study of gender ratios and male and female leadership, van Emmerik, Wendt 
and Euwema (2010) proposed the moderating role of gender ratio on the relationship 
between gender and leadership behaviors. Male managers in organizations with more 
female managers tended to engage less in initiating structure, whereas women 
managers‘ behavior was not associated with the existing gender ratio in an organization. 
Thus increasing the proportion of female managers seems to have an impact on 
perceived male leadership behaviors (less initiating structure by male managers). This 
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implies that indeed more ―feminine leadership behavior‖ is realized when more women 
are in managerial positions. With a higher degree of consideration one conclude that this 
reflects a more ―feminine approach‖.   
 
Interaction and participation 
The unique role of women on boards is often reflected in their highly participative 
management style (Pearce and Zahra, 1991) and in their more sensitive approach to 
people compared to their male colleagues (Bradshaw and Wicks, 2000). 
 
Based on surveys and interviews with female leaders, Rosener (1995) found that women 
exhibit an interactive leadership style that emphasizes inclusion. Specifically, women 
are found to encourage participation by soliciting input from others, share power and 
information by keeping open communication channels.  
 
In their study Gardiner and Tiggemann (1999) concluded that female managers are 
more oriented towards interpersonal leadership than man, however, only in female-
dominated industries. Gibson (1995) in a cross-cultural study in four countries, found 
that in all countries male managers emphasize more goal setting, whereas female 
managers focus more on interaction and facilitation. 
 
Eagly and Johnson (1990) found that women tended to be more democratic and 
participative, and less autocratic and directive compared to male leaders. Compared to 
male leaders, women are less hierarchical, more cooperative and collaborative, and 
more oriented towards enhancing the others‘ self-worth (Eagly et al., 2003; Book, 
2000). Such managerial behavior promote the sharing of task-relevant information 
(Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003), a key process underlying the positive effects of 
diversity (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a). Furthermore, in her most recent meta-study, 
Eagly (2007) shows small, systematic differences in male and female leadership 
behaviors; women  as more transformational and rewarding, while men use to a higher 
degree initiating structure, show more laissez-fair leadership, and pay more attention to 
mistakes made by subordinates.  
 
Finally, in their study in 2013, Bart and McQueen found that female directors were 
more likely to use a cooperative decision-making approach that results in fair decisions 
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when competing interests are at stake; in contrast, male directors were more likely to 
make ―decisions using rules, regulations and traditional ways of doing business or 
getting along‖ (2013: 97).   
 
Treatment of conflict 
Women are more likely to accept others‘ positions and contribute to the solution of 
conflicts. Hence, when potential for conflict arises, women may be able to avoid them 
based on their higher sensitivity and ability to resolve interpersonal and task-related 
disagreements. However, on the other side, women feel strongly about their underlying 
values, and are therefore more likely to raise their voice when issues discussed are in 
conflict with their values (Huse and Solberg, 2006). 
 
Risk-taking  
Women are generally considered to be more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy, 
2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). However, as the vast literature on gender and 
risk-taking has produced mixed findings, scholars have suggested that differences in 
risk propensity between women and men may depend upon the nature of the task 
involved (Bromiley and Curley, 1992; Maxfield, Sharpiro, Gupta and Hass, 2010) and 
the context (He, Inman and Mittal, 2007).  
 
Research has found that women are more risk averse than men in areas of physical 
health and safety (Harrant and Vaillant, 2008; Harris, Jenkins and Glaser, 2006). 
Studies of risk-taking behavior in investment and insurance decisions found that gender 
differences are more nuanced and depending on context (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; He 
et al., 2007; Holt and Laury, 2002).  
 
Bringing a more fine-grained approach to this line of research, some scholars (Fietze, 
Holst and Tobsch, 2009) have proposed that differences in risk-averseness between 
women and men might be the result of intolerance towards ambiguity, namely that 
women are more sensitive to uncertain situations (Fietze, Holst and Tobsch, 2011). 
Thus, men, compared to women, have a higher tendency to underestimate the 
probability of negative events occurring (Schubert, Gysler, Brown and Brachinger, 
1999). Because executives operate in highly complex, uncertain and competitive 
environments, how ambiguity is interpreted and acted upon, plays a major role in 
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strategic decision-making (Plambeck and Weber, 2010). Rost and Osterloh (2010) 
found that, under conditions of uncertainty, women engaged more in superior 
information processing than men. If women are more sensitive to ambiguities in the 
environment and engage in more information processing in such situations, they would 
be more mindful, deliberate and careful in making strategic decisions that might lead to 
legal complications for the firm (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005).  
 
With respect to strategic and managerial decision-making, the Davies Report (2011: 9), 
found that a gender-balanced board is more likely to pay attention to managing and 
controlling risk. Consistent with this view, Wilson and Altanlar (2009) found that 
having at least one female director on the board appeared to cut a company‘s chances of 
going bankrupt by 20%, and that having two or three female directors lowered the 
chances of bankruptcy even further.  
 
This negative correlation appears to hold well, irrespective of size, sector and 
ownership, for established companies as well as for newly incorporated companies. 
Similarly, studies following the 2008 financial crisis also suggest that upper 
managements with a higher women ratio engaged less in sub-prime loans (Muller-Kahle 
and Lewellyn, 2011) and relied less on TARP funds (Bansak, Graham and Zebedee, 
2011). 
 
3.4.2. Women directors´ distinct contribution to board´s internal work-processes  
 
The contribution of diverse task relevant information and skills (explained under point 
3.2 earlier in this chapter) are important inputs for performing board functions, but in 
itself it is not enough to ensure a better performance. In order for a board to benefit from 
diversity‘s potential, and finally reach superior performance, it must develop effective 
internal work-processes.  
 
Group effectiveness theory (Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Gladstein, 1984; Hackman, 1987; 
Pelled, 1996; Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998) presents a framework relating inputs, 
processes and outcomes, where inputs refer to individual., team and organizational 
characteristics, processes refers to information-elaboration and decision-making 
activities, and outcomes refers to performance.  
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Figure 3.1. Input-Process-Outcome Team Effectiveness Framework 
 
Source: Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp and Gilson, 2008 
 
Inputs englobe individual members´ characteristics as personality, values, knowledge 
and skills (Webber and Donahue, 2001; Harrison et al., 1998), team-level factors like 
functions, tasks, objectives, structure and influences, and organizational and contextual 
factors like organizational design and environmental complexity. These inputs together 
drive work-group processes toward task accomplishment. 
 
Processes describe how inputs are transformed into outcomes (Gist, Locke and Taylor, 
1987; Guzzo and Shea, 1992; Hackman, 1983). Good corporate governance is 
concerned with the processes through which the board fulfills its functions and executes 
its tasks, and focuses on the development of work systems and practices that ensure 
good performance (Cadbury Report (CFACG, 1992); Turnbull Report (Turnbull 
Committee, 1999).  
 
A number of empirical studies have confirmed that board processes are important 
factors influencing board performance (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; van Ees, van der 
Laan and Postma, 2008; Zona and Zattoni, 2007), and most researchers agree that the 
hypothesized links between composition and outcomes are mediated by these processes 
(Priem, Lyon and Dess, 1999; Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson and Jundt, 2005).   
 
Historically, group processes were categorized as either ―task work‖ or ―team work‖ 
(McIntyre and Salas, 1995).  Task work refers to the activities (functions) that the board 
must perform to accomplish the task, whereas teamwork describes the interaction and 
relations between the board members, including relational conflict management, 
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cohesion, confidence building, as well as affect-management (McIntyre and Salas, 
1995).  
 
Board processes are an important predictor of board effectiveness (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Petrovic, 2008). Although diversity has demonstrated to have both positive and 
negative consequences, the consensus seems to be that board discussions and analyses is 
improved with more women on corporate boards (Burke 1997; Daily et al., 1999; 
Hillman et al., 2007). The presence of women directors on boards increase board 
effectiveness through high quality board development activities (Nielsen and Huse, 
2010b).  
 
Board development activities refer to activities whose aim is to enhance efficient 
working systems through the establishment of rules and norms that support the boards‘ 
decision-making processes and mechanisms (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Huse, 2007). Such activities are identified as mediators that enhances 
group productivity (Gist et al., 1987), and are considered key elements for the 
successful performance of board tasks (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989).  
 
Women directors on boards contribute to the enhancement of board work through 
development activities related to board instructions, board evaluation, and board 
development programs. Prior research suggests that women and men differ in their 
expectations for their own behavior in organizational settings (Ely, 1995). In this same 
line, Fondas (2000), found that women directors have higher expectations of board task 
performance than their male colleagues. As such, women directors are more likely to 
commit to the development of board practices which will ensure the effective 
performance of board tasks. 
 
Burgess and Tharenou (2002) found that women directors brought about new ideas and 
strategic change, and contributed to long-term competitive advantage. They tend to ask 
more questions than men (Huse and Solberg, 2006), and add diverse ways of thinking 
into male-dominated boards (Bilimoria, 2000). In this same line, Hillman et al., (2007) 
found that the participation of women directors on boards generates a wider range of 
perspectives for information search. Women, not being part of the ―old-boys network‖, 
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are less subject to groupthink and add an independent voice to decision-making 
processes (Brennan and McCafferty, 1997), leading to better understanding and higher 
quality decisions (Amason, 1996).  
 
In their study Burgess and Tharenou (2002) also found that women executives ensured 
better board-room behavior, in line with Bilimoria (2000). Fondas and Sassalos (2000) 
who also found that women‘s board-room presence lead to more civilized behavior and 
sensitivity to other perspectives. Women are more socially oriented (Huse et al., 2009), 
and their presence light up the board-room atmosphere (Huse and Solberg, 2006).  
 
Finally women tend to be better prepared for board issues than men, and more 
egalitarian and caring in nature (Huse, 2007). Huse and Solberg (2006) suggest that 
women directors being less experienced in board work may spend more time preparing 
for board meetings, trying to understand the nature and logic of board work, devoting 
more time to board evaluation, and identify areas with potential for improvement. As a 
result, women directors are likely to enhance board development activities. They 
enhance the board‘s processes and performance in facilitating effective debate on 
governance issues (Fondas, 2000), and contribute by being more attentive to 
stakeholders, creating goodwill, and focusing top management attention to ―soft‖ issues 
and concerns (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997). Boards with a higher representation of 
women also encouraged a larger number of board meetings (Adams and Ferreira, 2004). 
These last authors also found that female directors have fewer attendance problems at 
board meetings, and that boards, with a higher ratio of women directors, tend to have a 
higher participation in decision-making, which again lead to higher effectiveness 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2004). 
 
Singh (2008) in her study of gendered boardroom cultures in engineering, high 
technology and scientific organizations, found that directors with experience of working 
with women directors found men to be more inclined to have political behavior. This 
seems to be tempered when women are present, partly because women want to get on 
with the task at hand rather than ―play games.‖ Other comments were that male-only-
groups can get carried away with the big agenda, and miss a lot of the detail that women 
would pick up on. Male directors confessed that in the presence of women directors, 
they change their language, become more civilized, and moderate their masculinity. 
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3.4.3. Board functions and the role of women directors 
 
As earlier included, a corporate board is generally believed to assume the following 
functions: 
 
1. The monitoring function  
2. The service and strategic function  
3. The resource provision function  
 
The monitoring function of the board 
Studies have shown that the participation of women on corporate boards benefit the 
board´s monitoring role in protecting shareholders‘ interests by better top management 
control (Watson et al., 1993; Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
found that women directors are more likely to sit on monitoring committees, are more 
likely to force CEO departures after poor stock price performance, and are therefore 
more likely to be tough monitors of CEOs. Corroborating with this, in their study of 
women´s contribution to corporate boards, Nielsen and Huse (2010b) found a relation 
between the women ratio and the performance of the board ´s monitoring function. 
Izraeli (2000) found that women directors seem to take their role as board directors 
seriously; preparing conscientiously for meetings and asking more questions, making it 
less likely for decisions to be nodded through. Women have higher expectations 
regarding their own responsibilities as directors, and therefore put higher emphasis on 
these tasks (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000).   
 
Since the recent scandals in corporations (Enron, Arthur Andersen, Lehman Brothers 
etc….), and the passing of the US Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 2002 and other movements, 
there has been a call for a higher percentage of outside directors, assumed as being more 
independent and therefore better monitors of the top management team (Carter et al., 
2003). The majority of the women directors are outside directors, hence responding to 
this call. 
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The service and strategy function of the board 
With respect to the board role of participation or advice to management on strategic 
issues, several process-focused studies have examined how cognitive processes in upper 
management decision-making change due to gender diversity. Hillman et al., (2007) 
showed how gender diversity generated a wider range of perspectives for information 
search available for strategic decision-making. Directors make decisions that are 
consistent with their cognitive bases (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and men and women 
have different ideas, beliefs, and perspectives (Pelled et al., 1999). 
 
Biggins (1999) stated that the main criterion for selecting board members was to 
enhance the board´s ability to contribute to strategic direction. The aim of introducing 
greater diversity into the board is therefore to better balance the skills and attributes that 
are needed for quality decision-making.  Board of directors with more women were 
more likely to identify criteria for measuring strategy, monitor its implementation, 
follow conflict of interest guidelines, and adhere to an ethical code of conduct (Brown, 
Brown and Anastasopoulos, 2002).  
 
Bilimoria (2000) suggests that women are particularly valued as board members for 
their ability to provide strategic input and generate more productive discourse. 
Moreover, women directors may ask questions more freely (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 
2000). As a result, women are more likely to question the conventional wisdom and 
speak up when concerned, or in doubt about an issue or a particular managerial decision 
(Bilimoria and Huse, 1997; Huse and Solberg, 2006). Furthermore, boards with women 
directors may experience different discussion patterns and increased debate, compared 
to boards with only men members.  
 
In an empirical study of corporate boards, Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that boards 
with a higher representation of women, characterized as participative boards, had more 
debates and disagreements, and were associated with higher perceived and objective 
firm performance. Letendre (2004) suggests that women board members provoke lively 
board-room discussions. Their different beliefs, values, and ways to express and 
communicate their opinions in the board-room, may therefore lead to in-depth and 
profound debates, and help address simultaneously different aspects of the issues at 
hand. Women directors with different values are more likely to consider counter-
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arguments regarding the decisions to be made, and they are more likely to question the 
conventional wisdom, and to speak up when concerned or in doubt about an issue or a 
particular managerial decision (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997; Huse and Solberg, 2006).  
 
Other studies of the behavior of women directors on boards found that women directors, 
more so than men, were prepared to push the ‗‗tough issues‘‘ in board discussions. This 
was also the case on boards with only one woman director, and this was reported by 
both men and women directors in two recent studies (Konrad et al., 2008; McInerney-
Lacombe et al., 2008).  
 
Gender diversity has also been found to facilitate creativity within groups (Hoffman and 
Maier, 1961; Nemeth, 1986), and as boards are engaged in non-routine problem solving, 
involving brainstorming and creativity, the questioning of the status quo is beneficial 
for strategic decisions. As women are not part of the ―old boys‘ network‖ they may be 
subject to less groupthinking, and add an independent voice to the decision-making 
process (Brennan and McCafferty, 1997). In turn, this leads to better understanding and 
formulation of more diverse product-market strategies and higher quality decisions 
(Amason, 1996). 
 
According to Welbourne, Cycyota and Ferrante (2007) the presence of women in upper 
management is positively associated with innovation and problem solving within firms. 
Bilimoria and Wheeler (2000) saw women directors as champions for change because 
they tend to be younger than their male counterparts, and they are more open to new 
ideas and approaches to doing business. Miller and Triana (2009) found a positive 
relation between board gender diversity and innovation. 
 
In her study of Finish board directors, Virtanen (2012) suggests that as women‘s 
backgrounds are different, women behave differently on boards than men. They focus 
on questioning the old rules seeking changes rather than consensus (Leblanc and Gillies, 
2005; Singh, 2008; Pesonen, Tienari and Vanhala, 2009).  
 
The resource provision function of the board 
Based on the resource dependence theory, it is argued that boards are appropriate 
mechanisms to attract external resources which are critical for the firm's success, 
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through the contribution of board directors with external networks and links to the 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and the participation of women directors 
provide these differential and important resources to the board. 
 
Their inclusion furthermore project an image to society as a ―modern‖ company, 
complying with good practices and social responsibility. This in turn build reputation 
and legitimacy among the different stakeholders of the company. Firms have a desire to 
have a good relation with its stakeholders, its customers, its labor force and with society 
in general, and highly visible and observable gender diversity on the board may send 
signals to the public which may be positively interpreted (Tsui et al., 1992), especially 
when this demographic characteristic is traditionally under-represented (Catalyst, 2011). 
 
Links and relations to the external environment is improved by corporate charity and 
philanthropic activities (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Brammer, Millington and 
Pavelin, 2009). A study of corporate social responsiveness orientation in SandP firms 
indicates that women directors are more oriented towards discretionary elements of 
corporate responsibility than men (who are more concerned about economic 
performance). The growing numbers of women directors on corporate boards have led 
to increased attention to social responsibility, charitable giving, and community 
relationships (Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998; Williams, 2003). A study of Fortune 500 
firms from 1991–94 also found a link between women on boards and the firm‘s 
charitable support of community and cultural activities (Williams, 2003). It is therefore 
argued that women directors are more likely to engage in reputation-building activities 
such as philanthropy and community-out-reach, and therefore more likely to improve a 
firm‘s reputation (Fombrun, 2004). 
 
With respect to the creation of legitimacy Cox et al., (1991) propose that the call for 
legitimacy has contributed to significant pressure on firms in order to include females 
on their boards. Legitimacy refers to the social acceptance stemming from adherence to 
a system‘s norms, values and rules (Hirsch and Andrews, 1984). The argument is based 
upon the belief that society today is concerned about equal opportunities for men and 
women, and that companies whose boards include women directors, transmit the 
system´s values, norms and rules, which in turn enhance the legitimacy of their 
organization. The legitimacy of a firm may therefore improve by its including women to 
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the board (Daily and Schwenk, 1996; Hambrick and D‘Aveni, 1992), thus, all other 
things being equal., gender diversity on boards adds legitimacy to an organization 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996). As an example of stakeholders pressure are institutional 
investors who increasingly scrutinize corporate boardrooms for diversity (Browder, 
1995; Singh, 2005).  
 
Another important link represented by women board members is the link to consumers. 
Board members who better reflect the corporation‘s consumer population have a better 
understanding of the consumers‘ needs and behavior, and will therefore make better 
strategic decisions about the company´s future (Arfken et al., 2004).  
 
From this point of view, scholars suggest that women should be represented on the 
corporate boards of consumer goods as women play a role in approximately 80% of 
consumer purchase decisions and, thus, women on the board would better represent the 
customer base (Wolfman, 2007). Daily et al., (1999) quoted Avon‘s CEO as stating, 
―Having women on the board just makes good sense‖ (1999: 94). 
 
Women directors‘ performance on board committees 
Some of the board´s tasks are performed by board committees. These committees 
perform a specific function within one of the six categories as suggested by Braiotta and 
Sommer (1987) and Bilimoria and Piderit (1994): 
 
1. The executive and/or strategic planning committees who often act as a surrogate 
for the full board in moments of crisis, subject to statutory limits or additional 
restraints imposed upon them by the full board. 
2. The nominating committees whose responsibility is to identify individuals 
qualified to become board members, consistent with the criteria approved by the 
board. This committee is often also responsible for corporate governance 
development, and for recommending a set of guidelines applicable to the 
corporation and for board functioning. 
3. The compensation committee whose responsibility is to review and approve 
corporate goals and objectives relevant to CEO compensation. This committee 
also evaluates the CEO‘s performance, and makes recommendations to the 
board with respect to non-CEO executive officers compensation. 
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4. The audit committee whose responsibility is to assists board´s oversight of the 
company‘s financial statements, compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements, the independent auditor‘s qualifications and independence, and the 
performance of the company‘s internal audit function. 
5. The financial committee whose responsibility is to review and recommend 
financing, dividend, investment, and risk management plans and policies. This 
committee maintains the relationship with the financial community. 
6. The public-policy committee whose responsibility is to review and oversee 
corporate plans and programs dealing with social issues such as community 
involvement, employee issues and government regulations, dealing with equal 
opportunity, the environment, or product safety. 
 
The participation on committees (audit, nomination, and remuneration committee) is 
likely to strengthen a directors‘ identification with the company, with the board, and 
with their role as a director. In addition, the committees create an opportunity for 
additional meetings and therefore socialization amongst board members. Participating 
on committees is recommended as a mean of reducing inter-group-bias as well as in-
group favoritism, and out-group discrimination (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and 
Terry, 2000). Women´s participation on board committees can therefore enhance their 
influence, not only through the actual assistance and decision-making of the committee, 
but also through the social processes that takes place in the committee´s meetings. 
Additionally, more female participation on committees can enhance more female 
directors on the board (Westphal and Milton, 2000). In their study of board committees 
they demonstrated that a minority board member on a committee was more likely to 
favor new board members who were similar to her/him. 
Most corporate policies are created in board committee meetings (Anderson and 
Anthony, 1986). Committees, in doing their work, meet separately and make 
recommendations for approval by the full board. Thus, meaningful policy input comes 
most frequently from the relevant committee members, rather than from board members 
who are not on the committee (Anderson and Anthony, 1986; Braiotta and Sommer, 
1987). One way to determine the involvement and influence of women directors on 
boards is therefore to examine committee membership, and compare assignments of 
male and female directors (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994).   
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Table 3.3. Summary of the principle findings relating women directors and boards. 
 
Author(s) and Year Findings
Women Director´s contribution to task relevant information
Milliken & Martins (1996); Wiersema& Bantel  (1992) Greater diversity of opinions, leading to more creative and innovative discussions.
Ancona & Caldwell (1992) Greater pool of task-relevant information, and broader social networks. 
Westphal & Milton (2000); Carter et. al, (2003); Fondas (2000) Different and valuable contributions, leading to better strategic decision-making.
Bilimoria & Wheeler (2000); Mattis (2000) Enhanced dealing with diversity and change. Greater openness to ideas and approaches. 
Beutel & Marini (1995) Greater compassion with people.
Eagly et al. (2004) Less tolerance for ethical lapses.
Knippen (2014) Higher quality decisions due to more preparation time and deeper analysis of issues. 
Hillman  (2015) Higher ability to foresee possible problems and consequences. 
Adams & Ferreira (2008) Higher efficiency in monitoring management. 
Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt & van Engen (2003) Better mentoring of subordinates, and focus on encouragement and reward. 
Mattis (1993); Mainiero & Sullivan (2005) Higher consciousness for women and family issues, representing these issues on the board
Women Directors´ contribution to the elaboration and decision-making process: Women´s distinct Leadership behaviors
Eagly & Johnson (1990); Nielsen & Huse (2000) Higher concern for people, more kind behavior, helpful and understanding.
Pearce & Zahra (1991), Eagly & Johnson (1990) More democratic and participative style of leadership.
Bradshaw & Wick (2000); Huse (2007) More sensitive approach to people. More egalitarian and caring in nature.
Rosener (1995) More interactive leadership, inclusion, input, giving information and power-sharing. 
Eagly et. al. (2003); Book (2000); Helgesen (1990) Less hierarchical, more cooperative and collaborative.
Eagly et. al (2003); Rosener (1995) More oriented towards enhancing others‘ self-worth. More transformational and rewarding. 
Huse & Solberg (2006) More likely to accept others‘ positions and contribute to different solutions. 
Harrant & Vaillant (2008); Harris, Jenkins & Glaser (2006) Higher risk averse in areas of physical health and safety. 
Fietze et. al. (2011); Littman-Wernli & Schubert (2001) More sensitive to uncertain situations.
Rost & Osterloh (2010) Under conditions of uncertainty, higher degree of superior information processing. 
Sheridan & Milgate (2005) More deliberate and careful analysis, being able to avoid legal complications. 
Wilson & Altanlar (2009) Contribute to lower probability of bankruptcy.
Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn (2011); Bansak et. al. (2011). Less engamement in sub-prime loans and TARP funds.
Women directors´ distinct contribution to board´ s internal work-processes 
Ely (1995); Fondas (2000) Higher engagement in board development activities and board evaluation.
Burgess & Tharenou (2002) More ideas for strategic change, leading to long-term competitive advantage. 
Huse & Solberg (2006) Higher tendency to ask more questions. 
Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella (2007) Wider range of perspectives for information search.
Brennan & McCafferty  (1997) Lower tendency for group-think, and higher independency in decision-making. 
Burgess & Tharenou (2002); Fondas & Sassalos (2000)  Better and more civilized board-room behavior, and sensitivity to different perspectives.
Huse & Solberg  (2006) More orientation towards social issues, and light up the board-room atmosphere. 
Huse (2007) More time for preparing board meetings, and better preparation of board issues.
Fondas (2000) Enhance effective debate on governance issues.
Bilimoria & Huse (1997) Higher attention to stakeholders and ―soft‖ issues and concerns.
Adams & Ferreira (2004) Encourage more board meetings, and have fewer attendance problems. 
Adams & Ferreira (2004) Higher degree of participation in decision-making, and higher effectiveness. 
Singh (2008) Less inclined to have political behavior.
Women directors´ distinct contribution  to board functions 
Watson et. al. (1993); Fondas & Sassalos (2000) Better protection of shareholders‘ interests by closer top management monitoring.
Adams & Ferreira (2009); Nielsen & Huse (2010) More likely to be tough monitors of CEOs, and higher attention to the monitoring function.
Fondas & Sassalos (2000)  Higher expectations regarding their own responsibilities as directors.
Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella (2007) Wider information search for enhanced strategic decision-making.
Bilimoria & Wheeler (2000); Letendre (2004) Ability to ask questions more freely, and provoke lively board-room discussions. 
Bilimoria & Huse (1997); Huse & Solberg  (2006) More likely to question the conventional wisdom and to speak up when concerned 
Konrad et. al. (2008); McInerney-Lacombe et. al. (2008). Better prepared to push ‗‗tough issues‘‘ in board discussions. 
Hoffman & Maier (1961); Nemeth (1986) Better ability to facilitate creativity within groups. 
Welbourne, Cycyota & Ferrante (2007) Enhance innovation and problem solving within firms.
Stanwick & Stanwick  (1998); Wang & Coffey (1992) Higher attention to social responsibility, charitable giving, and community relationships.
Williams (2003) Higher engagement in firm‘s charitable support of community and cultural activities.
Fombrun  (2004) More engagement in reputation-building activities, philanthropy and community out-reach.
Sirianni & Friedland (1995) Represent links between firms and a society that is diverse, complex and gender sensitive.
Gillan & Starks (2000) Represent links to institutional investors who favor boards with greater diversity. 
Mattis (1993), Mainiero & Sullivan (2005) Represent links to other women in- and outside the organization, and families and family issues
Source: Prepared by the author
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3.5. WOMEN DIRECTORS´ CONTRIBUTION TO FIRM´S FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Boards exist to perform tasks for the organization they represent, and their function is 
linked to their organization´s performance (Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff and 
MacKenzie, 1995; Argote and McGrath, 1993; Goodman, 1986).  
 
Thus, board diversity is a particularly interesting case to study, as the influence of the 
board‘s elaboration and decision-making processes can be related to the performance of 
the organization as a whole (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
 
An issue that has attracted the attention of scholars around the world for decades, is the 
link between board diversity and the firm´s financial performance. Firm financial 
performance data are particularly attractive due to their unique characteristics; they are 
easily available and accessible (for firms listed on the national stock exchanges), easy to 
interpret, objective in nature, comparable across countries, industries and companies, 
and very relevant for all the stakeholders of the firm. 
 
The impact of women board directors on firm financial performance is one of the most 
frequently diversity relation studied by academics A variety of financial performance 
measures has been used, as well as samples from different countries and industries, but 
no clear and consistent relation has been established; some studies show positive links, 
others negative links, and others no relation at all. Table 3.4 present a summary of some 
of the most relevant studies reporting negative, positive and no link between women 
directors and firm financial performance.  
 
Below is a more detailed presentation of some the studies reporting relations between 
women directors and firm financial performance. These studies include samples from 
different countries and industries, over a period of 15 years, and include different firm 
financial measures. Apart from establishing that ROA and Tobin´s Q are the most 
related variables to measure women directors´ contribution to firm financial 
performance, no other consistent conclusion can be drawn.  
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Erhardt et al., (2003) found evidence of a positive relation between the percentage of 
women on boards and the return on assets (ROA) and the return on investment (ROI). 
They argued that as women on boards are associated with higher shareholder value, 
women should become more prevalent on corporate boards.  
 
Adams and Ferreira (2004) studied the impact of board diversity on investor‘s behavior. 
They found a significant association between the stock market volatility and the 
proportion of women, in that firms with boards that had a lower fraction of woman 
tended to have a more volatile stock price. However, in their subsequent study of 2009, 
the authors reported a negative relation between the proportion of women directors and 
Tobin‘s Q. 
 
Another study finding a positive relationship between the ratio of women directors and 
financial performance was Carter et al., (2003). This study which was done on Fortune 
1000 boards, measuring firm financial performance by the Tobin‘s Q. 
 
Krishnan and Park (2005) found a significant positive relationship between the 
percentage of women on top management teams and organizational performance, 
measured by the return on sales (ROS) and the return on assets (ROA).  
 
In Spain, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008, 2010), investigating the relationship 
between gender diversity of boards and financial performance found that board gender 
diversity had a positive effect on firm value measured by the Tobin‘s Q, and that adding 
women to a corporate board had a positive effect on the stock market. However, another 
Spanish study on gender diversity on boards, found no relation between women on 
boards and business success (Reguera-Alvarado, Laffarga-Briones and de Fuentes-Ruiz, 
2011). 
 
In Turkey, Ararat et al., (2015) found a positive relationship between demographic 
diversity and performance, mediated by the board‘s monitoring efforts. They developed 
a compound board diversity index (BDI), consisting of the sum of the Blau indexes for 
gender, age, education level and nationality, and compared this to the firms´ return on 
equity (ROE).  
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A study of the University of Michigan Business School examining stock value and 
earnings growth following initial public offerings (IPO) in the USA, found that IPO 
were significantly more successful when the companies had senior female executives. 
That is, having women in top management can result in higher earnings and greater 
shareholder wealth (Ripley, 2003).  
 
Biggins (1999) argued that although boards are not social agencies and it is not their job 
to create cultural diversity, companies are discovering that diverse board helps generate 
better returns for shareholders. 
 
Related to risk and profitability on the stock market, the European Corporate 
Governance Institute´s study of the board of directors of 1024 publicly traded firms in 
Europe found that having more women on the board of directors decreased the 
variability of stock returns. In the same line, Adams and Ferreira (2004, 2009) found a 
strong negative relation between the variability in stock returns and the proportion of 
women on the boards.  
 
A series of studies found no link between women directors and firm financial 
performance; Carter et al., (2010) did not find any significant relationship between 
gender diversity on boards and financial performance for a sample of major US 
corporations. Their analysis did not support the business case for inclusion of women 
directors to corporate boards based on firm financial performance, however, no 
evidence of any negative effect was found either. They concluded arguing in favor of 
gender diverse boards, however based on other criteria than financial performance. 
 
For a sample of US companies, Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) found no significant 
relation between the ratio of female board directors and their companies‘ profit margin, 
ROA, or ROE. 
 
There are also examples of studies showing a negative relation between women 
directors and firm financial performance; Smith et al., (2006) for a sample of Danish 
firms, found a negative relation between board gender diversity and gross profits to 
sales. However, they found no statistically significant relation between board gender 
diversity and other accounting measures of financial performance. Rose (2007) did not 
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find any significant relation between board gender diversity and Tobin‘s Q for a 
different sample of Danish firms.  
 
Finally, Bøhren and Strøm (2010), concluded in their study of Norwegian firms that the 
evidence on gender diversity is scant and conflicting, with studies finding positive, 
negative and no relationships between gender and firm value. 
 
As we can conclude from the above, the issues around female board participation are 
getting increased attention by academics (Daily et al., 1999; Terjesen et al., 2009; 
Vinnicombe et al., 2008). This is accompanied by a strong call for a higher gender 
balance at corporate boards, coming from politicians and institutions in most European 
countries. EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding requested that large publicly held 
companies in Europe should voluntarily achieve a 30% level of women on boards by 
2015. Although not all countries are fulfilling this request, some improvements have 
been recorded on the European scene.  
 
Analyzing the above results linking women to firm financial performance, we find that 
although results are positive, they are not all-conclusive for the business case of women 
on corporate boards. However, taking into account the qualitative contributions of 
women on boards, presented in Table 3.3, we believe that it is a question of time before 
the business case will be confirmed. As society is claiming higher women participation, 
and as the women ratio on boards is increasing and becoming more ―normalized‖, we 
believe that future research will show more positive results. 
 
It is with this belief that we propose a study of the relation between women board 
directors and firm financial performance, conducted in two different countries, one 
being Norway a mature country in terms of gender balance where woman‘s´ 
participation on boards has become normalized, and Spain, a country with a much lower 
female participation at all levels, but with a recent intention to increase the percentage 
of women on boards. For our study we have selected the performance measure of 
Tobin´s Q, as this is seen, together with ROA, to be one on the most relevant 
performance measure in these type of studies.  
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Table 3.4. Summary of the principle findings relating women directors and firm´s 
financial performance. 
  
Author(s) Independent variable Dependent variable Modetating Data base Main result
Year Gender measure Performance measure variable
Wellalage & Locke Percentage of women Tobin´s Q None 88 listed comp. Negative relation
2013 Blau index Sri Lanka
Ahern & Dittmar Percentage of women Tobin´s Q None 248 comp. Negative relation
2012 Norway
He & Huang Blau index ROA None 530 manufactoring Negative relation
2011 comp. USA
Bohren & Strom Percentage of women Tobin´s Q, ROA, None 203 listed comp. Negative relation
2010 ROS Norway
Adams & Ferreira Percentage of women ROA, Tobin´s Q None 1939 comp. USA Negative relation
2009 Dummy
Ararat et. al. Compound board ROE Monitoring 100 listed comp. Positive relation
2015 diversity index, age intensity Turkey
gender, ed.lev, nation
Dezso & Ross Percentage of women Tobin´s Q Innovation- 1500 comp. S&P Positive relation 
2012 Dummy driven strategy USA
Lindstaedt et al. Percentage of women ROA, ROE, High female ratio 160 comp. Positive relation 
2011 Price to book v. B2B companies Germany
Luckerath-Rovers Percentage of women ROE, ROS, None 99 comp. Positive relation
2011 ROIC Netherlands
Campbell & Minguez Blau, Shannon index Tobin´s Q None 68 comp. Positive relation
2008 Dummy Spain
Smith et al. Percentage of women Varios economic Women´s level 2500 comp. Positive relation
2006 measures of education Denmark
Carter et al. Percentage of women ROA, Tobin´s Q None 638 Fortune 1000 Positive relation
2003 Dummy comp. USA
Erhardt et al. Percentage of women ROA, ROI None 112 Fortune 1000 Positive relation
2003 comp. USA
Singh et al. Percentage of women Profit, Revenues None 100 FTSE Comp. Positive relation
2001 UK
Carter et al. Percentage of women ROA, Tobin´s Q None 2563 firm-years Neutral relation
2010 observations, USA
Haslam et al. Percentage of women ROE, ROA None 126 listed comp. Neutral relation 
2010 Dummy Tobin´s Q UK Neg. To TQ
Miller & del Carmen Blau index ROI, ROS Innovation 326 Fortune 500 Neutral relation
2009 comp. USA
Rose Percentage of women Tobin´s Q None 100 listed comp. Neutral relation
2007 Denmark
Randoy et al. Percentage of women ROA, stock None 458 comp. Neutral relation
2006 market value Scandinavia (N/S/D)
Shrader et al. Percentage of women ROS, ROA, ROI None 200 comp. Neutral relation
1997 ROE USA
Source: Prepared by the author
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3.6. CRITICAL MASS OF WOMEN DIRECTORS ON BOARDS: WOMEN AS 
MINORITY MEMBERS 
 
Social psychology theory brings the attention to the potential limitation of the 
contribution of diverse board members when boards have an unbalanced board 
composition. It predicts that individuals belonging to a majority group have a greater 
potential to exert a disproportional amount of influence on the group´s decisions 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). 
 
Directors from minority groups (like women board members) perceive that their 
minority status often represent a hindrance to their work as a director (Ferreira, 2010) 
and perceive that they have a harder time influencing the board´s decisions than 
members of the majority group.  
 
This situation was seen in Kanter´s (1977) seminar work examining women´s status in a 
large American corporation. She found that the individuals belonging to a majority 
group (usually men) seemed to control the individuals belonging to a minority group 
(usually women). Kanter defined a minority representation of around 15% of a group as 
a ―token‖ and argued that “tokens are not treated as individuals, but as representatives 
for their category” (Kanter 1977: 208).   
 
Being a token has three behavioral consequences; visibility, polarization, and 
assimilation. Visibility implies that tokens find themselves being watched all the time, 
resulting in perceptions of performance pressure. Polarization implies that the dominant 
group feels threatened or uncomfortable around tokens, and that they therefore heighten 
their boundaries by exaggerating both the commonality and the differences of tokens. 
The majority may thus try to exclude tokens from informal networks where important 
socialization takes place. Finally, assimilation implies that tokens are forced into 
stereotypical categories defined by the dominants. Even if there are differences among 
the members of the minority group, these are not perceived by the majority group. 
Tokens are thus perceived as representing an entire demographic group. Hence, token-
woman are stereotyped by the majority group (Kanter, 1977) and are not seen as they 
really are. This role is labeled encapsulation; a process that forces tokens into limited 
and caricatured roles and expectations as to what is a ―suitable behavior‖ for a woman.  
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Kanter suggests that women minorities in groups are subject to meeting barriers in 
influencing group decisions. The visibility mechanism in tokenism theory predicts 
additional performance pressures for women directors (Powell, 1993), and that they, in 
order to be perceived as having equal ability as their male counterpart, must provide 
more evidence of their ability (Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997). 
 
The influence of minority members in a group therefore depends upon the strength, 
immediacy and number of its members (Latane, 1981). However, as the size of the 
female minority group increases, it gains trust, and the majority benefits from the 
resources they bring to the organization (Kanter, 1977). This is the principal idea behind 
the critical mass theory proposing that minority members gain in influence as their 
numbers reach a certain threshold (Konrad et al., 2008). 
 
Most literature on critical mass begins with Kanter´s work of 1977, where she observes 
that the relative numbers of different people in a group, differences which derive from 
―salient master statuses” like gender, race and ethnicity (Kanter, 1977: 966), are crucial 
in shaping the interaction dynamics in the group. To theorize these interactions, she 
constructs four different categories of groups according to their composition; (1) 
uniform groups, (2) skewed groups, (3) tilted groups and (4) balanced groups. The 
tipping points between the groups are not clearly defined, and although Kanter suggests 
a ―100:0‖ for uniform groups, a ―perhaps 85:15‖ for skewed groups, a ―perhaps 65:35‖ 
for tilted groups, and a ―60:40 to 50:50‖ for balanced groups, her diagram suggest a 
continuous scale as shown below (Kanter, 1977: 967). 
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Figure 3.2. Group categories according to composition
 
Source: Kanter, 1977: 383 
 
• Uniform groups are groups in which all members share the same (visible) 
characteristic. That is, with respect to gender, all members of the group are 
either male or female.  
• Skewed groups are groups in which one dominant type (males) tend to control 
the few (females). The dominant group tend to see women first as female, 
embodying the gender role stereotype, and only later as individuals. This makes 
it more difficult for the women members to be heard, and importantly, listened 
to on an equal basis as other group members. A male dominated skewed group 
consists of 20% or less women.  
• Tilted groups are groups with a less extreme distribution. Unlike in skewed 
groups, minority members can ally and influence the culture of the group. They 
do not stand for all of their kind, instead they represent a subgroup whose 
members are to be differentiated from each other in their skills and abilities 
(Kanter 1977: 209). A male-dominated tilted group have from 20 up to 40% 
women. 
• In a so-called balanced group, majority and minority turn into potential 
subgroups where gender-based differences become less and less important. The 
focus turns to the different abilities and skills of men and women (Kanter 1977: 
209). A balanced group with respect to gender representation has from 40 up to 
60% women.  
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As argued above, when the size of the minority group increases to the point when it is 
no longer a token or a small minority, the nature of the relations between the minority 
and the majority changes qualitatively (Bear, Rahman and Post, 2010; Etzkowitz, 
Kemelgor, Neuschatz, Uzzi and Alonzo, 1994.). Research has shown that groups that 
have a more balanced male-to-female ratio in their composition negate the formation of 
strong in-groups and out-groups, and instead encourage a group-wide sense of loyalty 
and affect (Kanter, 1977; Konrad et al., 2008). As the number of male and female board 
members become more balanced it becomes harder to maintain an insider/outsider bias, 
as men themselves become outsiders to the women, who themselves self-categorize 
with one another (Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1985; Westphal and Milton, 2000).  
 
The fundamental proposal of the critical mass theory is thus that as boards become more 
gender balanced, their potential to benefit from diversity is increasing, and that there 
might be a critical number of women on boards that marks a threshold, resulting in a 
substantial difference for their effective influence on board processes and performance. 
 
Critical mass theory has over the last twenty years gained wide currency among 
politicians, media and international organizations as a justification for measures to bring 
more women into political office (Grey, 2006). Scholars have applied the critical mass 
theory to legislative and political settings (Childs and Krook, 2008), but few have 
proposed what exact number represents a critical mass.  
 
Asch‘s studies in 1951 and 1955 lead to the definition of a threshold that represent 
critical mass. He used groups of students who were told that they were participating in a 
study on visual perception (―vision test‖). The Asch experiment demonstrated that when 
an individual is faced with the unanimous opinion of three people, he or she feels the 
pressure to conform to the others. Conformity pressure is a well-known group 
phenomenon, described by Janis (1972) in his study on the development of groupthink. 
Janis identified three symptoms of groupthink; overestimation of the group, close-
mindedness, and pressure towards conformity. A behavioral consequence of pressure 
towards conformity for the minority is self-censorship, where the minority members of 
the group feel they have to censor opinions that deviate from the opinions of the 
majority.  
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Other studies have also suggested that three could represent the tipping point (critical 
mass or threshold) that influence the group setting (Konrad et al., 2008; Post, Rahman 
and Rubow, 2011, Torchia, Calabró and Huse, 2011). 
 
Drawing on the preceding arguments and recent studies of women on corporate boards, 
Konrad et al., (2008) suggested that the critical mass of women directors on boards is 
reached when there is ―at least three women‖ on the board. In their study they 
interviewed thirty-seven women board directors, twelve CEOs, and seven company 
secretaries. Their study explored three dimensions of numerical representation of 
women - one woman, two women, and three women. Their results revealed different 
dynamics when there were one, two, or three women on the board. When there were 
two women on the board, an impact was demonstrated on the male colleagues, who 
were less likely to dismiss comments made by a woman, and in the boardroom, where 
the culture was perceived to be warmer and more open to wider discussions. The real 
change however occurred when there were three or more women on the board. Women 
felt more comfortable, supported, less constrained about what the men would think, 
freer to raise issues, and their interactions became more positive. The dynamics moved 
from invisibility to conspiracy to ―normality‖, and the critical mass normalized 
women‘s presence as leaders. It was only at that point that the diversity of the group 
was not any longer a ―woman‘s issue‖ but a group responsibility.  
 
Post et al., (2011) also found that three women on the board seemed to be a critical 
threshold. Having ―at least three women directors‖ makes boards more heterogeneous, 
and allows majority-minority interactions and processes to take place thereby enabling 
the overall board to take high-quality decisions. 
 
As described earlier, studies have shown that heterogeneous groups produce higher 
quality decisions than homogeneous groups on complex tasks, and generate more 
innovative solutions (Amason, 1996). Hoffman (1959) and Hoffman and Maier (1961) 
recognized that pressure for uniformity is an impediment to good problem solving. In 
particular, minority views can stimulate consideration of the non-obvious; they often 
detect novel solutions (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983), use more varied strategies, and 
think in more original ways (Nemeth and Kwan, 1985). The number of women directors 
on the board is therefore of significance when evaluating their potential contribution to 
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the overall board performance. While one female board member may make a positive 
contribution, companies with three or more women on the board are likely to benefit 
even more from female contributions. 
 
Konrad et al., ´s study (2008) concluded that once the number of women directors on 
boards increased to a consistent minority (―at least three women‖), the women directors 
perceived that their ability to effectively influence board processes and performance had 
increased substantially. The core idea is that, with at least three women directors, it is 
possible to increase the likelihood that women‘s voices and ideas are heard, and that 
thereby boardroom dynamics change substantially. 
 
In this same line a Canadian study of the boards of  private, public, and not-for-profit 
organizations in 2002 revealed that boards with three or more women were significantly 
different from the all-male boards (Brown et al., 2002). Three-quarters of the boards 
with three or more women explicitly identified criteria for measuring strategy, 
compared to only one half of the all-male boards. 94% of these boards explicitly 
monitored the implementation of corporate strategy, compared to only two-thirds of the 
all-male boards (Brown et al., 2002). Furthermore, boards with two or more female 
directors placed more importance on the use of search consultants than other boards, 
which is likely to reduce the influence of the ―old boys‘ network‖ and increase 
transparency of board member selection. Boards with three or more women directors 
were also more likely to have higher levels of board accountability, with formal limits 
to authority and formal director orientation programs. These boards were also more 
likely to ensure a more effective communication among the board and its stakeholders. 
And finally, such boards were significantly more active in promoting performance 
measures, such as customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and gender 
representation, as well as considering measures of innovation and corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
Elstad and Ladegard (2012) in their study of 458 women directors on Norwegian 
corporate boards, with a women ratio ranging from 11 to 100%, found that having two 
or more woman on the board was a critical limit for increased perceived influence for 
each woman on the board. They found that an increased women ratio led to higher 
levels of perceived influence, and higher perceived information sharing. 
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In a recent study of German boards Joecks, Pull and Vetter (2013), tested Kanter‘s 
predictions and found that critical mass lied in the range of 20–40% women directors. 
They found evidence for that skewed boards perform worse than uniform boards, and 
that tilted boards outperform skewed boards. They argue that if there is a ―critical mass‖ 
of women on boards that is needed in order for female representation to positively affect 
firm performance, this apparently is reached within tilted boards - just as proposed by 
Kanter.  
 
Table 3.5. Summary of the principle findings relating critical mass and firm 
performance. 
 
  
Author(s)  Independent variable Dependent variable Modetating variable Data base Main result
Year Gender measure Performance measure
Taarn Pedersen Percentage of women ROE, ROA, Net profit None Board of 110 service Critical mass 
2013 on boards Tobin´s Q firms in Japan improve performance
Joecks, et al. Percentage of women ROE Critical mass Board of 151 listed Critical mass 
2013 Kanter group classific. firms in Germany improve performance
Strydom & Yong Percentage of women ROE, ROA, Sales None 3085 firm-year Critical mass 
2011 on boards Earnings quality obs. Australia improve performance
Torchia et al. Percentage of women Innovation Board strategic 317 firms Critical mass related
2011 Measured by questionaire tasks in Norway to more innovation
Konrad et al. Percentage of women Impact on boards Critical mass 50 female directors Critical mass improve
2008 on boards Measured by interviews Fortune 1000 USA womens impact on boards
Childs & Krook Percentage of women Promoting female issues Critical mass Review of literature No conclusion
2008 in politics in politics. Review literature Kanter & Dahlerup
Chestermann & Percentage of women Appointment of women None 50 female, 31 men, 5 Critical mass related to
Ross-Smith 2006 in TMT Universities Measured by interviews Universities, Australia more women appointments
Broome et al. Critical mass of women Raising women issues Critical mass 46 female directors No link
2011 on boards Discourse analisis in 118 comp. USA
Source: Prepared by the author
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3.7. SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND INTERGROUP BIAS BASED ON 
GENDER 
 
Social categorization processes, with roots in the social identity theory (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986), the self-categorization theory (Turner, 1975, 1987), and the similarity-
attraction paradigm (Byrne, 1971), explain how similarities and differences among 
board members serve as a basis for categorization of one self and others into different 
subgroups. The subgroup members distinguish between their own in-group (―us‖), and 
the other out-group (―them‖), and have the tendency to like and trust ―us‖ more than 
―them‖ (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). Through this 
process a corporate board might be divided into different subgroups that can give rise to 
conflicting inter-subgroup relations.  
 
Board members have multiple identity structures based on different characteristics (e.g., 
gender, age, profession, tenure), allowing them to categorize (and form subgroups) in 
many different ways. It is therefore important to determine which characteristics are 
more ―salient‖; meaning more likely to evoke in an individual the view of oneself 
versus others.  
 
As earlier commented, van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose that the extent to which 
a characteristic engender social categorization is contingent on three factors: 
comparative fit, normative fit, and cognitive accessibility (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et 
al., 1987). With gender, the comparative fit is typically high, as gender represent a 
visible and readily detectable characteristic, fulfilling the condition of providing a good 
reflection of similarities and differences between both gender groups. The normative fit 
of gender is also high as societal gender stereotypes may give subjective meaning 
(Pearsall et al.,  2008), fulfilling the requirement that the characteristic must make sense 
within an individuals‘ subjective frame of reference; beliefs, expectations, and 
stereotypes (Turner et al., 1987). Finally, cognitive accessibility of gender is also high 
as the categorization men vs. women very easily comes to mind. 
 
Gender, being a characteristic most people have used for self-categorization throughout 
their lives (Fiske, 1998) is considered highly salient for social categorization. Gender is 
furthermore one of the most commonly used characteristic for the definition of self-
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schemas (individual‘s psychological construction of self) as this schema is developed 
from childhood and serve as mental models through which information is processed 
(Konrad et al., 2000). 
 
Having determined that gender is a salient diversity characteristic, one can expect that 
men and women on corporate boards engage in social categorization. However, the 
categorization into women and male subgroups on the board only refers to the 
perceptual grouping of people (Turner et al., 1987), and is not necessarily negative in 
itself (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a). 
 
It is the potential intergroup bias between the subgroups that leads to conflict, as  
members show more favorable responses to other  ―in-group members‖  than to others 
categorized as ―out-group members‖ (Brewer, 1979), and in this way impedes boards in 
taking advantage of the potential benefits of diversity.  
 
As we saw earlier in the chapter on diversity, intergroup bias on corporate board may 
range from subtle social competition for status and prestige, to outright discrimination 
(Brewer and Brown, 1998). Such bias can lead to the no-appointment of women to 
boards (Mateos De Cabo et al., 2011), as well to unequal status of the men and the 
females on the board (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2014). This may provoke the activation of 
faultlines, and the formation of female and male subgroups, subgroups which might 
experience affective and evaluative reactions, leading to conflict and reduced cohesion 
among group members, finally resulting in reduced performance. 
 
Intergroup bias can lead to women director´s arguments having less influence on board 
decisions than the men forming part of the dominant group (Miller and Brewer, 1996; 
Westphal and Milton, 2000). In this way, bias may lead male majority directors to 
devalue the input of women minorities on the board, thus limiting the potential of 
women´s contribution to board decision-making.  In a study of Norwegian corporate 
boards, Elstad and Ladegard (2012) found an intergroup bias in the perceptions of 
women vs. men directors on the boards. The gender of the respondent of the study had 
an impact on the assessment of women‘s contributions to decision-making; with male 
respondents rating women‘s contributions significantly lower than the female 
respondents did. 
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One such intergroup bias is found in the social status values (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek 
and Norman, 1998; Berger, Wagner and Zelditch, 1985) suggesting that people form 
expectations about the competence of others, based on status values assigned by the 
society as a whole (Ridgeway, 1991). In western countries white and men are seen as 
more able and competent than black and women, and thereby have higher social status 
value (Berger et al., 1985; Berger et al., 1998; Elsass and Graves, 1997; Ridgeway, 
1991).  
 
Board job-holder schemas represent another bias against women directors, in that the 
perceptions about the attributes a person should have in order to fit as a board member, 
favor typical male board member characteristics, in terms of personal attributes, 
backgrounds and experience. Thus, it is not the formal director description, but an often 
unconscious mental model about the characteristics a director should have that causes 
the bias (Perry, Davis-Blake and Kulik, 1994). As typically white male hold the 
majority of board positions, people are more likely to consider white male fitted for 
these positions. So, even if there is no consciously discrimination against women, a 
schema in favor of male board directors is unconsciously applied (Fiske and Taylor, 
1991). In a study about the perceptions of leadership in Australia, characteristics like 
heroism, physical and emotional toughness and self-reliance were described as typical 
leadership attributes (Sinclair, 1998); characteristics more typical of males than of 
females. This ideology of leadership perpetuates the status quo of who ―looks like a 
leader‖.  
 
Gender stereotyping is yet another form of intergroup bias, resulting in general lower 
esteem of women and social barriers for women´s progress (Carli and Eagly, 1999; 
Elsass and Graves, 1997). Stereotyping is defined as the ascription of the in-group 
stereotypical characteristics to the self (Biernat, Vescio and Green, 1996; Guimond, 
Chatard, Martinot, Crisp and Redersdorff, 2006; Turner et al., 1987). Past research on 
self-stereotyping has demonstrated that people belonging to low status groups or 
numerical minorities are more likely than majority group members to self-stereotype 
(Latrofa, Vaes, Cadinu and Carnaghi, 2010), and that women, but not men, engage more 
often in self-stereotyping regardless of numbers (Latrofa et al.,  2010). Women display a 
higher level of gender in-group identification as gender is a more important ―identity 
maker‖ for women than for men (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1991).  
Literature review: ―Value-in-board-gender-diversity-proposition‖ 
106 
 
Cadinu and Galdi (2012), in order to explain the higher level of self-stereotyping by 
woman than by men, argue that group membership to minority and low-status groups is 
more accessible than group membership to high-status groups, and thus concluded that 
gender group membership was more accessible for women than for men. They further 
demonstrate that implicit self-categorization is an important mechanism underlying 
implicit self-stereotyping, and that women show stronger implicit gender self-
stereotyping than men, and that this is significantly associated with explicit self-
stereotyping, and that the high accessibility of gender group membership lead to 
stronger self-stereotyping for women than for men, resulting in the fact that both gender 
self-categorization and gender self-stereotyping were stronger for women than for men. 
This is consistent with Mullen´s (1991) theory of group salience, which propose that 
membership to a numerical minority group is highly salient, resulting in a focus on the 
in-group, which then leads to a prototypical perception of in-group members, including 
the self. Majority-group members pay less attention to the in-group, thus forming 
exemplar rather than prototypical representations of in-group members.  
 
These findings point to a possible higher salience of gender for women directors in 
token or small minority status on the board, or when they feel threatened by intergroup 
bias, indicating lower status than men. Their natural reaction would be to seek support 
and esteem in their gender subgroups, feeling strong identification with ―us‖ vs. ―them‖. 
This can lead to faultline subgroups, and affect the relation between the subgroups. As 
argued in earlier chapter under critical mass, research found that groups that have a 
more balanced male-to-female ratio in their composition negate the formation of strong 
in-groups and out-groups, and instead encourage a group-wide sense of loyalty and 
affect (Kanter, 1977; Konrad et al., 2008). As the number of male and female board 
members become more balanced it becomes harder to maintain an insider/outsider bias, 
as men themselves become outsiders to the women, who themselves self-categorize 
with one another (Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1985; Westphal and Milton, 2000).  
 
Most of the inter-group oppression and conflict serve the function of establishing and 
maintaining particular group-based, hierarchical social systems, where gender is one of 
the variables establishing the hierarchical difference (Social dominance theory) 
(Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Western societies are characterized by 
being both patriarchal (Marshall, 1984; Powell, 1993) and white-centric (Essed, 1991; 
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Hooks, 1989), where positions of power are typically held by males to a 
disproportionate degree - the more powerful the position, the more likely that the 
position will be occupied by a male (Sidanius, 1993). Thus, white men seek to preserve 
their power and authority by consciously discriminating against women and people of 
color when making promotion decisions for top management positions (Morrison and 
von Glinow, 1990).  
 
Social dominance orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) is a 
scale that intend to measure the degree to which an individual support these hierarchical 
group-based systems of inequality. Various studies have shown that males produce 
significantly higher SDO than females (Pratto, Stallworth and Sidanius, 1997; Sidanius, 
Levin, Liu and Pratto, 2000; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto and 
Brief, 1995; Sidanius, Pratto and Rabinowitz, 1994), and that men are therefore more 
likely to have anti-egalitarian beliefs. The higher SDO of men indicate their preference 
to perpetuate their dominant position, while the lower SDO of women show their 
decreased favor for such systems.  
 
The degree of male social dominance vary upon culture, defined as a system of 
collectively held beliefs and values. Cultural patterns of thinking, feeling and acting are 
acquired in early childhood because at that time a person is most susceptible to learning 
and assimilation. These patterns are deeply rooted, and once established within a 
person´s mind, they are unlikely to change substantially (Hofstede, 2001).  
 
Hofstede (1980) is his study of national cultures, established six cultural dimensions 
defining cultural tendencies. One of these, the degree of masculinity, may be expected 
to be related to intergroup bias. A high score on masculinity indicates that the society is 
driven by traditional masculine work-role models of achievement, competition, control, 
power and success, and that this is indicative for a high degree of gender differentiation 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hofstede and McCrae, 2004). In terms of this national cultural 
dimension, Spain scores relatively high (42) while Norway scores very low (8). 
 
The cultural dimension of power distance can also impact intergroup bias, in that it 
deals with the fact that in a certain culture all individuals are not considered equal, and 
that less powerful members of institutions and organizations within the country expects 
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that power is distributed unequally. With respect to this dimension Spain´s score is 
again high (57), indicating that Spain is a hierarchical society, in which organizations 
are seen as reflecting inherent inequalities and centralization of power. Norway, 
however, scores low on this dimension (31) indicating a culture of equal rights, 
decentralized and shared power, importance on participation and consensus, less focus 
on control, and direct and transparent communication. Intergroup bias favoring power 
distance between male and female board members, or between majority and minority 
subgroups, may influence the overall board performance. In spite of the fact that all 
board members have the same responsibility and are equally liable, male board 
members seem to have more power than female board members on traditional., male 
dominated boards (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Huse et al., 2005).  
 
A final cultural dimension that can be expected to influence intergroup bias is the 
dimension of uncertainty avoidance, which indicate the extent to which the members of 
a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs 
to avoid this. According to Hofstede (1980), if there is one dimension that clearly 
defines the Spanish culture it is this dimension, reflected by a score of 86, which 
indicates a great restistance to change and concern in undefined situations. Having 
women entering the traditional male dominated board rooms can represent such 
uncertain and new contexts. Norway scores 50 on this dimension, which does not 
indicate an exceptionally high preference for uncertainty avoidance. 
 
Figure 3.3. Differences in cultural dimensions between Norway and Spain. 
 
Source: Geert-hofstede.com, 2014  
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As a closing comments, it can be argued that gender is a salient diversity attribute with a 
high potential to lead to gender subgroups on boards. Furthermore, it can be concluded 
that numerous factors in society, like gender schemas and stereotyping, social status 
values, job-holder schemas and male dominance on boards can lead to intergroup bias. 
 
3.8. FAULTLINE STRENGTH AND THE DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS ON THE 
ELABORATION PROCESSES OF TASK-RELEVANT INFORMATION   
 
Social categorization combined with intergroup bias generate the bases for faultline 
division, in that subgroup differentiation between ―us‖ (similar in-group members) and 
―them‖ (dissimilar out-group members) is based on the alignment of diversity attributes 
between subgroups.  
 
Furthermore, as people typically prefer to work with similar others (van Knippenberg et 
al., 2004a; Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998; Brewer and Brown, 1998; Tajfel and Turner, 
1986) this can disrupt effective information exchange, constructive debate and 
collaboration, crucial for the process of elaboration of task relevant information. 
Consequences of this could be that the board does not consider all relevant information 
for the complex analysis and decision-making involved in the strategic and non-routine 
work of the board, thus arriving at less optimal performance than they could have 
reached without this disruptive influence. Such outcome of board performance is likely 
to be reflected in the bottom line financial performance of the company (Carpenter et 
al., 2004; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
 
However, this disruption do not always happen, and the key question is therefore to find 
out when, and under which circumstances a social categorization create faultlines that 
affect performance. As an answer to this, van Knippenberg et al., (2004a) propose that it 
is the salience of the social categorizations that drives these subgroup effects.  
 
Categorizations are used to make sense of the world by capturing similarities and 
differences between people. A diversity attribute is more likely to be more salient when 
the categorization makes sense to the individual (normative fit), when it easily comes to 
mind (cognitive fit), and when it provides a good reflection of the similarities and the 
differences between the members of the two sub groups (comparative fit).  
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Different diversity attributes have different salience (gender is believed to be highly 
salient), and may have different effects depending on whether differences on one 
attribute converge with differences on another attribute, or not. The more diversity 
attributes that align (e.g. the  male members of a board are all engineers and have the 
highest tenure) the higher the comparative fit of a categorization in terms of these 
attributes, and the more likely this subgrouping is to be salient. 
 
Lau and Murnighan (1998) proposed the term faultlines to refer to combinations of 
diversity attributes that may render salient subgroupings. Based on the author´s faultline 
definition, board faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines that split a board into 
relatively homogeneous subgroup based on board members‘ alignment along multiple 
diversity attributes (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lau and Murnighan, 1998, 2005; Li and 
Hambrick, 2005).  
 
The most commonly used diversity attributes in faultline studies are age, education 
background, gender, race, functional background and tenure (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). 
Gender, being a highly salient diversity attribute, plays an important role in faultline 
research, and is considered one of the most common trigger for faultlines and subgroup 
formation (Thatcher and Patel, 2012).  
 
When subgroups form, negative processes can arise as the two subgroups become 
cautious of one another (Li and Hambrick, 2005). Subgroup division combined with 
intergroup bias, provoke distrust, frustration, discomfort, hostility, and anxiety, leading 
to relational conflict and annoyance among the individuals of the group (Choi and Sy, 
2010; Homan et al., 2007; Pearsall et al., 2008; Pickett and Brewer, 2001; Lipponen et 
al., 2003; Polzer et al., 2006; Amason and Schweiger, 1997; Amason, 1996; Pelled, 
1996). This hinder effective group functioning, causing lack of coordination, 
cooperation, and cohesion (Brewer, 1995, 1996, LaBianca et al., 1998).  
 
Based upon earlier findings of subgroup dynamics (Lau and Murnighan, 2005), one 
might therefore expect that when boards experience a strong subdivision, information 
sharing across the two subgroups may be misinterpreted, so that comments are viewed 
as criticisms or threats rather than as constructive critiques (Bartel, 2001; Lau and 
Murnighan, 2005) leading to negative attributions of other subgroup members (Jehn, 
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1997). This is expected to affect the elaboration and decision-making processes so 
crucial for the performance of the board (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a). As 
information processing ability and cohesiveness of the board is reduced, board members 
spend time and energy focusing on each other and their misunderstandings, conflicts 
and annoyance, rather than on the task (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; De Dreu and 
Weingart, 2003). This deplete energy and effort that could be expended towards task 
completion and consolidation around mutual goals (Amason and Mooney, 1999), and 
causes boards to arrive at less optimal solutions to problems, less competitive strategic 
decisions and less innovative policies than they could have reached without this 
disruptive influence, likely to be reflected in the bottom line financial performance of 
the company (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
 
This study pretend to establish the comparative fit, yielding gender subgroups with high 
intragroup similarity and high intergroup differences, on boards in Norway and Spain, 
based on the attributes of gender, tenure, education level and education background. As 
the objective of this study is to analyze the effects of faultlines between gender 
subgroups, only companies with two or more women on the board are included, as it 
requires a minimum of two members to form a subgroup. 
 
We expect to find evidence of the negative consequences of gender faultlines on 
corporate boards, and through this, contribute to the literature by demonstrating how the 
concept of faultlines based on the theoretical foundation of the social categorization and 
intergroup bias, can be used in order to achieve a better understanding of board 
composition and board performance. 
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Table 3.6. Summary of the principle findings relating faultlines and firm performance. 
 
Author(s) Faultline Performance Data base Main result
Year measure measure
Veltrop et. al. Gender, age and factional ROI 318 Pension funds Demographic faultlines in factional groups
2015 group affiliation Netherlands have negative relation to performance,
positively moderated by board reflexion
Georgakakis TMT experience based ROA 109 European firms Experienced based faultlines have negative
& Ruigrok and socio-demographic in Germany, Switzer- relation to performance, moderated 
2014 faultlines land, Netherlands, UK by CEOs  background characteristics
Cooper et. al. TMT Informational ROA, ROE, TobinsQ 380 Firms listed in Informational faultlines affect performance,
2014 faultlines, Fau index S&P 1500 index moderated by dynamism, complexity 
USA and munificence of the environment
Hutzschenreuter Fau index Added product scope´s 61 listed comp. Faultlines moderate added product scope´s
& Horstkotte (Demographic - age and effect on firm performance Germany effect on firm performance, in that task
2013 nationality, and task (ROA) related faultlines increase performance 
related faultlines - tenure, when adding product scope, while 
edu. level and content) demographic faultlines decreases it.
Thatcher & Patel Fau index Cohesion and task, Meta-analysis of  36 Demographic faultlines increase conflict,
2012 (Age, gender, race, relationship & process published articles and decrease  performance and cohesion.
tenure, function, conflict including 39 The effect on performance was stronger
education level) Performance empirical studies than the effect on satisfaction.
Kaczmarek et al. Fau index Performance - Tobin´s Q 263, 229, 216 listed Negative relation
2012 (Type of directorship, comp. 
education level, tenure, UK
financial background)
van Knippenberg Faultline index  based Performance 42 mgmt. teams Not all faultlines have the same effect. 
et al. 2011 on two/three dimensions (Productivity & Profit) UK The moderating effect of shared 
(Gender, tenure and objectives do not have the same effect 
functional background on all faultline bases.
Minichilli et al. Family ratio Performance - ROA 500 family controlled Curvilinear (U-shaped) relation between 
2010 (Ratio of family comp. Italy nº of family members and performance,
members in comp.) moderated positively by family CEO
Bezrukova et al. Demographic based Perceived injustice and 57 work groups Group faltlines weakened the positive 
2010 clustering analysis psychological distress 36 work groups relationship between inter-personal
(surface level diversity) Measured by comp. USA injustice and psychological distress
questionnaires
Choi & Sy Shaw (04) faultline index Task & relationship 62 work groups Different faultlines have different effects.
2009 (Gender, age, race, conflict.  Performance comp. USA Both task and relationship conflict had
 tenure) Org. Citizenship (GOCB) negative relation to performance.
Measured by Task conflict increased GOCB.
questionnaires Relationship conflict decreased GOCB.
Bezrukova et al. Fau index Performance 76 work groups Different faultlines have different effects
2009 (Social category and Team discretionary awards Fortune 500 comp. Social category (SC) -  negative relation
information-based Perceived team perform. USA Information-based (IBF)  - no relation
faultlines) (quantitative & qualitative) Team identification moderate IBF
Pearsall et al. Women ratio Performance 80 teams Negative relation between team creativity
2008 (Gender faultline) (Team creativity) University students and activated gender faultlines
Measured by USA
questionnaires
Barkema & Shvyrkov Tenure and education International expansions 2159 expansions Negative effects of strong faultlines on
2007 diversity of TMT of 25 Dutch firms expansions requirering TMT comunication,
expecially when low TMT overlap tenure
Rico et al. Educational background Performance 52 teams Weak-faultline teams performed better 
2007 diversity (Score on decision task) University students and reported higher levels of social
Social integration Spain  integration. 
(Questionnaires) Team task autonomy moderated the effect
Molleman Fau index Cohesion & relational 99 work groups Negative relation on team functioning
2005 (Gender, age, working conflict. Measured by University students moderated negatively by team autonomy
personality, abilities) questionnaires Netherlands
Thatcher et al. Fau index Task, relational & process 79 work groups Curvilinear (U-shaped) relation to process
2003 (Gender, age, race, conflict, performance & University students and relationship conflict. No link to task 
nationality, degree, moral, measured by scores USA conflict.  Curvilinear (inverted U) relation 
and work experience) & questionnaires to morale and performance
Source: Prepared by the author
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3.9. MODERATING FACTORS UPON FAULTLINES AND ITS DISRUPTIVE 
EFFECTS ON THE ELABORATION PROCESSES OF TASK-RELEVANT 
INFORMATION   
 
Various factors have been proposed to moderate the negative effects of social 
categorization and faultlines upon the elaboration processes of task-relevant 
information, and two main lines of argumentation stand out as the most frequent used 
moderators decreasing these negative effects; time and board members attitudes. 
 
One of the moderating factors related to time is the overlap board tenure. Over time, as 
members get to know each other well, perceived social categories may eventually 
become blurred (Chatman and Flynn, 2001; Harrison et al., 1998; Pelled et al., 1999). 
Hence, self-categorization and intergroup biases abate over time as differences in 
knowledge, views and preferences may be reduced, (Katz, 1982). In their study of 
TMTs, Barkema and Shvyrkov (2007) explored the formation of subgroups, and how 
the negative effects of faultlines decreased as TMT members interacted over the years. 
 
Harrison et al., (1998, 2002) advanced in the idea that these negative effects change 
over time as groups gain experience working together. Higher overlap tenure may lead 
group members to find out that stereotypes and initial impressions fade away as they get 
to know each other better, and thus attenuating the effects of social categorization 
processes (Pettigrew, 1998).  
 
The idea behind this moderating effect is that the overlap tenure helps group members 
to enhance cooperation and cohesion (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks and Matthyssens, 2011; 
Carroll and Harrison, 1998). 
 
Another moderator related to time, is chair-board shared experience. The idea behind 
this moderating variable is similar to that of overlap board tenure, however, it focuses 
specifically on the overlap tenure of the chair with the rest of the members of the board, 
and emphasizes the role of the chair as an integrator of the board. Buyl et al., (2011), in 
their study of CEO-TMT shared experience, found that there were two main reasons 
why this overlap helped the team in its performance. First, previous studies on 
elaboration processing have demonstrated that shared team experience allows the team 
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members to ―develop a shared conceptualization of who knows what‖ inside the team 
(Brandon and Hollingshead, 2004: 633), and therefore facilitate the assignment of 
functions and tasks, according to the expertise needed to effectively perform these 
responsibilities (Hollingshead, 2000).  It is therefore believed that a chair, who has this 
common experience with his/her board members, will have a better understanding of the 
resources that each subgroup has, which again allows for a more effective management 
of their tasks.  
 
Related to the discussion of gender diversity on boards, this argument is particularly 
interesting, as faultlines are argued to have negative effects on boards, basically due to 
the social categorization processes and the intergroup bias; in this case male bias against 
women directors, and a chair with a better understanding of each director´s contribution, 
will thus allow him/her to be above such bias based on gender.   
 
Secondly, previous research on TMT´s argues that social categorization costs can be 
reduced when directors have been working together over some time (Harrison et al., 
2002; Balkundi and Harrison, 2006). Implicitly it assumes that overlap team tenure 
allows subgroups to resolve conflicts and work better together, and thereby improve 
their performance. Buyl et al., (2011) found, in the context of TMTs, that the shared 
experience between the CEO and the other directors, facilitated the bridging of the gaps 
within the team, resolved self-categorization inclinations, and enhanced interpersonal 
communication and cohesion. Thus, chairs with shared experience with the board 
members is therefore believed to be better prepared to reduce the negative effects of 
social-categorization, intergroup bias and board faultlines. This was demonstrated in a 
recent study in the context of TMTs by Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2014), who found 
that CEO-TMT shared team experience positively moderated the negative relationship 
between faultlines and firm performance.  These findings are particularly interesting 
when discussing gender diversity on boards, as above commented, intergroup bias 
against women directors constitute the principal hinder for women´s participation, 
contribution and influence on the board. A chair that reduces these negative effects of 
intergroup bias on the board, will therefore enhance the diversity contribution of women 
to the positive elaboration processes of task relevant information on the board.  
 
Literature review: ―Value-in-board-gender-diversity-proposition‖ 
115 
 
Related to board members attitudes, pro-diversity beliefs shared among directors is 
another important moderator of negative faultline effects. Individual beliefs or 
characteristics such as openness to experience (Homan et al., 2008), and pro-diversity 
beliefs (Homan et al., 2007; van Dick, van Knippenberg, Haegele, Guillaume and 
Brodbeck, 2008) has recently been included as moderators in qualitative studies of 
faultlines. Diversity beliefs can be defined as beliefs about the value of diversity to 
work-group functioning (van Knippenberg and Haslam, 2003). Several authors have 
found that people differ in their beliefs and attitudes toward diversity (Meyer and 
Schermuly, 2012), and that organizational climates and cultures may differ in how they 
value diversity (Ely and Thomas, 2001). A recent study on diversity climate found that 
a supportive diversity climate reduces the negative consequences associated with 
relationship-related faultlines (Chung, Liao, Jackson, Subramony, Colakoglu and Jiang, 
2015).  
 
Contingent on such beliefs, diversity may affect the extent to which one‘s own board is 
perceived as being a good board, where "good" may refer to (expectations of) task 
performance as well as to other aspects of board functioning. Based on these findings, 
pro-diversity beliefs may lead board members to respond more favorably to women 
directors and may thus increase the likelihood that the board benefit from their diversity 
by inviting new information and perspectives from all board members and, thereby, 
stimulate performance (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a) 
 
Super-ordinate identity is another moderator which fit the category of board member´s 
attitudes, as it examines group-level propositions such as super-ordinate identities and 
goals (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Homan et al., 2008; Jehn and Bezrukova, 2010), social 
information exchange (Jehn and Rupert, 2008), and cognitive integration (Cronin et al., 
2011). This is also related to the moderator of shared objectives proposed by van 
Knippenberg et al., (2011). The existence of a super-ordinate identity or shared overall 
objectives imply that all board members identify with an overall board identity  and 
mission, and that they are able to set aside in-group differences in order to work 
together towards these common objectives. Studies have found that greater 
informational diversity (Homan et al., 2007) and overlapping team tenure (Barkema and 
Shvyrkov, 2007) help develop super-ordinate identity and thereby may mitigate the 
negative effects of gender based faultlines on group performance. 
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Certain leadership characteristics and behavior are other moderators of the negative 
faultline effects upon the board´s performance. In recent studies a number of leadership-
based moderators have been proposed; team leader behavior (Gratton et al., 2007), 
transformational leadership (Kunze and Bruch, 2010), leadership role structure (Gratton 
et al., 2007), and CEO diverse career experience (Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2014). 
Kunze and Bruch (2010) show that transformational leadership mitigates the negative 
effects of faultlines. Suggesting a more contingent leadership style to mitigating the 
negative effects of demographic-based faultlines, Gratton et al., (2007) recommended 
that leaders use task orientation during the early stages of group formation and 
relationship orientation in the longer term. 
 
One of the key success factors of diversity management is the real commitment of the 
senior executives of the organization (Rynes and Rosen, 1995). Nielsen and Huse 
(2010a) found a negative association between male chairperson and women‘s ableness 
to contribute to the elaboration processes of the board, thus suggesting that the chair´s 
gender may play an important role for the integration and the participation of all board 
members in the elaboration-decision-making processes. 
 
Context variables can also moderate the negative effects of faultlines upon performance. 
The context of the board and the context that surrounds the board, may affect the extent 
to which a faultline influences outcomes. Board size, evenness of subgroup size, and 
number of subgroup are important for the study of faultlines. Strong faultlines require 
homogeneity of subgroup (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). When the overall group is very 
large, it is unlikely that subgroup will be homogeneous across multiple attributes (Hart 
and van Vugt, 2006). Thatcher and Patel (2011) found that group size had an inverted-U 
effect on faultline strength, confirming that large groups are unlikely to have strong 
faultlines.  
 
Another characteristic that will influence faultline strength and distance is the extent to 
which a faultline creates subgroups of even size. Subgroups with an uneven number of 
members could have an imbalance in relative distribution of power, resources, and 
abilities (Lau and Murnighan, 1998).  Shaw (2004) and Trezzini (2008) argued that it is 
important to investigate the number of subgroup that exist within the overall group, as 
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higher numbers of subgroup are likely to lead to weaker faultlines (Lau and Murnighan, 
1998).  
 
The context variable of the country in which a firm is embedded can also constitute an 
important contextual variable. Many factors vary substantially from country to country; 
from the general economy affecting firm performance, to legislation regulating board 
composition for listed companies, to the national culture with respect to women and 
equality between gender.  Masculinity, defined earlier as the degree a society reinforces 
traditional masculine work-role models of male achievement, control, and power 
(Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hofstede and McCrae, 2004), as well as the degree of male 
social dominance vary upon culture, and are indicatives for a high degree of gender 
differentiation in the society. These beliefs form part of cultural patterns of thinking 
(Hofstede, 2001).  
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter present the model that will be used in the study, and the hypotheses 
established for this dissertation. 
 
4.2. RESEARCH MODEL  
 
Based on the Categorization-Elaboration Model (CEM) of van Knippenberg et al., 
(2004a) and the information/decision-making perspective of diversity, the principal 
proposition of this study is that gender diversity on corporate boards contribute 
positively to firms financial performance, due to women´s distinct task-relevant 
information, behavior and skills for the elaboration/decision-making processes, 
contributing to improved effective performance of the board´s processes, and improved 
firm financial performance. 
 
This positive contribution of women directors will be further accentuated in a positive 
way by having a critical mass of women directors on the board.  
 
However, due to social categorization dynamics and intergroup bias, faultlines can form 
gender subgroups on the board, disrupting the positive exchange of information and 
constructive debate, thereby reducing the positive effects of the gender diversity on the 
board, and consequently affect firm financial performance in a negative way. 
 
Overlapping board members‘ tenure and chair-board shared experience will reduce the   
negative effects of the social categorization and intergroup bias, and therefore reduce 
the negative effects of gender faultlines upon firm financial performance. 
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Figure 4.1. Research model based upon CEM. 
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
4.3. HYPOTHESES FOR THE STUDY 
 
(1) The contribution of women directors and firm financial performance 
 
The ―value-in-diversity hypothesis‖ proposes that diversity is beneficial for 
organizations, and that diversity ultimately will improve organizational performance 
(Cox et al., 1991). The principal foundation for this argument is that by pooling various 
cognitive resources into the group, the variety of task-relevant knowledge, skills and 
perspectives available for constructive debate, elaboration and decision-making will 
increase the group performance (Horwitz, 2005).  
 
According to the Categorization-Elaboration model used in our study, the positive 
effects of diverse board members upon firm performance lies in the elaboration 
processes of the board (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a). Building on the 
conceptualization of groups as information processors (Hinsz et al., 1997), elaboration 
is defined as the individual-level processing of information and perspectives, the 
exchange and the feeding back the results of this individual-level processing into the 
group, and the discussion and integration of its implications. It is in this elaboration 
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process engendered by board diversity that diverse boards have the possibility to 
outperform more homogeneous boards. 
 
Taking into account that gender is associated not only with social differences, but also 
with informational differences, (Cox et al., 1991; Tsui and O‘Reilly, 1989), having both 
women and men directors participating actively in the elaboration processes, will enrich 
the processes through the generation of a wider range of perspectives and information 
(Hillman et al., 2007), and enhance constructive debate and exchange of ideas.  
 
Women on boards are found to ask more questions than men (Huse and Solberg, 2006), 
they ask the questions more freely (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000), and they add diverse 
ways of thinking into a traditionally male-dominated board (Bilimoria, 2000). As they 
are not part of the ―old-boys network‖, they are less subject to groupthink, and add an 
independent voice to decision-making processes (Brennan and McCafferty, 1997). As a 
result of all of this, women are more likely to question the conventional wisdom and 
speak up when concerned, or in doubt about an issue or a particular managerial decision 
(Bilimoria and Huse, 1997; Huse and Solberg, 2006). 
 
In an empirical study of corporate boards, Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that boards 
with a higher representation of women had more debates and disagreements. Gender 
diverse boards versus all male boards experience different discussion patterns and 
increased debate (Huse, 2007) as women provoke lively board-room discussions 
(Letendre, 2004). Their different beliefs, values and ways to express and communicate 
their opinions in the board-room lead to in-depth and profound discussions, and help 
address simultaneously different aspects of the issues at hand.  
 
Women directors with different values are in this way more likely to consider counter-
arguments regarding the decisions to be made, and they are more likely to question the 
conventional wisdom and to speak up when concerned, or in doubt about an issue or a 
particular managerial decision. They also seem to be more prepared than their male 
colleagues to push the ‗‗tough issues‘‘ in board discussions (Bilimoria and Huse, 1997; 
Huse and Solberg, 2006).  
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Gender diversity has also been found to facilitate creativity within groups (Hoffman and 
Maier, 1961; Nemeth, 1986), and as boards are engaged in non-routine problem solving, 
involving brainstorming and creativity, the questioning of the status quo is beneficial 
for strategic decisions. As women board members bring different expertise, 
perspectives, resources and viewpoints they will very likely produce unique information 
sets, which again lead to enhanced innovation and creativity (Watson et al., 1993; 
Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  
 
The board of directors is the most influential actor determining strategy direction and 
decision-making of the organization (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). In this way, 
women are particularly valued as board members for their ability to provide strategic 
input and generate more productive discourse (Bilimoria, 2000). They bring new ideas 
and strategic change, contribute to long-term competitive advantage (Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2002), and their participation on the board is positively related to innovation 
and problem solving (Welbourne et al., 2007). Women are furthermore better prepared 
for board discussions than men (Huse, 2007), leading to better understanding and higher 
quality decisions (Amason, 1996).  
 
It is in this line that we propose that women´s distinct contribution to the earlier 
described service and strategy functions of the board, in providing top management with 
advice, counsel and strategic direction, will enhance firm performance, as the company 
will better benefit from the board members´ human capital and the enhanced board 
discussion on strategic issues, that can bring forward different perspectives and points 
of view, contributing to more ideas and new opportunities for the firm (Johnson et al., 
1996; Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pearce and Zahra, 1991). 
Having women on boards will also enhance the board´s resource function, as women 
directors provide the firm with distinct and important resources such as information and 
expertise, relations, networks and links to the external environment and to important 
stakeholders (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
 
H1: Gender diversity on corporate boards is positively related to firm performance. 
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(2) Critical mass of women directors and firm financial performance 
 
The fundamental proposal of the critical mass theory is that as boards are becoming 
more gender balanced, their potential to benefit from gender diversity is increasing. 
Critical mass researchers have been trying to determine whether there is a critical 
number of women on corporate boards that would mark a substantial difference with 
respect to their positive influence on board processes and performance.  
 
Konrad et al., (2008) came up with a proposal suggesting that critical mass is reached 
when there is ―at least three women‖ on the board. Their results revealed different 
dynamics when there were one, two, or three women on the board. When there were 
two women on the board, an impact was demonstrated on the male colleagues, who 
were less likely to dismiss comments made by a woman, and in the boardroom, where 
the culture was perceived to be warmer and more open to wider discussions. The real 
change however occurred when there were three or more women on the board, 
―normalizing‖ women´s participation, and increasing the likelihood that women‘s 
voices and ideas were heard in the boardroom, and thereby changing the boardroom 
dynamics substantially. In this way women´s contribution to the service and strategy 
function of the board, is enhanced with a higher women ratio on the board. 
 
In a study of corporate women in Norway, Elstad and Ladegard (2012) propose that 
having two or more woman on the board represent an increased perceived influence 
among the women. Joecks et al., (2013) in their study of German listed companies 
found that if a ―critical mass‖ of women on boards is needed in order for female 
representation to positively affect firm performance, this was reached with tilted boards, 
defined as boards with above 20% women participation. 
 
Post et al., (2011) found that having three women on the board seemed to be a critical 
threshold. Having ―at least three women directors‖ makes boards more heterogeneous, 
allowing majority-minority interactions and processes to take place, thereby enabling 
the overall board to take high-quality decisions. 
 
Pressure for uniformity is an impediment to good problem solving (Hoffman and Maier, 
1961). Minority views have proved to stimulate consideration of the non-obvious; novel 
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solutions (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983), use more varied strategies, and think in more 
original ways (Nemeth and Kwan, 1985). Therefore, the number of women board 
directors is important when evaluating their potential contribution to the overall board 
performance; while one female board member may make a positive contribution, 
companies with two, three or more women on the board are likely to benefit more from 
female contributions, thus the hypotheses is: 
 
H2: Critical mass of women directors on corporate boards moderate positively the 
relation between women on boards and firm financial performance 
 
(3) Gender faultlines on corporate boards and firm financial performance 
 
The extent to which differences between group members engender social categorization 
resulting in faultlines is contingent on three factors as earlier explained; normative fit, 
comparative fit and cognitive accessibility of the categorization. High comparative fit, 
high normative fit, and cognitive accessibility yields subgroups with high intragroup 
similarity and high intergroup differences, forming subgroups with strong faultlines 
(Homan et al., 2008; Homan et al., 2007; van Knippenberg et al., 2011). The attribute of 
gender fulfills all three factors, and is, due to its faultline clarity and salience, 
considered to be one of the most common trigger for faultline division and subgroup 
formation (Thatcher and Patel, 2012). One can therefore expect that if there are two or 
more women on the board, a gender faultlines may emerge forming two gender 
subgroups.  
 
When subgroups form on the basis of faultlines, negative processes are likely to arise as 
the two sides become wary of one another (Li and Hambrick, 2005). Because of the 
categorization processes combined with intergroup biases, subgroups are likely to 
experience distrust, frustration, discomfort, hostility, and anxiety (Choi and Sy, 2010; 
Homan et al., 2007; Pearsall et al., 2008; Pickett and Brewer, 2001; Lipponen et al., 
2003; Polzer et al., 2006), resulting in increased relational conflict, reduced group 
cohesion and increased process losses, all leading to decreased board performance (Li 
and Hambrick, 2005). Board performance is related to the performance of the 
organization as a whole (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and it is in 
this way that faultlines are argued to affect overall firm financial performance. 
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 Intergroup biases has proved to be a factor disrupting group communication and 
cohesion. Intergroup biases lead board members to perceive their ―in-group members‖ 
as more valid sources of information than the ―out-group members‖. Likewise they 
place a higher degree of trust in their ―in-group members‖ than in their ―out-group 
members‖ (Brewer, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). As a consequence of this, information 
and arguments from the ―in-group members‖ are more likely to be considered and 
valued than the information and the arguments coming from the ―out-group members‖ 
(van Knippenberg, 1999; Clark and Maass, 1988). Two important intergroup bias in the 
board context are (1) the belief that women are less competent than men (assumed by 
both men and women in male dominated contexts) (Carli, 1999), and the fact that board 
selectors assume that women lack adequate human capital for board positions (Burke, 
2000). 
 
The elaboration and decision-making processes of the board are the primary processes 
underlying the positive effects of diversity. In order for these processes to contribute 
positively to firm performance, it is necessary that boards assure an effective sharing of 
ideas, opinions and perspectives from diverse others, oriented towards the integration of 
different contributions and constructive debate, with the final objective of reaching 
better decisions. It is here that the elaboration/decision-making processes can be 
disrupted by intergroup bias and faultlines inhibiting such sharing of ideas, integration 
and constructive debate.  
 
Faultlines are operationalized by an index measuring the comparative fit though the 
correlation of the different diversity attributes across the board members, and yield a 
measurement of the extent to which the categorization yields subgroups with high 
intragroup similarity and high intergroup differences (Thatcher et al., 2003).  
 
The idea of this study is to analyze the two gender subgroups on the board, establishing 
the degree of alignment of gender with other diversity attributes, such as tenure, 
education level and education background, and to see how this degree of alignment 
(faultline strength) affect firm financial performance. 
 
H3: Strong gender-based board faultlines have a negative impact on firm performance   
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(4) Overlap board tenure and the effect upon faultlines 
 
Based on social categorization research, it can be argued that social categorization 
processes and intergroup bias on a board lead to subgroupings and low overall board 
cohesion and high relational conflict (Brewer, 1991). However, intergroup bias and 
relational conflict may abate over time as differences in knowledge, views, and 
preferences may be reduced, especially when boards interact over a period of months or 
years (Katz, 1982; Harrison et al., 1998, 2002). 
 
Board members typically stay on a board for many years (in our sample the average 
board tenure is 6 years), and it is expected that the time a boards has spent working 
together serves as an ―equalizer‖ that enable socialization of its members (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996). Socialization over time produce convergence as dissimilar 
members re-categorize themselves into ―in-group members‖ (Pelled et al., 1999; Qin, 
2007). Higher overlap board tenure may therefore lead members to find out that 
stereotypes and initial impressions fade away as they get to know each other better, and 
thus attenuating the effects of social categorization processes (Pettigrew, 1998), which 
again diminished the negative effects resulting from strong faultlines (Barkema and 
Shvyrkov, 2007).  
 
Corroborating with this Michel and Hambrick (1992) argue that ―similarity of schemata 
among team members, developed via long tenures, can be expected to enhance cohesion 
as managers adopt common repertoires based on theories, beliefs, and attributions 
arising from past experiences‖ (1992: 17). Thus, shared tenure on an organization‘s 
board can create shared frames of reference and shared experiences (Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992) and therefore reduce negative faultline effects and relational conflict. 
 
Overlap board tenure result in board level mutual knowledge of the skills, limitations, 
and idiosyncratic habits of each board member, enabling the board to function and make 
decisions effectively as a group (Kor, 2003). Collaborative behavior is a valuable group 
skill that develops over time and has previously been identified in the literature on 
work-groups and top management teams (Kor, 2003, 2006). The time directors have 
spent working together results in positive relationship dynamics within the board, 
enhancing team cooperation and cohesion (Buyl et al., 2011; Carroll and Harrison, 
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1998). Longer overlap board tenure facilitates the development of ―shared mental 
models‖ (Cannon-Bowers, Salas and Converse, 1993) and ―mutual knowledge‖ 
(Cramton, 2001) about who on the board knows what, and how best to seek and share 
information for important decisions from and with other board members.  
 
H4: The negative relationship between strong gender-based board faultlines and firm 
performance is less pronounced when overlapping board members tenure increases. 
 
(5) Chair-board shared experience and the effect upon faultlines 
 
The idea behind the moderating variable of chair-board shared experience is similar to 
the idea behind the overlap board tenure, and is based upon the same theoretical 
argumentation.  
 
However, it focuses specifically on the overlap tenure of the chair with the rest of the 
members of the board, and how this leads to reduced negative effects upon 
performance; a chairman with common experience with a large part of the board has a 
better understanding of the knowledge and the information residing in each board 
member, male and female (Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2014), allowing for a better 
allocation of tasks and responsibilities according to the skills and knowledge required 
for the task, and in this way ensuring a better elaboration process, finally enhancing 
overall firm performance (Hollingshead, 2000).  
 
Chair-board shared experience facilitates the chairman to ―bridge the gaps between 
board subgroups‖, resolve social categorizations and intergroup biases, and enhance 
interpersonal communication and integration among board members (Buyl et al., 2011: 
157). Thus, chairmen possessing shared experience with other board members are better 
equipped to reduce the social categorization processes, and thus reduce the negative 
effects of faultlines.   
 
H5: The negative relationship between strong gender-based board faultlines and firm 
performance is less pronounced when chair-board members’ shared experience 
increase. 
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5.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The initial research proposal was to advance in the knowledge about gender diversity on 
corporate boards, in respect to what goes on inside these boards; often referred to as the 
―black box‖. Following the suggestion that information about gender related board-
room dynamics and how these affect women´s contribution to boards are best obtained 
through in-depth interviews (Burke and Mattis, 2000), a methodology based on personal 
interviews seemed to be the most appropriate. However, after having done some initial 
attempts at contacting Norwegian and Spanish female board members requesting 
agenda for interviews, we became aware of the difficulties of getting access to these 
women and their time constraints. Our concern that these difficulties would lead to poor 
numerical results in terms of number of interviews, and therefore questionable validity 
of our conclusions, led us to reconsider the research design. 
 
The definite research proposal was to advance in the knowledge about women directors 
on boards and their relation to firms´ performance, focusing on secondary data on board 
member´s attributes and firms´ financial performance. Firms´ financial performance is 
argued to be related directly to the board´s activities (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). This is public information, and therefore readily accessible, and has 
previously been the focus of interest of many diversity researchers, thus making it 
possible to do comparative analysis. The Tobin´s Q measurement of firm value was 
decided as the measure for firms´ performance, and the information needed for its 
calculation was found on databases (in Spain SABI), the Madrid and the Oslo Stock 
Exchanges and in the company´s annual reports.  
 
Most data on board composition were obtained from companies´ corporate governance 
reports, annual reports, corporate websites (Ruigrok et al., 2007), and direct contact 
with the CFO and/or the Director of Investors Relations of the companies. Where 
information was missing, business biographies were consulted (Hillman et al., 2002; 
Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  
 
The study include all companies with statuary domicile in Norway and Spain, listed 
permanently during the time period of the three years of our study, 2012, 2013 and 
2014, on the Oslo Stock Exchange in Norway, and on the Madrid Stock Exchange 
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(Mercado continuo) in Spain. The final number of companies included is 184, out of 
which 95 are Norwegian firms, and 89 are Spanish firms. The total number of board 
members included is 1528, out of which 658 are members of Norwegian boards, and 
870 are members of Spanish boards. The number of women on Norwegian boards is 
245, while the number of women on Spanish boards is 114. 
 
The reason for proposing a comparative analysis between these two European countries, 
Norway and Spain, representing two very different cultures, one from Northern Europe 
and one from Southern Europe, with radical differences with respect to women´s 
participation in public life, was that both countries represent a bench-mark in terms of 
legislation of women participation on boards.  
 
Norway is the country with the highest representation of women directors on their 
boards in the world. In 2003, Norway passed its controversial quota law, mandating that 
by 2008, all boards of public limited liability companies should comprise a minimum of 
40% of each gender. Spain, following the Norwegian model, was the third European 
country (after Norway and Finland) to pass a law with the objective of increasing 
women´s participation in all public and private organizations. The Gender Equality Act 
(Ley de Igualdad) was approved by the Spanish Parliament in March 2007; however it 
is a weaker imitation of the Norwegian model. The passing of the law in Spain 
generated an open debate about gender equality (Minguez-Vera and Martin, 2011).   
 
When the Norwegian government first announced this gender quota law in 2002, the 
stated objectives were to balance participation of both gender on boards in order to 
reach a fairer society with higher gender equality, increase the population from which 
boards recruited their directors, and make a better use of untapped female talent 
(Grosvold, Brammer and Rayton, 2007). The law was very specific about the numbers, 
detailing the following representations; on a board of two or three members both gender 
should be represented; on a board of four or five members there should be at least two 
representatives of each gender; on a board of six to eight members there should be at 
least three representatives of each gender; on a board of nine members there should be 
at least four representatives of each gender;  and boards with more than nine members 
should have 40% of each gender (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). The law applied to all 
public limited liability companies except those firms where one gender was less than 
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20% of the workforce. A further restriction was that the quota should be applied 
separately to each group of board members, being those employee-elected or 
shareholder elected; in Norway employees of firms with more than 200 employees have 
the right to elect one-third of the board. The law, which was implemented with 
resistance from business leaders, was backed by the threat of non-compliant firms being 
closed down. At the expiry of the deadline, five years later, virtually all companies 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange had complied with the law, resulting in almost 38% 
of the board members being women - a quadrupling of the number over this period, 
going from 6.8% to 38% in 5 years (SSB, 2012). However, some companies, resisting 
compliance, decided to delist from the Oslo Stock Exchange and/or to change their 
domicile to another country.    
 
Spain´s Gender Equality Act (Ley de Igualdad) has the objective of achieving a 40% 
women ratio by 2016, a significant jump from the 5% level which prevailed in Spain at 
the time of the adoption of the law (2007). It establishes that 40% of all candidates filed 
on political party ballots must be women, and encourages greater female employment 
by giving preferential treatment to companies with a higher women ratio when bidding 
for government contracts. It also recommends Spanish listed companies to reach a 40% 
female board representation by 2016, an objective that has proved to be too ambitious 
for the Spanish situation. The Spanish law, in comparison to the Norwegian law that 
established severe penalties, is largely aspirational, as it recommends, but do not require 
the fulfilment of the law.  
 
Spanish corporations follow the ―comply or explain principle‖ of the recommendations 
established by the ―Good governance code of listed companies‖. In its latest update 
approved in January 2015 by the CNMV (National Securities Markets Commission), 
paragraph 14 specify the recommended objective of reaching 30% female representation 
on corporate boards in Spain by 2020.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH DESCRIPTION 
 
The objective of this research is to analyze whether boards of directors with a diverse 
composition, specifically with respect to women directors, are able to benefit from 
diverse task-relevant information and incorporate this into their elaboration and 
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decision-making processes, improving the overall company performance. The presence 
of a critical mass of women on the board is suggested to moderate positively this impact 
on firm performance, improving the performance with a higher women ratio. The 
existence of gender faultlines, resulting from social categorization and intergroup bias is 
suggested to negatively impact the firms´ performance, in that performance decrease as 
faultlines are stronger. The final objective of this study is to advance in our 
understanding of the dynamics of gender diversity on boards of directors. 
 
The principal proposal in line with the Categorization-Elaboration Model (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2004a), is that women directors offer unique and different task-
relevant information and perspectives, as well skills and competences for enhanced 
elaboration and decision-making, and in this way contribute to improved firm 
performance. 
 
Increasing the women ratio on the board will positively influence their contribution and 
finally the firm´s performance, as it is expected that having more than one women on 
the board will positively enhance their contribution, and change the perception of 
―strangeness‖ of women‘s board participation, thus making it easier for them to be 
heard, being taken into account, and influence the board´s decision. 
 
Social categorization, intergroup bias and faultline division is expected to disrupt the 
effective exchange of ideas and perspectives, as well as influence negatively the internal 
board processes of elaboration and decision-making, thereby reducing the positive 
effects of diversity, and contribute to decreased firm performance. These negative 
effects can be reduced by socialization over time, erasing initial differences and social 
categorizations, taken into account in this study through the moderators of overlap 
board tenure and chair-board shared experience. 
 
The conceptual analysis concerns fundamental principles underlying the contribution of 
diversity, and is aimed to speak to the broad diversity research. The study focuses on 
attributes that are relevant for board diversity research, as well for general group 
diversity research. The main attributes included in previous diversity research are 
gender, age, tenure and ethnicity (van Knippenberg et al., 2011; Thatcher et al., 2003; 
Tsui et al., 1992). However, informational attributes like education level and education 
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background have also received much attention from researchers, thus making abundant 
reference material and previous results available for study (Curseu, Raab and Han, 
2012; Virtanen 2012; Hillman et al., 2002; Kaczmarek et al., 2012b; Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992; Ruigrok et al., 2007).  
 
In this study the following four diversity attributes were chosen as object of study; 
gender, tenure, education level and education background.  
 
The decision of including tenure instead of age is due to the fact that these two 
attributes are often highly correlated, which makes it inconvenient to include both in the 
same study (i.e. in order to achieve a certain tenure it requires time (age), although low 
tenure does not necessarily imply low age) (van Knippenberg et al., 2011). Tenure was 
therefore decided instead of age, as this attributes seemed more relevant for boards 
(Ruigrok et al., 2007; Tuggle et al., 2010; Kaczmarek et al., 2012b).  
 
The reason for including education level and education background is two-fold; first, 
these data are typically available in firms´ annual reports, web pages and executive 
directories and bibliographies. Secondly, as our objective is to study board directors´ 
diversity contribution to firms´ performance, these job-related, informational diversity 
attributes seemed particularly relevant. 
 
Ethnicity was left out of the study, as there are virtually no members from ethnic 
minorities on the boards in Norway and Spain.  
 
5.3. METHODOLOGY 
 
5.3.1. Selection and description of the sample and the national context 
 
The decision was taken to study listed companies, basically due to the fact that most 
research on board diversity is focused on such samples, and also due to the fact this this 
facilitate the information collection. Listed companies are subject to certain legislation 
and good practice norms, requiring publication of financial data and information on 
board composition in their corporate governance reports.  
Research 
138 
 
The starting point was to establish the firms that had been present, on a permanent 
bases, on the Madrid Stock Exchange (Mercado Continuo) and the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (Oslo Børs), during the period from the 1
st
 of January 2012 till the 31
st
 of 
December 2014. In the Spanish case, 112 companies fulfilled this requirement, while in 
the Norwegian case 165 companies were detected. Only companies with a statuary 
domicile in Norway and Spain were included in the sample, because there are large 
differences in diversity between countries, and using companies with a statuary 
domicile in another country could affect the results (Luckerath-Rovers and van Zanten, 
2008). These companies, with statuary domicile outside of Norway and Spain were 
therefore excluded. In line with previous research (Beverley and Shireenjit, 2009; De 
Andrés, Azofra and López, 2005; Fernández-Méndez and Arrondo-García, 2007) 
financial institutions were also excluded because of the special nature and management 
of these companies. 
 
After these corrections, the final sample was 184 firms, of which 89 were Spanish and 
95 Norwegian. 
 
Table 5.1. Establishment of the Norwegian sample. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Establishment of the Spanish sample. 
 
 
Boards in Norway and Spain have similar responsibilities. In both countries they are 
responsible for making sure that the companies are run in a responsible way (monitoring 
Description Nº
Number of firms permanently on the Norwegian Stock Exchange during 2012, 2013 and 2014: 165
Number of firms with statuary domiciliation outside of Norway (excluded): 45
Number of financial institutions (excluded) 25
Number of Norwegian firms included in the study: 95
Source: Prepared by the author
Description Nº
Number of firms permanently on the Spanish Stock Exchange during 2012, 2013 and 2014: 112
Number of firms with statuary domiciliation outside of Spain (excluded): 8
Number of financial institutions (excluded) 15
Number of Spanish firms included in the study: 89
Source: Prepared by the author
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function), for offering support, guidance and strategic advice and direction to the top 
management team (service and strategy function), and for offering crucial access to 
external networks important for the company´s survival (resource provision function). 
The boards also have the formal responsibility of signing the reported accounts and 
audit materials (Norsk anbefaling eierstyring og selskapsledelse, 2014: 23–27, and 
Good governance code of listed companies, CNMV, 2015). 
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 list the Norwegian and the Spanish firms included in the study.  
 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 were tested upon the Global sample (184 firms) as well as upon the 
two subsets, Norway and Spain. Hypothesis 3, 4, and 5, which refers to gender 
faultlines were tested upon the faultline sample, where only firms with two or more 
women board directors were included. The reason for excluding the firms with zero or 
one women director is that gender subgroups cannot form on the basis of just one 
member (Thatcher et al., 2003, Kaczmarek et al., 2012b). The faultline sample was 
therefore reduced to 117 firms, out of which 32 were Spanish and 85 were Norwegian 
firms.  
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Table 5.3. Norwegian firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs), 2012-2014. 
 
Norwegian firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs) 2012-2014
1 AF Gruppen 49 Nordic Semiconductors
2 Aker 50 Norsk Hydro
3 Aker Solutions 51 Norske Skogindustrier
4 AKVA Group 52 Norway Royal Salmon
5 Atea Group 53 Norwegian Air Shuttle
6 Austevoll Seafood 54 Norwegian Energy Company
7 Belships 55 Norwegian Property
8 Bergen Group 56 Oceanteam Shipping
9 Bionor Pharma 57 Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap
10 Biotec Pharmacon 58 Opera Software
11 Birdstep Technology 59 Orkla
12 Blom 60 Petroleum Geo Services 
13 Bonheur 61 Photocure
14 Bouvet group 62 Polaris Media
15 Byggma 63 Protector Forsikring
16 Data Respons 64 PSI Group
17 Det Norske Oljeselskap 65 Q-Free
18 DiaGenic/Nel 66 Rocksource
19 DNO International 67 SalMar
20 DOF 68 Scana Industrier
21 Dolphin Group 69 Schibsted
22 Eidesvik Offshore 70 Sevan Marine
23 Ekornes 71 Siem 
24 Electromagnetic Geoservices 72 Skiens Aktiemølle
25 Eltek 73 Solstad Offshore
26 EVRY 74 Solvang 
27 Farstad Shipping 75 Statoil
28 Fred. Olsen Energy 76 Storebrand 
29 GC Rieber Shipping 77 Telenor
30 Gjensidige 78 Telio Holding
31 Goodtech 79 TGS
32 Grieg Seafood 80 Tide
33 Gyldendal 81 Tomra Systems
34 Hafslund group 82 TTS Group
35 Havila Shipping 83 Veidekke
36 Hexagon Composites 84 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding 
37 Hurtigruten 85 Wilson
38 I.M. Skaugen 86 Yara International
39 InterOil Exploration and Production 87 Arendals Fossekompani
40 Intex Resources 88 Borgestad 
41 Itera 89 Kværner
42 Kitron 90 Reach Subsea
43 Kongsberg A.Holding 91 Selvaag Bolig
44 Kongsberg Group 92 Spectrum
45 Lerøy Seafood Group 93 Storm Real Estate
46 Marine Harvest 94 Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
47 Medistim 95 Borregaard
48 Navamedic
Source: Prepared by the author
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Table 5.4. Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, 2012-2014. 
 
 
Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange (Mercado Continuo) 2012-2014
1 Abengoa 46 Iberpapel Gestion
2 Abertis 47 Indra Sistemas
3 Acciona 48 Industria de Diseño Textil
4 Acerinox 49 Inmobiliaria Colonial
5 Acs 50 Inmobiliaria del Sur 
6 Adolfo Domínguez 51 International Consolidated Airlines Group 
7 Adveo Group Internacional  52 Inypsa
8 Almirall 53 Jazztel
9 Amadeus It Holding 54 Laboratorios Farmacéuticos Rovi
10 Amper 55 Lingotes Especiales
11 Atresmedia 56 Mapfre
12 Azkoyen 57 Mediaset España Comunicación
13 Barón de Ley 58 Meliá Hoteles
14 Biosearch 59 Miquel y Costas 
15 Bodegas Riojanas 60 Montebalito
16 Cementos Portland Valderrivas 61 Natra
17 Cie Automotive 62 NH Hotel Group
18 Clínica Baviera 63 Nicolás Correa
19 Codere 64 Obrascon Huarte Lain 
20 Compañía vinícola del Norte de España 65 Papeles y Cartones de Europa
21 Construcciones y Auxiliar ferrocarriles 66 Prim
22 Deoleo 67 Promotora de Informaciones
23 Día 68 Prosegur
24 Duro Felguera 69 Quabit Inmobiliaria
25 Ebro Foods 70 Realia Business 
26 Elecnor 71 Red Eléctrica Corporación 
27 Enagás 72 Renta Corporación Real Estate
28 Ence Energía y Celulosa 73 Repsol 
29 Endesa 74 Sacyr
30 Ercros 75 Solaría Energía y Medio Ambiente 
31 Faes Farma 76 Sotogrande
32 Ferrovial 77 Técnicas Reunidas
33 Fersa Energías Renovables 78 Technocom Telecomunicaciones y Energía 
34 Fluidra 79 Telefónica
35 Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas 80 Testa Inmuebles en Renta
36 Funespaña 81 Tubacex
37 Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica 82 Tubos Reunidos
38 Gas Natural SDG 83 Uralita (Coemac)
39 General de Alquiler de Maquinaria 84 Urbas Grupo Financiero
40 Grifols 85 Vidrala
41 Grupo Catalana Occidente 86 Viscofan
42 Grupo Empresarial San José 87 Vocento
43 Grupo Ezentis 88 Zardoya Otis
44 Grupo Tavex 89 Zeltia
45 Iberdrola
Source: Prepared by the author
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Comparing the Norwegian and the Spanish firms and their boards one can observe 
certain differences as seen in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5. Information on the total sample of firms and the boards included in the study. 
 
Description of the sample  (184 firms) Number of Norwegian Spanish 
observations Firms Firms
Sample Information
Number of Firms 184 95 89
Number of Board Members 1528 658 870
Number of Women on Board 359 245 114
Company information
Firm Size 184 2.792 15.920
Firm Age 184 56 47
Board Size 184 7 10
Industry 184 95 89
Oil, Gas and Energy 18,48% 26,32% 10,11%
Construction, Basic Materials, Manufacturing…. 25,54% 21,05% 30,34%
Consumer goods 18,48% 11,58% 25,84%
Consumer services 15,76% 16,84% 14,60%
Finance and Real Estate 8,70% 6,32% 11,23%
Telecommunications and Technology 13,04% 17,89% 7,88%
Gender diversity 184 95 89
Number of Firms (0 WOB) 31 1 30
% 16,83% 1,05% 33,70%
Number of Firms (1 WOB) 36 9 27
% 19,55% 9,47% 30,33%
Number of Firms (2 WOB) 51 33 18
% 27,76% 34,73% 20,23%
Number of Firms ( >2 WOB) 66 52 14
% 35,86% 54,75% 15,74%
Uniform Boards (only male BM) 31 1 30
% 16,83% 1,05% 33,70%
Skewed Boards (1% to 20% WOB) 42 6 36
% 22,82% 6,33% 40,45%
Tilted Boards (from 20 to 40% WOB) 81 59 22
% 44,02% 62,11% 24,73%
Balanced Boards (from 40 to 60% WOB) 30 29 1
% 16,31% 30,51% 1,12%
Tenure diversity 1528 658 870
Low Tenure (0 to 4 years) 41,30% 58,95% 22,47%
Medium Tenure (from 4 to 8 years) 41,30% 34,73% 48,31%
High Tenure (more than 8 years) 17,40% 6,32% 29,22%
Average Tenure 5,63 3,86 6,98
Education Level diversity 1528 658 870
No information available 7,46% 0,47% 12,76%
Secondary/Vocational schooling 7,07% 14,39% 1,49%
University Degree 34,88% 31,17% 37,70%
Post Graduate/Master 41,75% 47,27% 37,59%
PhD 8,84% 6,70% 10,46%
Education Background diversity 1528 658 870
No information available 7,46% 0,47% 12,76%
Secondary/Vocational schooling 7,07% 14,39% 1,49%
University Degree in Business and Law 56,15% 52,90% 58,63%
University Degree in Humanities 2,42% 2,43% 2,31%
University Degree in Science 25,33% 29,05% 22,54%
Other University Degrees 1,57% 0,76% 2,18%
Source: Prepared by the author
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Table 5.6. Information on the firms and the boards included in the faultline study. 
 
 
From the above tables, we can see that Norwegian boards are generally smaller than 
Spanish boards, averaging 7 board members in the Norwegian sample, and 10 board 
members in the Spanish sample.  
 
The Spanish firms are much bigger than the Norwegian firms, averaging 15.920 
employees in the Spanish sample, versus 2.792 employees in the Norwegian sample.  
 
Rotation of board members is higher in Norway than in Spain, being the average tenure 
on Norwegian boards 3.86 years, and on Spanish boards 6.98 years.  
 
The participation of women directors constitute another important difference, being 
women to a lesser degree represented on Spanish boards (Carrasco, Laffarga and Ruiz-
Barbadillo, 2011). In our study the average women ratio on Spanish boards is 12.65%, 
and on Norwegian boards 37.05%. 
 
Another important difference between Norwegian and Spanish boards lies in the origin 
of their board members. In Norway, executive directors are recommended to stay out of 
the boardroom. According to the ―Guide of best Practices‖ for companies listed on the 
Description of the faultline sample  (117 firms) Number of Norwegian Spanish 
observations Firms Firms
Number of Firms with WOB > 2 117 85 32
Number of Board Members 947 615 332
Number of Women on Board 323 236 87
Tenure diversity Low Tenure (0 to 4 years) 56,41% 62,35% 40,62%
Medium Tenure (4 to 8 years) 35,90% 32,91% 43,75%
High Tenure (More than 8 years) 7,69% 4,74% 15,63%
Education Level diversity No information available 1,47% 0,32% 3,61%
Secondary/Vocational schooling 10,56% 14,60% 3,01%
University Degree 34,44% 30,40% 38,55%
Post Graduate/Master 45,08% 47,15% 41,26%
PhD 8,45% 7,53% 13,57%
Education Background diversity No information available 1,47% 0,32% 3,61%
Secondary/Vocational schooling 10,56% 14,60% 3,01%
University Degree in Business and Law 58,08% 52,35% 68,67%
University Degree in Humanities 3,27% 3,08% 3,61%
University Degree in Science 25,45% 29,11% 18,67%
Other University Degrees 1,17% 0,54% 2,43%
Source: Prepared by the author
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Oslo Stock Exchange, neither the CEO nor any other member of the executive 
management team should be a member of the board (Norsk anbefaling for eierstyring og 
selskapsledelse, 2014).  However, representatives from the employees are required to 
form part of the board; they have the right to elect up to one third of the board members, 
or minimum two members, depending on the size of the organization. 
 
In Norway, in addition to the corporate boards, it is recommended for companies with 
more than 200 employees, to constitute a corporate assembly.  This assembly, whose 
members are elected at the annual general meeting, represent a broad cross-section of 
the company´s shareholders and stakeholders. Having an assembly is not mandatory, 
and an agreement between the firm and the employees/unions can be reached about 
waiving its existence. In this case the employees are entitled to have one additional 
board member, over and above the one-third they are entitled to by the Norwegian 
Public Limited Liability Companies Act (Allmenaksjeloven, section 6-3 and section 6-
35).   
 
In Spain boards have a mix of executive directors and external directors. The external 
board members are typically of three different origins; (1) Independent board members 
– elected due to their personal and professional profile with no relation to the firm nor 
to the shareholders, (2) Reference shareholders – external board members with a 
significant number of shares, or external board members serving as representatives for 
other mayor shareholders (―dominicales‖) and (3) Other externals – for example the 
previous CEO who after retirement is elected to the board; thus no longer being part of 
the company, however, maintaining a strong link to the organization.  
 
Another characteristic of Spanish boards is duality. This concept refers to the cases 
where the CEO of the company is at the same time the Chairman of the board. Guides 
of best board practices recommend duality to be avoided, as the independence of the 
board is reduced when the firm´s CEO is at the same time the board´s Chair. 
 
Due to these differences in the board compositions of the Norwegian and the Spanish 
boards, this study does not take into account the origins of the board members, although 
we fully understand that this is another source of diversity, as well as a ground for 
faultline formation. 
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Finally, the above mentioned employee representation on Norwegian boards can explain 
the higher percentage of members with Secondary/Vocational schooling in the 
Norwegian sample than in the Spanish sample (14.39% versus 1.49%). 
 
The national context in which the Norwegian and the Spanish boards are embedded. 
Boards are embedded in organizations, which again are embedded in countries. 
Nationality is a super ordinate construct that include both formal and informal factors 
affecting companies and boards (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2012). In order to facilitate a 
better understanding of the national context in which Norwegian and Spanish boards are 
embedded, two such national factors are described below; the national economy and the 
cultural setting. Although these two factors are not included in the study, a control 
variable is included coding the country.  
 
With respect to the national economy, the two countries differ greatly in their GDP.  
Norway, in 2012, had a GDP per-capita of $99,461.55, and was ranked as the second-
wealthiest country in the world in terms of monetary value (International Monetary 
Fund). Spain´s GPD per-capita, in 2012, was $29,288.68 (International Monetary 
Fund).  
 
The unemployment rate in Norway, in 2012, was 3.22% (International Monetary Fund). 
The hourly productivity level, as well as the average hourly wages are among the 
highest in the world. The average monthly earnings for all men in Norway, in 2012, was 
5.161 euros, while the corresponding earnings for women was 4.460 euros; 86% of 
male salaries. Average monthly earnings for senior officials was 7.287 euros, excluding 
overtime pay (SSB, 2012).  
 
In Spain the unemployment rate in 2012 was 25%, and the hourly productivity rate 
situated Spain among the three less productive countries in Europe. The average 
monthly earnings for all men in Spain, in 2012, was 2.149 euros, while the 
corresponding earnings for women was 1.628 euros; 76% of male salaries. Executives 
and managers constituted the occupational group with the highest average monthly 
wage of 4.430 euros, more than twice the average annual wages (INI, 2012).  
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A country´s national culture, defined as a system of collectively held beliefs and values, 
is another important context variable when referring to gender diversity and boards. As 
described earlier cultural patterns of thinking, feeling and acting are acquired in early 
childhood because at that time a person is most susceptible to learning and assimilation. 
These patterns are deeply rooted, and once established within a person´s mind, they are 
unlikely to substantially change through subsequent experiences (Hofstede, 2001).  
 
The institutional environment of the country in which a person has spent the majority of 
his or her formative year‘s influence how people deal with others, how they decipher 
the environment, and how they act. Growing up in a country with a particular 
configuration of formal and informal institutions will therefore have an impact on 
individual´s thinking and acting (Nielsen and Nielsen, 2012).  
 
The literature on cross-cultural management has shown that certain aspects of national 
culture have a pervasive influence on management behavior, and that this can be helpful 
in understanding issues related to top management teams and board of directors 
(Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Wendt, Euwema and van Emmerik, 2009; 
Brodbeck, Frese, Akerblom, Audia, Bakacsi and Bendova, 2000; Gerstner and Day, 
1994; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004).  
 
Gender equality vary from country to country, and this is the reason why national 
culture is relevant when studying issues related to gender. It plays a major role in 
managerial perceptions of gender, and is an important antecedent for women´s 
representation on corporate boards (Carrasco, Francoeur, Labelle, Laffarga and Ruiz-
Barbadillo, 2015). Culturally and legally-oriented national institutional systems count 
for over half of the variation of women´s ratio on corporate boards found in a study 
across 38 countries (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). 
 
The degree to which women have achieved positions of power reflects substantial 
differences between countries. Terjesen et al., ´s study of 43 countries (2009) revealed 
that countries with a higher representation of women on boards were more likely to 
have women in senior management.  
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The Gender Parity Index, measured by the World Economic Forum, is a measure of 
each country´s gender equity in terms of economic participation, educational attainment, 
health, survival and political empowerment. This national measure gives an indication 
of the gender equity per country.  
 
From Hofstede´s national cultural framework (explained in chapter 3) there are two 
dimensions that particularly seem relevant when relating national culture and gender 
equality; (1) power distance and (2) masculinity (Hofstede, 1980, 2001).  
 
With respect to these two dimensions, Norway scores low on power distance and very 
low on masculinity. A low power distance clearly characterizes the Norwegians style; 
hierarchy for convenience only, emphasis on equal rights, accessibility of superiors, 
management as facilitators and decentralized power. Norway is the second most 
feminine society (after Sweden). This means that the ―softer‖ aspects of its culture are 
valued and encouraged such as leveling with others, dialog, consensus, cooperation and 
sympathy for the underdog. An effective manager is a supportive one, and decision-
making is achieved through involvement (Hofstede and McCrae, 2004). 
  
Looking at the Spanish case, one finds that Spain score relatively high on power 
distance, pointing to Spain as a hierarchical society. This means that people accept a 
hierarchical order in which everyone has his/her place, and which needs no further 
justification. (Hofstede and McCrae, 2004). Spain´s medium score on masculinity 
points to a relatively masculine culture.  
 
A recent meta-analysis on women‘s representation on corporate boards in 32 countries 
used these two dimensions of Hofstede´s cultural framework, and found that countries 
with a higher power distance and a higher masculinity index reported lower 
representation of women on boards (Carrasco et al., 2015). 
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Table 5.7. Comparisons of WOB, gender parity and Hofstede´s index of masculinity 
and power distance. 
 
 
Due to these demonstrated differences at the country level; the national economy and 
the culture, as well as the above reported differences between firms and boards of the 
two countries, we find it interesting to, apart from the analysis on the Global sample, 
report the results of the two subsets of the two country samples, and include a 
comparative analysis.   
 
5.3.2. Data collection 
 
Having defined the scope and the time frame of our study to include the 184 firms 
permanently present on the Madrid and Oslo Stock Exchanges, during the time period 
from the 1
st
 of January 2012, till the 31
st
 of December 2014, we proceeded to collect the 
relevant information on each individual firm, the individual board members as of 31
st
 of 
December 2012, and the financial performance of each firm for the study period (2012-
2014). 
 
Table 5.8. is a summary of the variables included in the study, their means and the 
sources of information for our data collection. 
 
  
Country Percentage Country Gender Country Hofstede´s index Country Hofstede´s index
of WOB parity score of  Masculinity of  Power distance
Norway 38 Norway 0,8403 Sweeden 5 Denmark 18
Finland 29,8 Finland 0,8286 Norway 8 Norway 31
France 29,7 Sweeden 0,8159 Netherlands 14 Sweeden 31
Sweeden 26,5 Denmark 0,7777 Denmark 16 Finland 33
Netherlands 25,1 Netherlands 0,7659 Finland 26 Germany 35
Denmark 21,9 Germany 0,7629 Spain 42 UK 35
Germany 21,5 UK 0,7433 France 43 Netherlands 38
UK 21 Spain 0,7266 Germany 66 Italy 50
Italy 15 France 0,6984 UK 66 Spain 57
Spain 14,8 Italy 0,6729 Italy 70 France 68
Source: European Commision, Factsheet WOB, 2014
The World Economic Forum´s Global Gender Gap
http://geert-hofstede.com/
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Table 5.8. Variables, means and sources for the information included in the study. 
 
 
Information on the firms 
The general information about the companies; their size, their age and the industry they 
belong to, was taken from the company´s web pages, their annual reports, and 
information and classifications on the Madrid and the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
Information on the board members  
We searched all boards as of 31
st
 of January 2012, identifying the names of each board 
member. The final sample yielded 1.528 board members; 658 representing directors of 
Norwegian boards, and 870 representing directors of Spanish boards. The information 
we include about each board director was his or her gender, tenure, education level and 
education background (further explained below under ―Variables of the study‖.    
 
The information on the individual Spanish directors was extracted from the National 
Securities Market Commission - CNMV - the official body entrusted with safeguarding 
the transparency of the Spanish Stock Exchange. Listed on this site one find the 
individual firms´ Annual Corporate Governance Reports. Chapter B in these reports 
provides information on the composition of the board, indicating the name of each 
individual board member, his or her position on the board, and the year of their first 
appointment. The origin of the directors, whether executive or non-executive (and 
within non-executive directors, whether independent, reference shareholders or other 
externals) is also reported, although for this study we do not use this information.  
Variables in the Mean Mean Mean Source of information
samples Global Norway Spain
Dependent variable
Tobin´s Q 2014 1,44 1,47 1,40 Stock Exchanges, Data base (SABI) and Annual Reports
Independent variables
Women Ratio 25,25 37,05 12,65 Data base (SABI), Annual Reports, Corporate web sites, Direct 
contactGender Faultline 0,43 0,43 0,41 Data base (SABI), Annual Reports, Corporate web sites, Direct 
contactControl variables
Tobin´s Q 2012 1,35 1,43 1,26 Stock Exchanges, Data base (SABI) and Annual Reports
Firm Size 9166 2838 15920 Stock Exchanges, Data base (SABI) and Annual Reports
Firm Age 51,25 55,22 47 Stock Exchanges, Data base (SABI) and Annual Reports
Board Size 8,33 6,97 10 Stock Exchanges, Data base (SABI) and Annual Reports
Industries Stock Exchanges, Data base (SABI) and Annual Reports
Moderating variables
Critical Mass 20% Data base (SABI), Annual Reports, Corporate web sites, Direct 
contactOverlap Board Tenure 3,21 2,58 4,85 Data base (SABI), Annual Reports, Corporate web sites, Direct 
contactChair-Board Shared Ex. 3,04 2,37 4,80 Data base (SABI), Annual Reports, Corporate web sites, Direct 
contactSource: Prepared by the author
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Education level and education background is not a required information by the CNMV, 
and these data proved to be more difficult and time-consuming to obtain. The sources 
consulted for this fine-grained data collection were corporate web sites, direct contact 
with the CFO and Investor Relations, and business bibliographies. 
 
The information on the individual Norwegian board members were easier to obtain; 
typically each firm´s web site had good files on board members, with information on 
gender, directors‘ board tenure, and education level and education background. 
However in some cases when this information was missing, the fine-grained data 
collection included direct contact with the CFO and Investor Relations, and business 
bibliographies. 
 
Information on firms´ performance  
The data collection included the search for the financial results of the year 2014, thereby 
letting two years pass in order to measure the impact of the board members´ decisions in 
year 2012 upon firm´s financial performance. We controlled too for the financial results 
of 2012. 
 
For the Spanish companies, the data on market capitalization was gathered from Madrid 
Stock Exchange (www.bolsamadrid.es), while the information on assets and liabilities 
was taken from the firm´s annual reports and from the ―El Sistema de Analysis de 
Balances Ibéricos‖ (SABI). This database provides up-to-date economic and financial 
information on all listed Spanish companies.  
 
For the Norwegian companies the gathering of the financial data proved to be more 
complicated that in the Spanish case. While the data on market capitalization was 
provided by the Oslo Stock Exchange, the data on assets and liabilities had to be 
collected one by one, from the firms´ annual reports of 2012 and 2014.  The only public 
and free source of information on Norwegian listed companies‘ financial performance is 
to be found in these reports, published on their web sites, and registered on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. No common free-access data base is available in Norway, which made 
it necessary to create our own data base for this study. 
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5.4. THE VARIABLES OF THE STUDY 
 
The variables of the study, their means and the sources of information are defined in 
Table 5.8. above. In this section we include more information about each variable and 
how each is measured. 
 
5.4.1. Dependent variable 
 
Board composition plays an important role for the firm‘s reputation among investors, 
and is therefore argued to have a greater impact on stock-based rather than for 
accounting-based measures of firm performance (Haslam et al., 2010; Oxelheim and 
Randøy, 2003).  
 
Based on this, we decided upon the stock-based performance measure of Tobin´s Q as 
our dependent variable. The Tobin´s Q is considered a forward-looking and holistic 
performance measure, taking into account both stakeholders´ perceptions of the firm´s 
value, and accounting data like assets and liabilities. It has been used frequently in 
similar research, and has been found, in some studies, to be positively related to gender 
diversity (Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 
2003).  
 
For the calculation of Tobin´s Q, we followed Kaplan and Zingales´ work (1997), 
defining the ratio as the sum of the market value of stock (market capitalization) and the 
book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets, (i.e. so that the book value 
of total assets proxies for their replacement value (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; 
Rose, 2007).  
Market capitalization + Book value of Debt 
           Book value of Assets 
 
In this way, the Tobin‘s Q is a proxy estimate of investor perceptions and confidence as 
to how efficiently firms make use of their assets for a given accounting period 
(Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). If Tobin‘s Q is greater than one, then the market 
value of the shareholders and creditors investment is greater than the amortized 
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historical cost of the assets. Tobin´s Q is a continuous variable, which can take any 
numerical value based on the calculation formula of Kaplan and Zingales (1997).  
We employed a two-year lag between predictors and the performance measure by using 
the stock data and the accounting data related to 2014 (2012+2), allowing for  the time it 
takes for board  composition to influence firm performance 
 
5.4.2. Independent variables 
 
Gender diversity  
Gender diversity is measured as the percentage of female board members over the total 
number of board members - women ratio - , a measure majorly used in previous gender 
research (Wellalage and Locke, 2013; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012;  Bøhren and Strøm, 
2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; 
Smith et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; Singh et al., 2001; 
Haslam et al., 2010; Rose, 2007).   
 
Gender diversity is a continuous variable, and its values can be from 0 to 100. 
 
Gender faultline 
We establish each board´s gender faultline, using an index that measure the degree of 
alignment of the directors´ diversity attributes with the gender subgroup. The three 
diversity attributes selected for this index are tenure, education level and education 
background, as we believe these diversity attributes are particularly relevant for board 
work. Thus alongside gender, we measure the alignment of tenure, education level and 
education background.  
 
Gender is generally considered a social category attribute, while tenure, education level 
and education background are considered informational diversity attributes. Some 
faultline researchers have distinguished between faultlines based on social category 
attributes (e.g., race, gender and age), and informational attributes (e.g., function, 
education and tenure) (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Molleman, 2005; Zimmermann, 2011). 
The original research by Lau and Murnighan (1998), which was later followed up by 
subsequent researchers, show however that it is possible to simultaneously investigate 
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the alignment of both social and informational category attributes (Bezrukova et al., 
2009; Thatcher et al., 2003; Thatcher and Patel, 2012; Rico et al., 2007).  
 
In this work we argue, following van Knippenberg et al., (2004a), that the frontier 
between social category and informational faultlines is not so clear, as any diversity 
attribute can at the same time give rise to both informational as well as social 
differences. Consider for example gender; throughout this study we propose the distinct 
contribution of women directors on boards, based on their informational contribution of 
task relevant information and skills. 
 
The empirical approaches to measure faultlines have broadly focused on two aspects; 
(1) faultline strength and (2) faultline distance. Faultline strength measures the degree of 
alignment among group members across several attributes (Thatcher et al., 2003), while 
faultline distance is the extent to which subgroups diverge as a result of accumulated 
differences between subgroups (Bezrukova et al., 2009). Our study is focused on 
faultline strength, measuring the degree of alignment across the four selected diversity 
attributes.  
Research has come up with different measures of faultlines as reported in table 5.9.  
 
Table 5.9. Different ways to measure faultlines and their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Author(s) Advantages Disadvantages
Widely used measure Limits number of subgroups to two
Consistent and accepted results Results depend on scales of measures
Most extended method when it is 
necessary to analyze more than two 
subgroups for each group.
Consistent and widely used results
Results are biased when distributions are 
skewed.
Less used (and accepted) measure
Can measure several attributes of 
faultlines such as inter-subgroup 
disparity, number of homogeneous 
subgroups, and degree of subgroups 
evenness.
Biased by group size.
Test alignment of attributes Does not measure width.
Less used measure.
Source: Prepared by the author
Trezzini                        
(PMD)
Thatcher et. al.                        
(Fau Index)
Meyer & Glenz                      
(ASW)
Large group samples required
Shaw et. al.                            
(FLS)
Simultaneously measures inter and intra-
subgroup heterogeneity.
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Thatcher et al´s Fau Index (2003) calculate the faultline strength (how a group splits 
into subgroups) assuming the existence of two subgroups, representing in this way the 
initial idea of Lau and Murnighan (1998) of maximizing the faultline strength when 
there are two subgroups (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). The index is flexible enough to 
accommodate both continuous and categorical attributes, and is based upon a clustering 
approach measuring the percentage variance explained by attribute alignment across the 
strongest group split. This index is the most frequently applied in the diversity literature 
(Thatcher and Patel, 2012) and represents a reliable measure of subgroup formation 
(Meyer and Glenz, 2013). The measure of Meyer and Glenz (2013) particularize 
subgroup numbers to the most useful number for each group, and could therefore 
include many subgroups within one board. The measure suggested by Shaw (2004) and 
Trezzini (2008) do not include any advantage to the previous listed measures, however 
both have some disadvantages that could affect this study. In the measure suggested by 
Shaw (2004) the results could be biased if the distribution is skewed, and in the measure 
suggested by Trezzini (2008), the results are biased by group size, which could affect 
the study due to the different sizes of the boards. 
 
Taking this into account, and considering the particularity to this study, pretending to 
measure two ―fixed‖ subgroups, the male and the female subgroup on the board, we 
consider that the Fau Index (Thatcher et al., 2003) is the most applicable for this study.  
 
The Fau Index formula is expressed as: 
 
 
A board contain a total of n members who are measured on p characteristics.  
A faultline can split this board into two subgroups in a total of S = 2n–1 – 1 ways.  
xijk denotes the value of the j
th
 characteristic of the i
th
 member of subgroup k  
x•j• denotes the overall group mean of characteristic j  
x•jk denotes the mean of characteristic j in subgroup k 
n
g
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As in Thatcher et  al.,´s study (2003), we only consider board splits in which each 
subgroup has at least two members (e.g., not allowing subgroups of size one), based on 
the argument that a subgroups with only one person do not really constitute a group. 
This is also in accordance with the study of Kaczmarek et al., (2012b) considering only 
group splits in which the size of each sub-group has at al least two members.  
 
This has a great impact on our study, as the bases for the subgroup division is gender, 
and hence only boards with two or more women directors could be included in this 
study. In the Norwegian sample of 95 firms, 85 fulfilled the requirement, while in the 
Spanish sample, only 32 out of 89 firms fulfilled the requirement, thus reducing the 
sample available for the faultline study to 117 firms. 
 
For the calculation of faultline strength (Fau Index), we used a software developed by 
Meyer and Glenz (2013) recommended and facilitated by the authors.  
 
The Fau index is a continuous variable that gives values between zero and one, with 
larger values indicating stronger faultlines. A value of zero means that there is no 
alignment between the attributes included in the sample, being the board members 
totally heterogeneous. A value of one means that the board is split into two 
homogeneous subgroups with perfect alignment between in-members of each subgroup.  
  
As earlier explained, we pre-established the two gender subgroups, and calculated the 
faultline strength of the alignment of the other three attributes (tenure, education level 
and education background) to these two subgroups.  
 
We will now comment on each of the three diversity attributes, which besides gender, 
make up the alignment measured by our faultline index. 
 
Director´s tenure on the board 
The director‘ tenure refers to the number of years the director has participated on the 
board, from his or her first year of appointment, to the year of our study (2012). As an 
example, if a director was appointed in year 2011, the tenure is one (2012-2011). 
Differences in directors‘ tenure may give rise to subgroupings as similarity in time of 
board appointment may facilitate both attraction and interaction (O‘Reilly et al., 1989). 
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Tenure can also be associated with status or authority within a board, giving rise to 
social categorization and intergroup bias.   
 
Tenure is of a continuous nature, and can take any value from zero and upwards. As this 
variable is used for the calculation of the faultline index, it becomes necessary to 
classify tenure values into artificial categorizations, leading to a certain loss of measure 
validity. However, artificial categorizations, based typically on the standard deviation or 
the mean tenure of the directors, is quite frequent in the diversity research including 
tenure as a diversity attribute (Hambrick et al., 1996; Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; 
Tuggle et al., 2010; Bao, Fainshmidt, Nair and Vracheva, 2012).  Wiersema and 
Bantel´s study (1992) used as a cut-off point for low tenure, the mean tenure for the 
sample minus one standard deviation, classifying tenure into two categories, low and 
high tenure.  
 
In our study, in order to establish the categorizations of the tenure attribute of the 
Norwegian and Spanish board members, we calculated the means, the standard 
deviations (Hambrick et al., 1996) and the percentiles for both countries separately, and 
over the Global sample.  
 
Table 5.10. Mean, standard deviation and percentiles of board members‘ tenure in the 
overall Global sample. 
 
 
The following three tenure groups were established:    
 
1 – Low tenure: From 0 to < 4 years 
2 – Medium tenure: From 4 to 8 years 
3 – High tenure: More than 8 years 
Tenure % Global sample Spain Norway
Total board members 1528 870 658
Mean 5,61 6,93 3,86
Standard deviation 7,09 8,18 4,42
Percentiles 25 1,00 2,00 1,00
50 4,00 5,00 3,00
75 7,00 10,00 5,00
Source: Prepared by the author
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Director´s education level and education background 
Differences in directors‘ education level, defined as board members‘ highest 
educational achievement, and directors‘ education background, defined as board 
members‘ curriculum of study (Curseu et al., 2012), may give rise to faultlines, as 
similarity in education may facilitate identification and attraction between members 
(Lau and Murnigham, 1998; Pelled, 1996)  
 
Directors´ education level  
Education level has been coded in many different ways in different studies. Curseu et 
al., (2012) coded five levels, using ―primary school‖ as the lowest level, and ―PhD‖ as 
the highest level of academic achievement. Virtanen (2012) in her study of Finnish 
Board members used five levels; ―PhD, Master´s Degrees, Engineering graduate, 
polytechnic education, Vocational education and other education‖, thus mixing 
education level and content. Hillman et al., (2002) coded four categories in their study 
of board member´s education level, namely; ―Some College, Under-graduate degree, 
Master‘s degree, and PhD degree‖. Ruigrok et al., (2007) in their study of board 
composition of Swiss companies, measured educational level according to four 
categories; ―Less than Bachelor‘s degree, Less than Master‘s degree, Less than 
Doctorate (including Master‘s and other postgraduate degrees) and PhD degrees‖. 
Finally, Kaczmarek et al., (2012b) in their study of board faultlines, defined five 
categories classified as ―School/Vocational., Bachelor, Master, MBA and PhD‖. 
  
We follow Kaczmarek et al., ´s  (2012b) coding of educational levels of board members. 
However, we include Master and MBA in the same classification of Postgraduate 
Master Degrees, following the criteria of the Declaration of Bologna (1999) adapting an 
overall EU system of two educational cycles at the University level, "Undergraduate 
studies" and "Graduate studies‖ corresponding to Bachelor and Masters Degrees, and 
classify;  
 
0 – No information available 
1 – School/Vocational  
2 – Bachelor (University undergraduate studies) 
3 – Postgraduate Masters Degrees 
4 – PhD  
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Directors´ education background 
In Ruigrok et al., ´s (2007) study of board directors‘ education background, four 
categories were used; business studies, technical studies, law studies and other studies.  
For our faultline analysis, we follow this coding, but include a category for the 
disciplines of Humanities, and include Law as part of business and management studies. 
We categorize as follows: 
 
0 – No information available 
1 – School/Vocational 
2 – Business and management studies (including administration, management and law)  
3 – Humanities  
4 – Technical studies (including science and engineering) 
5 – Other studies  
 
An important decision with respect to this categorization was taken; when assigning 
Education background category for board members with Post-graduate, Masters, or PhD 
degrees, it was done following the criteria of their Undergraduate University degree 
(e.g. an Engineer with an MBA degree, is recorded in this variable as a 4 corresponding 
to University degree in Technical studies. His or her MBA degree is reflected and taken 
into account in the variable Education level as a ―3‖, corresponding to Postgraduate 
Masters Degrees. 
 
5.4.3. Moderating variables 
 
Critical mass  
Most studies on critical mass begin with Kanter´s seminal work of 1977 on women 
working in a male-dominated Fortune 500 firm, and how the women ratio affects 
process interaction. In her analysis, Kanter established four categories of gender 
composition of work-groups: (1) uniform groups where all members were male, (2) 
skewed groups with a women ratio of 20% or less, (3) tilted groups with a women ratio 
from 20 to 40%, and (4) balanced groups with a women ratio of 40 to 60%. 
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We follow Kanter´s (1977) classification in our establishment of the critical mass 
measure of women directors, fixing the threshold to a specific women ratio on the board 
(>20%), instead of an exact number of women directors.  
 
Many studies however, fix the critical mass threshold to an exact number of women on 
the board, following the Asch experiments of 1951 and 1955, proposing that critical 
mass is reached with the exact number of three people. Konrad et al., (2008) 
corroborated this by suggested that the critical mass of women directors on boards is 
reached when there is ―at least three women‖ on the board. Post et al., (2011) also found 
that three women on the board seemed to be a critical threshold.  
 
Elstad and Ladegard (2012) in their study of 458 women directors on Norwegian 
corporate boards, with a women ratio ranging from 11 to 100%, found that having two 
or more woman on the board was a critical limit for increased perceived influence for 
each woman on the board.  
 
For our study however, we believe that the percentage of women directors on boards is 
a more relevant measure than a fixed number of women, due to the fact that board sizes 
vary substantially across the sample, having a minimum of two and a maximum of 
eighteen members. As an example, consider a board of four members (quite usual in 
Norway) with two female and two male directors. According to the above proposal of a 
critical mass threshold of three women, these boards would not fulfill the critical mass 
criteria, in spite of having a women ratio of 50%.  
 
We propose a critical mass measure based on women ratio, following Kanter´s (1977) 
categories of group composition, and most recently used in Joecks et al., ´s study of 
German boards (2013). These authors found that skewed boards performed worse than 
uniform boards, and that tilted boards performed better than skewed boards, thus 
confirming Kanter´s proposal of reaching a critical mass with tilted boards.  
 
According to this, four categories of gender composition on boards were defined: 
  
1. Uniform boards - Board with only male board members.  
2. Skewed boards – Boards with up to 20% women directors. 
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3. Tilted boards - Board with >20 and up to 40% women directors. 
4. Balanced boards - Board with > 40 and up to 60% women directors. 
 
The moderating variable of critical mass is a dichotomous variable (dummy variable) 
used to distinguish different treatment groups. We have assigned a 0 value to all the 
firms that have uniform or skewed boards, indicating a women ratio of 0 to 20%. To the 
firms with tilted or balanced boards, indicating a women ratio above 20%, the value of 1 
was assigned.  
 
Critical mass is considered obtained from tilted boards (from 20%) and upwards. 
 
Overlap board tenure  
With this variable we measure the time the board members have been together 
(overlapped) on the board, as a proxy for their social interaction over a time span. This 
measure has been used both in board context (Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2011), 
as well as in TMT research (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Kor, 2006; Carroll and 
Harrison, 1998; Harris and McMaham, 2008).  
 
Overlap board tenure is calculated by summing up pairwise overlaps in terms of board 
tenure for all possible pairs on the board, and dividing it by the number of pairs of the 
board, indicating an average overlap tenure of board members.  
 
Below is an example of how this calculation is done for a board with four members and 
the following tenures: 
 
Board member 1  5 years tenure 
Board member 2  2 years tenure 
Board member 3  4 years tenure  
Board member 4  4 years tenure 
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Table 5.11. Board members, tenure, overlap board tenure and total overlap. 
 
 
The overlap board tenure is a continuous variable which can take any value from zero 
and upwards. In our samples the mean Norwegian overlap board tenure reported 2.58 
years, while the Spanish overlap board tenure was 4.85 years.  
 
Chair-board shared experience  
Chair-board shared experience, is based on the same argument; the positive impact on 
the board ´s performance of the overlap board tenure, emphasizing the role of the chair 
as an integrator of the board. This moderator was previous used by Georgakakis and 
Ruigrok in their study of TMTs (2014).  
 
The chair-board shared experience is calculated in a similar way as the overlap board 
tenure, summing up the overlapping tenures between the chair and each of the other 
board members, and finally dividing the sum between the total numbers of pairs 
generated.  
 
Below is an example of how this calculation is done for a board with four members and 
the following tenures: 
 
Chair 1   10 year tenure 
Board member 2  5 years tenure 
Board member 3  2 years tenure  
Board member 4  4 years tenure 
 
Overlap with Overlap with Overlap with Overlap with Total
Board members Tenure board member 1 board member 2 board member 3 board member 4 Overlap
1 5 2 4 4 10
2 2 2 2 4
3 4 4 4
4 4
18
The overlap tenure is: 18/6 = 3
Source: Prepared by the author
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Table 5.12. Chair, board members, tenure and Chair-board shared experience. 
 
 
The chair-board shared experience is a continuous variable which can take any value 
from zero and upwards. In our samples the mean Norwegian chair-board shared 
experience reported 2.37 years, while the Spanish chair-board shared experience was 
4.80 years, similar to those of the overlap board tenure.  
 
5.4.4. Control variables  
 
As variables for control, typically used by previous research on corporate governance 
using financial data as outcomes, variables related to the company, to the board, to the 
industry and to the context are considered. 
 
Control variables related to the company. 
Past firm performance is a common predictor for future performance (Geletkanycz and 
Boyd, 2011; Tian et al., 2011; Tuggle et al., 2010). Geletkanycz and Boyd (2011) point 
out that its inclusion as a control variable also helps to mitigate concerns over model 
misspecification; to the extent that when unobserved factors impact a firm‘s future 
performance, prior performance should at least partly capture them. Moreover, poor 
firm performance may lead the board to take a more active role (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001).  
 
Past firm performance for the accounting year 2012 was measured by the stock-based 
measure of Tobin‘s Q. Tobin´s Q is a continuous variable, which can take any 
numerical value based on the calculation formula of Kaplan and Zingales (1997).  
 
Overlap with 
Board members Tenure board members 
Chair 10
2 5 5
3 2 2
4 4 4
11
The Chair-Board shared experience is: 11/3 = 3,67
Source: Prepared by the author
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Firm size has been suggested by scholars to be related to the firm´s performance, and 
has therefore been included as a control factor in previous board research (De Andrés et 
al., 2005; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Ruigrok et al., 2006). It is measured by the 
logarithm of the firm‘s total number of employees in the study‘s reference year (He and 
Huang, 2011; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Firm size is a continuous variable that can 
take any numerical value. 
 
Firm age has also been seen as influencing the level of firm resources, its growth 
potential and its performance (Beverley and Shireenjit, 2009; Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2009). It is measured as the number of years since the firm‘s founding until the end of 
2012.  
 
Firm age is a continuous variable that can take any numerical value. 
 
Control variables related to the board.  
Group size is often used as a control variable in faultline research (Barkema and 
Shvyrkov, 2007; Bezrukova, Spell and Perry, 2010; Li and Hambrick, 2005), as it 
seems that when size increases, members‘ liking for the teams decreases (Klein, Diaz 
Granados, Salas, Le, Burke, Lyons and Goodwin, 2009) thus, members in large teams 
seek out similar team members (Hamilton, Puntoni and Tavassoli, 2010), resulting in 
the creation of subgroups. Large boards could therefore have a higher probability of 
faultline subgroupings.  
 
Board size is a continuous variable that indicate the number of board members on a 
board and can take any numerical value from one and upwards. 
 
Control variable related to the industry.  
A number of studies suggest that industry is significant in explaining the representation 
or the under-representation of women on corporate boards (Fryxell and Lerner, 1989; 
Harrigan, 1981). Some studies present correlations between a particular industry and an 
increased number of women on the boards, for example retail, finance, media, banking, 
and health care (Fryxell and Lerner, 1989; Brammer et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 2007). 
Harrigan (1981) found that women directors were more prevalent in industries that 
produce women´s products. Burgess and Tharenou (2002) found that women executive 
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directors were more likely to be employed in higher occupational types, the public 
sector, and in larger organizations.  Brammer et al., (2007) suggested that industry´s 
proximity to consumers plays a more significant role in board diversity than does 
industry workforce.  
 
The sample used in this study includes firms from a variety of industries. A control 
variable is introduced in order to account for any specific industry trends in the results. 
For the classification of the Spanish and the Norwegian companies the code that was 
used was the code established for the Spanish stock market and the financial systems 
operator BME (Bolsas y Mercados Españoles): 
 
1. Oil, Gas and Energy 
2. Construction, Manufacturing, Basic materials, and Engineering 
3. Consumer Goods 
4. Consumer Services 
5. Finance and Real Estate (in our study only Real Estate companies)  
6. Telecommunications and Technology 
  
For the control variable related to the industries, dummy variables were used to 
distinguish the different groups. Each time we checked for one industry, that specific 
industry was assigned the value of 1, while all the others were assigned the value of 0. 
In that way, six industry variables were tested.  
 
Control variable related to the country.  
Finally, as we perform the analysis and report the results for the Global sample, the 
Norwegian sample and the Spanish sample, the country is a final control variable. 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, we present the empirical results of our investigation of the relationship 
between board of director diversity and firm performance. We test our hypotheses of a 
positive effect of women directors on boards on firm financial performance, while 
controlling for some of the idiosyncratic and unobservable factors that may 
simultaneously affect a company‘s performance and make its work environment more 
or less congenial to women directors. Our analysis is conducted over the Global sample, 
as well as over each of the two country samples separately (Norway and Spain), and the 
results are reported correspondingly for these three separate samples.  
 
To test the effect of women on boards upon firm financial performance we measured 
gender diversity as the percentage of women directors over the total number of board 
members and the firm´s Tobin´s Q. We tested for positive moderating effects of this 
relationship by a critical mass of above 20% women on boards. Further, we analyzed 
the effects of gender faultlines on boards, created on the bases of alignment of the 
diversity characteristics of gender, tenure, and education level and education 
background upon firm performance measured by Tobin´s Q, a relationship we predicted 
negative. Finally we tested for a positive moderation of this negative relationship by 
overlap board tenure and chair-board shared experience.  
 
In this chapter we first present the description of the variables included in the study, the 
testing of the principle assumptions for using linear regression, and the correlations for 
the Global sample and for the two subsets samples. Then we present an analysis on 
reverse causalty and endogeneity, and finally the regression analysis for the women on 
board study and the gender faultline study, for the three samples.  
 
6.2. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 
We start our analysis presenting the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in 
the study.  
 
The below tables, 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, contains these descriptive statistics for the Global 
sample, the Norwegian sample and the Spanish sample.  
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Table 6.1. Descriptive analysis of the variables included in the study (Global sample). 
 
 
Table 6.2. Descriptive analysis of the variables of the study (Norwegian sample). 
  
Min. Max. Mean
Standard 
deviation
Dependent variable
Tobin´s Q 2014 0,43 8,28 1,44 1,01
Independent variables
Women Ratio 0 60 25,25 16,33
Gender Faultline 0,18 0,88 0,43 0,13
Control variables
Tobin´s Q 2012 0,43 7,95 1,35 0,93
Firm Size 6 272598 9216 28745
Firm Age 2 358 51,25 52,42
Board Size 2 18 8,33 2,97
Oil, gas, energy 0 1
Construction, basic materials, engineering… 0 1
Goods 0 1
Services 0 1
Real Estate 0 1
Telecom, Technology 0 1
Moderating variables
Critical Mass 20% 0 1
Overlap Board Tenure 0 14,67 3,21 2,67
Chair-Board Shared Experience 0 12,67 3,04 2,33
Source: prepared by the author
Variables (Global sample)
Variables (Norwegian sample) Min. Max. Mean
Standard 
deviation
Dependent variable
Tobin´s Q 2014 ,64 8,28 1,47 1,10
Independent variables
Women Ratio 0 60 37,05 9,62
Gender Faultline ,18 ,78 0,43 0,12
Control variables
Tobin´s Q 2012 ,66 5,61 1,43 0,86
Firm Size 6 25667 2868 5152
Firm Age 2 358 55,22 66,39
Board Size 2 11 6,97 2,04
Oil, gas, energy 0 1
Construction, basic materials, engineering… 0 1
Goods 0 1
Services 0 1
Real Estate 0 1
Telecom, Technology 0 1
Moderating variables
Critical Mass 20% 0 1
Overlap Board Tenure 0 14,67 2,58 2,17
Chair-Board Shared Experience 0 10,90 2,37 1,66
Source: prepared by the author
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Table 6.3. Descriptive analysis of the variables of the study (Spanish sample). 
 
 
As linear regression is based on assumptions that condition and justify its use, before 
proceeding with the regression analysis, we check for the following assumptions:  
 
1. That there is a linear and additive relationship between the dependent variable of 
Tobin´s Q 2014 and the independent variables.   
2. That the variables are normally distributed. 
3. That the residuals are independent and not auto correlated. 
4. That the variance of the residuals is the same across all levels (Homoscedasticy).  
5. That there is no or little multicollinearity between the variables. 
6. That the data used in the study contribute to the most reliable prediction of the 
expected relation between the variables. 
 
Our first step will be to check whether the relationship between the dependent variable 
Tobin´s Q 2014 and the independent variables constitute a linear relationship.  
 
A good way to check for a linear and additive relationship is by a scatter plot, obtaining 
a visual representation of the residuals, their concentration and their dispersion. 
Variables (Spanish sample) Min. Max Mean
Standard 
deviation
Dependent variable
Tobin´s Q 2014 0,43 6,00 1,40 0,90
Independent variables
Women Ratio 0 56 12,65 12,04
Gender Faultline 0,24 0,88 0,41 0,14
Control variables
Tobin´s Q 2012 0,43 7,95 1,26 1,01
Firm Size 11 272598 15920 39907
Firm Age 3 148 47 31
Board Size 4 18 10 3
Oil, gas, energy 0 1
Construction, basic materials, engineering… 0 1
Goods 0 1
Services 0 1
Real Estate 0 1
Telecom, Technology 0 1
Moderating variables
Critical Mass 20% 0 1
Overlap Board Tenure 0 13,00 4,85 3,15
Chair-Board Shared Experience 0,73 12,67 4,80 2,90
Source: prepared by the author
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As the regression model is run in sequences (Model 1 to 4), some of the analysis below 
indicate the results of the corresponding model. Model 1 is the baseline model including 
all the control variables, Model 2 tests the principal relationship including the control 
variables and the independent variable, and Model 4 includes the moderation. 
 
Figure 6.1. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio  
(Global sample). 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio 
(Norwegian sample). 
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Figure 6.3. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio  
(Spanish sample). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline  
(Global sample). 
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Figure 6.5. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline  
(Norwegian sample). 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline  
(Spanish sample) 
 
 
Linear regression is sensitive to outlier effects, and just by visualizing the above scatter 
plots, four values of the Tobin´s Q 2014 seems to represent outliers that could possibly 
distort our predictions.  
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This leads us to an analysis of the variables in order to check for normal distribution. 
The information obtained from the above descriptive analysis of the variables (tables 
6.1, 6.2 and 6.3) can give us a first impression, as it contains information on the 
minimum, maximum and mean values, as well as the standard deviation of all variables 
included in the study. By a quick visual check of these data, we find that in all three 
samples, the maximum value of Tobin´s Q 2014 is higher than the general rule of three 
times its standard deviation (In the Global and the Norwegian sample the maximum 
value for Tobin´s Q 2014 was 8.28 versus the standard deviation of 1.10, and in the 
Spanish sample the maximum Tobin´s Q 2014 was 6.0 versus the standard deviation of 
0.90).  
 
In addition to this first check, we run a case analysis available within the SPSS in order 
to establish the residuals that are further away from its mean than three times its 
standard deviation. 
 
Table 6.4. Case analysis of the variables 
 
 
This analysis confirms the dispersion detected in the scatter plots and in the descriptive 
analysis of the variables, and points towards four cases (companies) with abnormal high 
Tobin´s Q. After having verified the original data and the calculation of the Tobin´s Q 
2014, in order to check for human errors, we conclude that the data are correct. Whether 
and how these four values affect in a significant way the overall relationship between 
Tobin´s Q 2014 and the independent variables, and thereby influencing our results, will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Our next step in checking the principal assumptions calls for an analysis of the residuals 
and their independence. The Durbin-Watson statistics is generally used to detect the 
presence of auto correlation between residuals. The results of this statistics present a 
Cases
Standardized 
Residuals
Tobin´s Q 
2014
Predicted 
value 
Residual 
value
10 5,365 7,06 1,890 5,170
49 6,498 8,28 2,019 6,261
143 4,486 5,70 1,377 4,323
183 4,740 6,00 1,432 4,568
Source: prepared by the author
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value from 0 to 4, where the value of 2 indicates independence between residuals. 
Values below 2 indicate a positive auto correlation and values above 2 indicate a 
negative auto correlation. Generally one can assume that the residuals are independent 
when the Durbin-Watson takes a value between 1.5 and 2.5. 
 
Table 6.5. Durbin-Watson statistics of the relationships Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women 
ratio, and Tobin‘s 2014 and Faultline (all three samples). 
 
 
 
As all values of the Durbin-Watson are between 1.5 and 2.5 we can assume that the 
residuals are independent. 
 
Our next step is to check for the assumption that the variance of the residuals is the 
same across all levels of the predicted values (homoscedasticity), and therefore 
independent from the values of the predictions. This assumption can be checked by 
visual examination of a scatter plot of the standardized residuals as a function of 
standardized predicted values. The results should not show any pattern or relation 
between the values. In case of marked patterns (heteroscedasticity) the results usually 
lead to serious distortion.  
 
  
Relationship Durbin- 
Watson
Woman ratio and Tobin´s Q 2014 
Global sample 1,864
Norwegian sample 1,688
Spanish sample 1,967
Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 
Global sample 1,899
Norwegian sample 1,775
Spanish sample 2,397
Source: prepared by the author
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Figure 6.7. Scatter plot of the standardized residuals as a function of standardized 
predicted values in the relationship between Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio  
(Global sample) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Scatter plot of the standardized residuals as a function of standardized 
predicted values in the relationship between Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline  
(Global sample) 
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From the scatter plot it seems that the residuals are independent from the predicted 
values, as the point cloud does not project any significant pattern. One observation 
however is that as the values of the residuals increase, the dispersion also seems to 
increase; implying that the lower value residuals are closer to the mean are more 
concentrated than the higher value residuals.   
 
Our next step is to check for multicollinearity between the variables. Multicollinearity 
occurs when the independent variables are not independent from each other. 
Multicollinearity might be tested with four central criteria; tolerance, variance inflation 
factor (VIF), condition index and correlation matrix. 
 
Tolerance measures the influence of one independent variable on all the other 
independent variables, and is defined as T=1-R2 When T<0.1 there might be 
multicollinearity in the data and with T<0.01 there certainly is.  
 
The VIF is defined as 1/T.  If VIF>10 there is an indication that multicollinearity could 
be present. A VIF>100 confirm that there certainly is multicollinearity in the sample. 
 
The condition index is calculated using a factor analysis on the independent variables. 
Values of 10-30 indicate a mediocre multicollinearity in the linear regression variables, 
while values >30 indicate strong multicollinearity. 
 
Table 6.6. Tolerance, VIF and Condition index of the regression analysis of Tobin´s Q 
2014 and Women ratio (all three samples). 
 
Min. Max. Max.
Tolerance VIF Condition index
Global sample
Model 1 0,073 13,651 25,713
Model 2 0,073 13,671 27,886
Norwegian sample
Model 1 0,078 12,788 24,830
Model 2 0,078 12,803 27,782
Spanish sample
Model 1 0,046 21,759 30,864
Model 2 0,046 21,798 32,825
Source: prepared by the author
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Table 6.7. Tolerance, VIF and Condition index of the regression analysis of Tobin´s Q 
2014 and Faultline (all three samples). 
 
 
The above values for minimum tolerance and maximum VIF indicate low levels of 
multicollinearity. The maximum condition index, in Model 2 in the Global and the 
Norwegian sample, and in Model 1 and 2 in the Spanish sample is close to 30, a limit 
value indicating mediocre multicollinearity. Taking all values into account we consider 
that no serious multicollinearity between the independent variables is existing.   
 
Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 contain the correlations between the variables in the Global 
sample, the Norwegian sample and the Spanish sample. 
Min. Max. Max.
Tolerance VIF Condition index
Global sample
Model 1 0,104 9,581 21,612
Model 2 0,104 9,593 25,523
Norwegian sample
Model 1 0,088 11,398 24,393
Model 2 0,087 11,504 28,773
Spanish sample
Model 1 0,082 12,201 21,138
Model 2 0,076 13,141 30,123
Source: prepared by the author
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lts Table 6.8. Correlations between the variables (Global sample). 
  
Nº Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Correlación de Pearson 1
Sig. (bilateral)
2 Correlación de Pearson ,297
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,000
3 Correlación de Pearson ,237
**
,865
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,001 ,000
4 Correlación de Pearson ,141 ,112 ,121 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,130 ,231 ,194
5 Correlación de Pearson ,791
**
,261
**
,255
** ,100 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,000 ,000 ,001 ,284
6 Correlación de Pearson ,045 -,127 -,088 -,154 ,067 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,547 ,086 ,234 ,098 ,368
7 Correlación de Pearson -,016 ,030 ,095 -,067 -,059 ,063 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,827 ,689 ,202 ,475 ,425 ,396
8 Correlación de Pearson -,037 -,355
**
-,292
**
-,387
** -,124 ,419
**
,168
* 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,616 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,094 ,000 ,023
9 Correlación de Pearson -,147
* ,118 ,110 ,028 -,037 -,073 -,134 -,143 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,048 ,110 ,137 ,761 ,624 ,327 ,070 ,053
10 Correlación de Pearson -,009 -,082 -,047 -,039 -,046 ,083 ,062 ,162
*
-,279
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,900 ,270 ,529 ,675 ,534 ,264 ,405 ,028 ,000
11 Correlación de Pearson ,078 -,134 -,118 -,106 ,030 -,049 ,052 -,030 -,227
**
-,279
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,295 ,070 ,111 ,255 ,683 ,505 ,482 ,690 ,002 ,000
12 Correlación de Pearson -,002 ,004 ,025 -,107 -,050 ,035 ,144 ,123 -,206
**
-,253
**
-,206
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,976 ,953 ,737 ,251 ,502 ,634 ,051 ,097 ,005 ,001 ,005
13 Correlación de Pearson -,115 -,117 -,097 ,261
** -,116 -,095 -,021 -,074 -,147
*
-,181
*
-,147
* -,133 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,122 ,113 ,189 ,004 ,118 ,198 ,777 ,321 ,047 ,014 ,047 ,071
14 Correlación de Pearson ,158
*
,224
** ,125 ,029 ,187
* ,081 -,073 -,031 -,197
** -,137 -,197
**
-,179
* -,128 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,033 ,002 ,090 ,754 ,011 ,276 ,322 ,678 ,007 ,063 ,007 ,015 ,083
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Source: Prepared by the author
TOBIN´S Q 2012
FIRM SIZE
FIRM AGE
BOARD SIZE
SERVICES
REAL ESTATE
TELECOM, 
TECHNOLOGY
OIL, GAS, ENERGY
CONSTRUCTION, 
ENGENEERING
GOODS
TOBIN´S Q 2014
WOMEN RATIO
CRITICAL MASS 20%
FAULTLINE
  
 
1
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Table 6.9. Correlations between the variables (Norwegian sample). 
  
Nº Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Correlación de Pearson 1
Sig. (bilateral)
2 Correlación de Pearson ,517
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,000
3 Correlación de Pearson ,190 ,599
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,066 ,000
4 Correlación de Pearson ,062 ,082 .
d 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,574 ,456 0,000
5 Correlación de Pearson ,703
**
,339
** ,081 ,019 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,000 ,001 ,434 ,859
6 Correlación de Pearson -,089 -,123 ,136 -,128 -,103 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,390 ,234 ,187 ,244 ,319
7 Correlación de Pearson -,021 -,078 ,125 -,081 -,107 ,337
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,838 ,452 ,228 ,460 ,301 ,001
8 Correlación de Pearson -,032 -,062 ,253
*
-,396
** -,169 ,439
**
,332
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,761 ,550 ,013 ,000 ,101 ,000 ,001
9 Correlación de Pearson -,161 -,008 -,106 ,051 -,019 -,005 -,192 -,202
* 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,120 ,937 ,307 ,644 ,854 ,961 ,062 ,049
10 Correlación de Pearson ,066 -,132 ,146 -,005 -,092 ,201 ,092 ,275
**
-,309
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,524 ,201 ,159 ,961 ,378 ,050 ,373 ,007 ,002
11 Correlación de Pearson ,005 ,087 ,102 -,167 -,085 ,006 ,078 ,054 -,216
* -,187 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,958 ,400 ,325 ,126 ,410 ,952 ,453 ,602 ,035 ,070
12 Correlación de Pearson -,052 -,146 -,088 -,002 -,079 ,011 ,244
* ,076 -,269
**
-,232
* -,163 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,619 ,157 ,394 ,988 ,449 ,918 ,017 ,463 ,008 ,023 ,115
13 Correlación de Pearson -,122 -,006 ,073 ,229
* -,112 -,124 -,022 -,124 -,155 -,134 -,094 -,117 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,239 ,954 ,481 ,035 ,280 ,233 ,829 ,233 ,133 ,195 ,365 ,259
14 Correlación de Pearson ,199 ,214
* -,060 -,039 ,293
** -,070 -,110 -,031 -,299
** -,129 -,181 -,225
* -,130 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,053 ,037 ,561 ,725 ,004 ,503 ,290 ,765 ,003 ,212 ,079 ,028 ,210
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Source: Prepared by the author
SERVICES
REAL ESTATE
TELECOM, 
TECHNOLOGY
FIRM AGE
BOARD SIZE
OIL, GAS, ENERGY
CONSTRUCTION, 
ENGENEERING
GOODS
WOMEN RATIO
CRITICAL MASS 20%
FAULTLINE
TOBIN´S Q 2012
FIRM SIZE
TOBIN´S Q 2014
  
1
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lts Table 6.10.  Correlations between the variables (Spanish sample). 
 
Nº Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Correlación de Pearson 1
Sig. (bilateral)
2 Correlación de Pearson ,316
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,003
3 Correlación de Pearson ,428
**
,790
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,000 ,000
4 Correlación de Pearson ,334 ,039 ,140 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,066 ,832 ,443
5 Correlación de Pearson ,919
**
,263
*
,388
** ,233 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,000 ,014 ,000 ,207
6 Correlación de Pearson ,104 ,103 ,113 -,177 ,135 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,338 ,336 ,290 ,332 ,214
7 Correlación de Pearson -,014 ,004 -,016 -,082 -,005 ,105 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,896 ,969 ,885 ,657 ,966 ,326
8 Correlación de Pearson -,020 ,038 -,013 -,441
* -,049 ,402
** ,187 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,854 ,722 ,904 ,011 ,654 ,000 ,079
9 Correlación de Pearson -,152 -,127 -,011 -,112 -,111 -,047 -,036 ,095 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,160 ,235 ,920 ,543 ,308 ,663 ,736 ,375
10 Correlación de Pearson -,092 ,095 -,021 -,071 ,007 ,058 ,046 ,038 -,221
* 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,398 ,377 ,843 ,699 ,950 ,587 ,672 ,727 ,037
11 Correlación de Pearson ,169 -,045 -,026 ,030 ,138 -,121 ,076 -,232
* -,198 -,390
** 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,117 ,675 ,810 ,869 ,201 ,257 ,479 ,028 ,063 ,000
12 Correlación de Pearson ,065 ,078 ,070 -,322 -,028 ,064 -,077 ,223
* -,139 -,273
**
-,244
* 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,551 ,465 ,515 ,072 ,799 ,554 ,472 ,035 ,195 ,010 ,021
13 Correlación de Pearson -,109 -,126 -,114 ,342 -,107 -,140 -,005 -,136 -,119 -,235
*
-,210
* -,147 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,313 ,238 ,288 ,055 ,323 ,190 ,965 ,204 ,265 ,027 ,048 ,169
14 Correlación de Pearson ,073 ,117 ,103 ,183 ,038 ,228
* -,020 ,136 -,105 -,122 -,186 -,130 -,112 1
Sig. (bilateral) ,503 ,273 ,337 ,317 ,725 ,032 ,849 ,205 ,326 ,255 ,082 ,225 ,297
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Source: Prepared by the author
SERVICES
REAL ESTATE
TELECOM, 
TECHNOLOGY
FIRM AGE
BOARD SIZE
OIL, GAS, ENERGY
CONSTRUCTION, 
ENGENEERING
GOODS
WOMEN RATIO
CRITICAL MASS 20%
FAULTLINE
TOBIN´S Q 2012
FIRM SIZE
TOBIN´S Q 2014
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In the correlation matrix for the Global sample (Table 6.8.) it is worth noting the 
negative correlation between women ratio and board size (-.355**). This finding is 
contrary to previous research, proposing that as board size gets bigger, the women ratio 
grows. One possible explanation for this finding is that as women ratio is strongly 
correlated to the country samples, with Norway having a mean women ratio of 37.05%, 
and being Norwegian boards smaller than Spanish boards, (7 compared to 10 board 
members). 
 
This is demonstrated in the two separate country samples (Table 6.9. and Table 6.10.) 
where no correlation between women ratio and board size is reported, neither in the 
Norwegian, nor the Spanish sample. 
 
After having tested for the principal assumptions for using a linear regression model, 
and having come to the conclusion that this model is appropriate for testing our 
hypotheses, we now turn to the previous results of the case analysis in Table 6.4, 
detecting four outlier values of our dependent variable Tobin´s Q 2014. What we need 
to establish is whether the reliability of our predictions are better served with the data 
included in the Global sample of 184 firms, or on the contrary, our predictions are more 
reliable with a sample of 180 firm, eliminating the 4 outlier values of Tobin´s Q 2014. 
 
In order to test for this, we run two different regression analyses; one for the 184 firms 
and one for the 180 firms. This analysis was done for the three relationships below, and 
for all three samples separately.    
 
(1) Women ratio and Tobin´s Q with moderator critical mass 20% 
(2) Faultline and Tobin´s Q with moderator overlap board tenure and  
(3) Faultline and Tobin´s Q with moderator chair-board shared experience 
 
Below we present the values of R, R-squared, Adjusted R-squared, Standard error, F-
statistics and its p-value for these analyses. 
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Table 6.11. Comparing Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio analysis for the two samples 
of 184 and 180 firms. 
 
 
Table 6.12. Comparing Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline analysis for the two samples of 
184 and 180 firms. 
 
 
Comparing these values, we find that R, R-squared and adjusted R-squared is higher for 
the sample of the 184 firms than the sample of the 180 firms. However the standard 
error is also higher for this sample. We therefore believe that our model gain in 
reliability by eliminating from the regression analysis the 4 firms presenting outlier 
values of Tobin´s Q 2014, working from then onwards with the sample of 180 firms.   
 
  
R R-squared Adjusted Standard F-statistics P-value
R-squared error
Sample 184 180 184 180 184 180 184 180 184 180 184 180
Global sample
Model 1 0,804 0,629 0,646 0,395 0,626 0,359 0,616 0,480 31,232 10,909 0,000 0,000
Model 2 0,816 0,659 0,665 0,434 0,644 0,396 0,601 0,466 30,726 11,556 0,000 0,000
Norwegian sample
Model 1 0,733 0,531 0,538 0,282 0,483 0,194 0,790 0,547 9,779 3,219 0,000 0,002
Model 2 0,796 0,712 0,634 0,506 0,585 0,439 0,707 0,456 13,054 7,552 0,000 0,000
Spanish sample
Model 1 0,931 0,862 0,866 0,743 0,849 0,709 0,350 0,319 49,194 21,422 0,000 0,000
Model 2 0,934 0,864 0,872 0,747 0,853 0,709 0,345 0,319 46,488 19,588 0,000 0,000
Source: prepared by the author
R R-squared Adjusted Standard F-statistics P-value
R-squared error
Sample 184 180 184 180 184 180 184 180 184 180 184 180
Global sample
Model 1 0,818 0,646 0,668 0,418 0,637 0,359 0,721 0,541 20,962 7,172 0,000 0,000
Model 2 0,823 0,650 0,677 0,425 0,643 0,361 0,715 0,540 19,639 6,649 0,000 0,000
Norwegian sample
Model 1 0,765 0,592 0,586 0,351 0,529 0,259 0,781 0,525 10,312 3,837 0,000 0,000
Model 2 0,770 0,600 0,592 0,360 0,530 0,259 0,780 0,525 9,509 3,578 0,000 0,001
Spanish sample
Model 1 0,949 0,878 0,901 0,771 0,851 0,643 0,518 0,500 18,173 6,044 0,000 0,001
Model 2 0,958 0,893 0,918 0,798 0,870 0,668 0,484 0,482 19,247 6,117 0,000 0,001
Source: prepared by the author
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The following figures 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 include new scatter plots of the relationship 
Tobin´s Q 2014 and women ratio for the sample of 180 firms. 
 
Figure 6.9. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio for the 
sample of 180 firms (Global sample). 
 
 
Figure 6.10. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio for the 
sample of 180 firms (Norwegian sample). 
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Figure 6.11. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Women ratio for the 
sample of 180 firms (Spanish sample). 
 
 
The following figures 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14 include new scatter plots of the relationship 
Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline for the sample of 180 firms. 
 
Figure 6.12. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline for the sample 
of 180 firms (Global sample). 
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Figure 6.13. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline for the sample 
of 180 firms (Norwegian sample). 
 
 
Figure 6.14. Scatter plot of the relationship Tobin´s Q 2014 and Faultline for the sample 
of 180 firms (Spanish sample). 
 
 
Based on a visual analysis of the scatter plots for the sample of 180 firms we confirm 
that the dispersion detected in the scatter plots for the sample of 184 firms is now 
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reduced; the points on the scatter plot are now more concentrated, contributing to a 
more representative, and a more reliable sample. With outliers we run the risk of 
extreme values influencing the overall results, projecting a wrong picture of the relation 
we study. We therefore believe that our model will gain in reliability and predictability 
by eliminating from the regression analysis the 4 firms presenting outlier values of 
Tobin´s Q 2014, working from then onwards with the sample of 180 firms.   
 
Reverse causality and endogeneity  
Endogeneity is a major methodological concern for many areas of management research 
relying on regression analysis to draw causal inference (Addallah, Goergen and 
O‘Sullivan, 2015). One of these areas is Corporate Governance (Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter, 2012).  Thus, although there is extensive research on the relationship between 
board composition and firm performance, the possible endogenous nature of the boards 
limit our understanding of many of the basic issues involved (Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2010). As such, literature state that one aspect that complicate the empirical 
analysis of boards of directors is that many of the variables might be determined 
endogenously (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007; 
De Andrés and Vallelado, 2008; Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008; Johnson et al., 2013; 
Kwon and Adler, 2014), meaning that the board composition is not exogenously 
determined but rather is affected by prior decisions and firm characteristics that in turn 
affect board decisions (Johnson et al., 2013). 
 
The potential for endogeneity between the variables relating to board composition and 
firm performance could be due to the effect of simultaneity, inverse causality or the 
omission of important possible variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003). With 
regard to the first issue, inverse casualty, it should be remembered that firm 
performance is, among other aspects, the result of the actions of its governing bodies 
and this in turn is a factor that could potentially influence the choice of future 
components of these governing bodies (self-selection). In other words, firms may, 
depending on an improvement or decline in their results, select the composition of their 
board. With respect to this issue, our theoretical model proposes that gender diversity 
improves firm´s financial performance. However, there are also theoretical reasons for 
believing that improved financial performance can lead to higher gender diversity on 
boards. The scarcity of women with experience in senior managerial positions (Hillman 
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et al., 2002) may allow highly solicited women to select more successful firms (Farrell 
and Hersch, 2005), and more successful firms may be more likely to respond to the 
pressure to conform to legitimacy norms of gender diversity (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The literature suggests two procedures for analyzing the effect of simultaneity: the use 
of exogenous ―instrumental‖ variables or the inclusion of ―lag effects‖ as 
instruments.  In the second option, panel data should be used.  However, even when 
they are available, carefully chosen strictly exogenous instruments remain the ―gold 
standard‖ for consistently identifying the effect of an explanatory variable on a 
dependent variable (Wintoki et al., 2012). 
 
The second issue, regarding non-observable heterogeneity that arise from the omission 
of certain explanatory variables from the model (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Kim 
and Lim, 2010), is critical when specifying the model. Obviously, the first step in trying 
to avoid this situation is to carry out an exhaustive literature review, in order to include 
all the variables that support the concept that is being studied. For this reason, and 
following a thorough review of prior studies, our study includes the set of control 
variables that have been analyzed in the summary above, which take into account board 
composition, the characteristics of the firm and the sector in which it is operating. In 
response to this point, we would point out that one source of endogeneity that is often 
ignored arises from the possibility that current values of governance variables are a 
function of past firm performance (Wintoki et al., 2012).  We have therefore included 
this variable in our study as a control variable (Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011). This 
procedure comes with the understanding that ―at a practical level, it is unlikely that any 
single study is completely free of endogeneity issues and we therefore argue that the 
initial consideration should be sought in careful theory construction‖ (Chenhall and 
Moers, 2007: 192). 
 
Taking into account the preceding paragraph, our research could suffer problems arising 
from endogeneity because of the inverse causality, that is, if it is the companies with 
better performance that attract more female directors, instead of the proposed 
relationship in our research (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). The possible presence of this 
situation could create a bias which would make it difficult to interpret the relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables. To reject or initially confirm the 
endogeneity in our data, we analyzed both for the Global sample and for each of the two 
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subsamples, if our variable women ratio correlated with the error of the initial 
regression between our dependent variable Tobin´s Q and independent women ratio. 
The results show that this correlation is only significant in the Norwegian sample  
(0.431*). Therefore, neither the Global nor the Spanish samples are subject to a 
correlation between the dependent variable and the error term raised by the endogeneity 
of data. 
 
Therefore, as described in previous paragraphs, the option that should be implemented 
in our study is that of including instrumentals variables. Instruments variables are used 
to explain a variable suspect of being endogenous, and which are exogenous with 
respect to the main equation. The major challenge with this option is to find valid 
instruments. A good instrument should correlate with the key independent variable, but 
not with the main equation dependent variable. 
 
Smith et al., (2006) used this method in their study of the relation between female 
directors (CEO´s and board directors) and firm value. Their major challenge was to 
identify a valid instrumental variable. The authors tested various variables related to 
firm characteristics. Finally they used as an instrument the average length of education 
of the spouses of the other CEOs in the firm. This method was also used by Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) in their study of the impact on firm valuation of quotas of female 
representation on Norwegian firms after the passing of the law in 2003. The authors 
used the pre quota variation in female board representation across firms as an 
instrument to capture exogenous variation in mandated changes in the proportion of 
female board members over time.  
 
Taking as a reference the contributions of this last research (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012), 
and in order to correct the possible endogeneity of our data (Stevenson, 2010), we 
propose that the legal requirement in Norway regarding incorporating women to the 
corporate board is an exogenous factor with respect to the composition of the board. 
Following this line of argument, firms incorporate women directors not due to the 
firm´s better or worse performance, but due to compliance with the law. This fact allows 
us to consider that the ratio of women directors on the board before the full 
implementation of the law, constitute a  good instrumental variable that helps us explain 
the ratio of women on the board in the period chosen for our research. 
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As stated earlier in our study, the Norwegian quota law was passed in 2003, foreseeing 
its full implementation in 2008. Due to this, we choose to include the women ratio of 
Norwegian boards in 2008 as an instrumental variable for the corresponding women 
ratio in 2012 (the year of our studio). 
 
We started out checking the correlation between the instrumental variable and our 
independent variable. The correlation between women ratio 2008 and women ratio 2012 
amounted to 0.705**; as well as the decrease of the correlation between the 
instrumental variable and the dependent variable. Subsequently, following indications 
of the literature, we carried out the Hausman test (1978). To do this, we simply 
regressed the women ratio 2012 variable using the women ratio 2008 in our Model 1. 
The model exhibited significant explanatory power with an adjusted R-squared of 
49.7% (p value <0.000). Therefore, and in the following sections we will include the 
OLS residuals obtained from the equation of this base model (Model 1) as an additional 
explicative variable in the rest of the models of the study. If the results report that the 
residuals (λ) of Model 1 are not significant in any of the models proposed, then we 
suggest that the results of our model for the Norwegian sample are not affected by 
endogeneity. 
 
Hypothesis tests 
Having checked for the principal assumptions that condition and justify the use of a 
linear regression model, and having found that (1) there is a certain linear and additive 
relationship between the dependent variable of Tobin´s Q 2014 and the independent 
variables, (2)  that the variables are sufficiently normally distributed in order not to 
distort the results, (3) that the residuals are independent, (4) that the variance of the 
residuals is the same across all levels, and (5) that there is little multicollinearity 
between the variables, and having included an instrumental variable in order to check 
for endogeneity in the Norwegian sample, we proceed to apply hierarchical regression 
analysis to test our hypotheses.   
 
Fifteen different analyses were run as indicated below in Table 6.13. 
 
  
Results 
192 
 
Table 6.13. Analysis, hypotheses, relations and samples. 
 
 
For each analysis a control model and various test models were developed. Model 1 is 
always the baseline model including all control variables, reporting the results of a fixed 
effects regression of Tobin‘s Q 2014 on the control variables included (Tobin´s Q 2012, 
firm size, firm age, board size and the six industries coded in the sample).  
 
The test models (2, 3 and 4) are compared to the control model to assess the 
contribution of the independent variables and the moderating variables, following the 
suggested technique of Cohen and Cohen (1983).   
 
The following three regression analysis presented in Table 6.14, 6.15, and 6.16 (Global 
sample, Norwegian sample and Spanish sample) are used to test Hypotheses 1: 
H1: Gender diversity on Corporate Boards is positively related to firm performance. 
 
  
Analysis Hypothesis Relation Moderation Sample
1 1 WR and Tobin´s Q 2014 Global
2 1 WR and Tobin´s Q 2014 Norwegian
3 1 WR and Tobin´s Q 2014 Spanish
4 2 WR and Tobin´s Q 2014 Critical Mass 20% Global
5 2 WR and Tobin´s Q 2014 Critical Mass 20% Norwegian
6 2 WR and Tobin´s Q 2014 Critical Mass 20% Spanish
7 3 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Global
8 3 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Norwegian
9 3 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Spanish
10 4 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Overlap Board Tenure Global
11 4 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Overlap Board Tenure Norwegian
12 4 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Overlap Board Tenure Spanish
13 5 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Chair-Board Shared Experience Global
14 5 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Chair-Board Shared Experience Norwegian
15 5 Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 Chair-Board Shared Experience Spanish
Source: Prepared by the author
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Table 6.14. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 1, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Women ratio (Global sample). 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that there is a positive relationship between women ratio and 
Tobin´s Q 2014. In Model 2, the estimated coefficient of women ratio was statistically 
significant (p<0.01) with a positive sign (beta=0.229). This result support Hypothesis 1 
in the Global sample. 
  
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,841 ,339 2,480 ,014
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,569 ,067 ,551 8,448 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,543E-06 ,000 -,072 -1,060 ,291
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,044 ,703 ,483
BOARD SIZE ,021 ,014 ,107 1,534 ,127
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,606 ,320 -,399 -1,892 ,060
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,461 ,305 -,333 -1,511 ,133
GOODS -,277 ,324 -,178 -,853 ,395
SERVICES -,325 ,327 -,201 -,995 ,321
REAL ESTATE -,529 ,336 -,253 -1,574 ,117
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,264 ,290 -,156 -,910 ,364
R-squared ,395
Adjusted R-squared ,359
Standard error ,480
F-statistics 10,909 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,645 ,334 1,931 ,055
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,514 ,067 ,498 7,641 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,497E-06 ,000 -,070 -1,059 ,291
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,016 ,268 ,789
BOARD SIZE ,037 ,014 ,184 2,571 ,011
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,691 ,312 -,454 -2,215 ,028
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,517 ,297 -,373 -1,742 ,083
GOODS -,291 ,315 -,187 -,926 ,356
SERVICES -,396 ,318 -,245 -1,245 ,215
REAL ESTATE -,541 ,326 -,259 -1,660 ,099
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,369 ,283 -,218 -1,301 ,195
WOMEN RATIO ,008 ,003 ,229 3,361 ,001
R-squared ,434
Adjusted R-squared ,396
Standard error ,466
F-statistics 11,556 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
1
2
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
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Table 6.15. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 1, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Women ratio (Norwegian sample). 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that there is a positive relationship between women ratio and 
Tobin´s Q 2014. In Model 2, the estimated coefficient of women ratio was statistically 
significant (p<0.001) with a positive sign (beta=0.371). The coefficient for the 
standardized residuals included in the model 1 and 2 reported not significant (p=0.112), 
thus no endogeneity seems to affect the results reported in the Norwegian sample. This 
result support Hypothesis 1 in the Norwegian sample. 
 
  
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) 1,384 ,450 3,078 ,003
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,302 ,081 ,333 3,714 ,000
FIRM SIZE ,000 ,000 ,000 ,005 ,996
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,121 1,301 ,197
BOARD SIZE ,013 ,029 ,043 ,446 ,657
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,719 ,396 -,526 -1,814 ,073
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,600 ,377 -,399 -1,591 ,115
GOODS -,403 ,416 -,215 -,970 ,335
SERVICES -,498 ,410 -,311 -1,214 ,228
REAL ESTATE -1,027 ,435 -,416 -2,363 ,021
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,465 ,361 -,303 -1,287 ,202
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,280 ,053 ,458 5,242 ,000
R-squared ,464
Adjusted R-squared ,391
Standard error ,475
F-statistics 6,370 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,649 ,488 1,330 ,187
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,274 ,078 ,302 3,519 ,001
FIRM SIZE ,000 ,000 ,004 ,046 ,963
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,110 1,245 ,217
BOARD SIZE ,004 ,027 ,014 ,152 ,879
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,792 ,377 -,580 -2,100 ,039
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,549 ,359 -,365 -1,530 ,130
GOODS -,531 ,397 -,283 -1,336 ,185
SERVICES -,542 ,390 -,338 -1,388 ,169
REAL ESTATE -1,004 ,413 -,407 -2,430 ,017
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,536 ,344 -,349 -1,558 ,123
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,117 ,073 ,191 1,608 ,112
WOMEN RATIO ,024 ,008 ,371 3,114 ,003
R-squared ,522
Adjusted R-squared ,450
Standard error ,452
F-statistics 7,274 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
1
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Table 6.16. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 1, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Women ratio (Spanish sample). 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that there is a positive relationship between women ratio and 
Tobin´s Q 2014. In Model 2, the estimated coefficient of women ratio was not 
statistically significant (p=0.306) with a beta of 0.067. This result does not support 
Hypothesis 1 in the Spanish sample. 
 
We believe that one reason why the Spanish results did not confirm the positive relation 
found between women ratio and Tobin´s Q in the Norwegian and the Global sample, 
might be found in the high percentage (29.90%) of Spanish boards with only one 
women director; and the possible reduced effects of being a  ―token‖ on the board 
(Kanter, 1977).  
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,152 ,376 ,404 ,687
TOBIN´S Q 2012 1,116 ,088 ,818 12,736 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,162E-06 ,000 -,077 -1,126 ,264
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,040 ,637 ,526
BOARD SIZE ,007 ,013 ,035 ,502 ,617
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,285 ,377 -,149 -,755 ,453
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,254 ,352 -,197 -,723 ,472
GOODS -,193 ,363 -,142 -,532 ,596
SERVICES -,026 ,370 -,016 -,070 ,944
REAL ESTATE -,188 ,372 -,103 -,505 ,615
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,111 ,332 -,055 -,333 ,740
R-squared ,743
Adjusted R-squared ,709
Standard error ,319
F-statistics 21,422 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,164 ,376 ,435 ,665
TOBIN´S Q 2012 1,084 ,093 ,794 11,663 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,206E-06 ,000 -,080 -1,169 ,246
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,037 ,591 ,556
BOARD SIZE ,007 ,013 ,038 ,538 ,592
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,295 ,377 -,155 -,783 ,436
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,282 ,352 -,219 -,800 ,426
GOODS -,199 ,363 -,146 -,549 ,584
SERVICES -,050 ,371 -,031 -,136 ,892
REAL ESTATE -,198 ,372 -,108 -,531 ,597
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,131 ,333 -,065 -,395 ,694
WOMEN RATIO ,003 ,003 ,067 1,031 ,306
R-squared ,747
Adjusted R-squared ,709
Standard error ,319
F-statistics 19,588 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
1
2
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
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The next three regression analysis presented in Table 6.17, 6.18, and 6.19 (Global 
sample, Norwegian sample and Spanish sample) are used to test Hypotheses 2:  
 
H2: Critical mass of Women Directors on Corporate Boards moderate positively the 
relation between Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance 
 
Table 6.17. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 2, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Women ratio, moderated by Critical mass 20% (Global sample). 
 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,637 ,334 1,905 ,059
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,515 ,067 ,499 7,653 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,506E-06 ,000 -,070 -1,065 ,288
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,024 ,388 ,698
BOARD SIZE ,037 ,014 ,185 2,587 ,011
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,700 ,312 -,460 -2,242 ,026
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,524 ,297 -,378 -1,765 ,079
GOODS -,306 ,315 -,197 -,972 ,332
SERVICES -,405 ,318 -,250 -1,273 ,205
REAL ESTATE -,550 ,326 -,263 -1,686 ,094
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,390 ,284 -,230 -1,371 ,172
WOMEN RATIO ,012 ,005 ,329 2,597 ,010
CRITICAL MASS 20% -,139 ,147 -,114 -,940 ,349
R-squared ,437
Adjusted R-squared ,396
Standard error ,466
F-statistics 10,659 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,648 ,331 1,957 ,052
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,522 ,067 ,505 7,815 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,475E-06 ,000 -,069 -1,054 ,294
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,019 ,308 ,759
BOARD SIZE ,039 ,014 ,194 2,735 ,007
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,650 ,310 -,428 -2,098 ,037
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,450 ,296 -,325 -1,522 ,130
GOODS -,243 ,313 -,156 -,775 ,439
SERVICES -,331 ,317 -,204 -1,043 ,299
REAL ESTATE -,491 ,324 -,235 -1,514 ,132
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,360 ,282 -,213 -1,275 ,204
WOMEN RATIO ,001 ,007 ,022 ,112 ,911
CRITICAL MASS 20% -,513 ,232 -,423 -2,214 ,028
WOMAN RATIO x CRITICAL MASS 20% ,019 ,009 ,615 2,080 ,039
R-squared 0,451
Adjusted R-squared 0,408
Standard error 0,461
F-statistics 10,37 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
3
4
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
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Hypothesis 2 suggests that the positive relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q 
2014 is moderated positively by critical mass 20%. In Model 4, the estimated 
coefficient of women ratio x critical mass 20% was statistically significant (p<0.05) 
with a positive sign (beta=0.615). This result support Hypothesis 2 in the Global 
sample. 
 
Table 6.18. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 2, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Women ratio, moderated by Critical mass 20% (Norwegian sample). 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,616 ,490 1,259 ,212
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,279 ,078 ,307 3,577 ,001
FIRM SIZE ,000 ,000 ,012 ,134 ,894
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,114 1,286 ,202
BOARD SIZE ,011 ,028 ,037 ,382 ,703
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,809 ,378 -,592 -2,142 ,035
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,520 ,360 -,346 -1,444 ,153
GOODS -,538 ,397 -,287 -1,354 ,179
SERVICES -,554 ,391 -,345 -1,420 ,160
REAL ESTATE -,974 ,414 -,395 -2,352 ,021
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,575 ,346 -,375 -1,661 ,101
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,103 ,074 ,169 1,391 ,168
WOMEN RATIO ,030 ,010 ,467 3,038 ,003
CRITICAL MASS 20% -,265 ,268 -,116 -,988 ,326
R-squared ,528
Adjusted R-squared ,450
Standard error ,452
F-statistics 6,787 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) 1,079 ,631 1,710 ,091
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,275 ,078 ,303 3,534 ,001
FIRM SIZE ,000 ,000 ,014 ,149 ,882
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,124 1,395 ,167
BOARD SIZE ,013 ,028 ,043 ,445 ,657
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,818 ,377 -,599 -2,170 ,033
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,525 ,359 -,349 -1,462 ,148
GOODS -,565 ,397 -,301 -1,422 ,159
SERVICES -,603 ,392 -,375 -1,537 ,128
REAL ESTATE -,982 ,413 -,398 -2,376 ,020
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,597 ,346 -,389 -1,726 ,088
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,093 ,075 ,152 1,247 ,216
WOMEN RATIO ,003 ,026 ,043 ,108 ,914
CRITICAL MASS 20% -,850 ,572 -,370 -1,487 ,141
WOMAN RATIO x CRITICAL MASS 20% ,031 ,027 ,630 1,158 ,251
R-squared ,536
Adjusted R-squared ,452
Standard error ,451
F-statistics 6,425 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
3
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Hypothesis 2 suggests that the positive relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q 
2014 is moderated positively by critical mass 20%. In Model 4, the estimated 
coefficient of women ratio x critical mass 20% was not statistically significant 
(p=0.251). This result did not support Hypothesis 2 in the Norwegian sample. 
 
Table 6.19. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 2, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Women ratio, moderated by Critical mass 20% (Spanish sample). 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the positive relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q 
2014 is moderated positively by critical mass 20%. In Model 4, the estimated 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,150 ,380 ,395 ,694
TOBIN´S Q 2012 1,079 ,094 ,791 11,438 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,215E-06 ,000 -,080 -1,170 ,246
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,036 ,570 ,570
BOARD SIZE ,007 ,013 ,040 ,560 ,577
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,280 ,381 -,147 -,735 ,465
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,256 ,361 -,199 -,711 ,480
GOODS -,174 ,371 -,128 -,469 ,641
SERVICES -,029 ,377 -,018 -,077 ,939
REAL ESTATE -,174 ,379 -,096 -,460 ,647
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,112 ,338 -,056 -,333 ,740
WOMEN RATIO ,002 ,005 ,036 ,355 ,723
CRITICAL MASS 20% ,057 ,145 ,040 ,392 ,696
R-squared ,747
Adjusted R-squared ,705
Standard error ,321
F-statistics 17,760 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,109 ,387 ,281 ,780
TOBIN´S Q 2012 1,091 ,097 ,800 11,292 ,000
FIRM SIZE -1,205E-06 ,000 -,080 -1,156 ,252
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,027 ,420 ,676
BOARD SIZE ,008 ,013 ,043 ,599 ,551
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,241 ,387 -,126 -,621 ,537
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,215 ,368 -,167 -,584 ,561
GOODS -,122 ,381 -,090 -,321 ,749
SERVICES ,023 ,387 ,014 ,060 ,952
REAL ESTATE -,125 ,388 -,068 -,321 ,749
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,079 ,343 -,039 -,230 ,819
WOMEN RATIO ,000 ,006 -,007 -,061 ,952
CRITICAL MASS 20% -,129 ,323 -,090 -,401 ,690
WOMAN RATIO x CRITICAL MASS 20% ,008 ,012 ,169 ,647 ,520
R-squared ,749
Adjusted R-squared ,703
Standard error ,322
F-statistics 16,294 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
P-value
3
4
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
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coefficient of women ratio x critical mass 20% was not statistically significant 
(p=0.520). This result did not support Hypothesis 2 in the Spanish sample. 
 
According to the results in the Global sample a critical mass of 20% women on boards 
moderate positively the relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q 2014. 
Although this proved statistically significant in the Global sample, it was not confirmed 
in the two separate country samples.    
 
In order understand the reason for these not-coinciding results, we suggest a closer look 
at the percentages of women directors on the boards of each of the three samples.  
 
In the Global sample of 180 firms the mean women ratio is 25.09%, and the mean board 
size is 8.35 members, thus being 2.1 women per board an average representation in 
terms of numbers. In the Norwegian sample of 93 firms, with a mean women ratio of 
36.7%, and a mean board size of 6.98 members, 2.56 women per board is the average 
female representation in terms of numbers. In the Spanish sample, with a mean women 
ratio of 12.5%, and a mean board size of 9.83 members, 1.27 women on boards is the 
average female representation in terms of numbers.  
 
As the mean women ratio in the Norwegian sample is far above the critical mass ratio, 
(36.7% versus 20%), it can be expected that the critical mass moderator does not 
explain the relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q 2014, above that which is 
explained by the independent variable of women ratio independently. In the Spanish 
sample the majority of the firms (76%) were below the critical point of 20% women on 
boards, making the sample for above 20% small and vulnerable for casualty effects. 
 
In the Global sample, combining the results from the Norwegian and the Spanish 
samples, Hypothesis 1 was supported and a positive relationship between women ratio 
and Tobin´s Q was confirmed. With a more balanced representation of firms ―on both 
sides‖ of the critical point of 20%, and a mean women ratio of 25.09%, this sample 
offer us a better possibility to check the moderating impact of the critical mass point of 
20% upon the relationship women ratio and Tobin´s Q. 
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However, concluding that the critical mass of 20% of women on boards moderate the 
relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q must be done with certain caution, as 
the moderator variable of critical mass 20% has a certain correlation by itself to the 
dependent variable Tobin´s Q as seen in the correlation matrix. 
 
The next three regression analysis presented in Table 6.20, 6.21, and 6.22 (Global 
sample, Norwegian sample and Spanish sample) are used to test Hypotheses 3: 
H3: Strong gender-based board faultlines have a negative impact on firm performance  
 
Table 6.20. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 3, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline (Global sample). 
 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) 1,122 ,423 2,652 ,009
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,543 ,088 ,516 6,201 ,000
FIRM SIZE -2,785E-06 ,000 -,074 -,890 ,376
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,018 ,228 ,820
BOARD SIZE ,022 ,024 ,079 ,903 ,368
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,780 ,382 -,477 -2,044 ,044
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,661 ,360 -,427 -1,836 ,069
GOODS -,391 ,394 -,204 -,991 ,324
SERVICES -,475 ,392 -,272 -1,212 ,229
REAL ESTATE -,732 ,422 -,265 -1,735 ,086
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,276 ,336 -,155 -,821 ,413
R-squared ,418
Adjusted R-squared ,359
Standard error ,541
F-statistics 7,172 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,835 ,495 1,687 ,095
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,542 ,087 ,515 6,201 ,000
FIRM SIZE -2,719E-06 ,000 -,072 -,870 ,387
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,014 ,171 ,864
BOARD SIZE ,031 ,025 ,114 1,232 ,221
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,785 ,381 -,481 -2,060 ,042
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,667 ,360 -,431 -1,854 ,067
GOODS -,377 ,394 -,197 -,958 ,340
SERVICES -,472 ,392 -,270 -1,205 ,231
REAL ESTATE -,803 ,426 -,290 -1,884 ,063
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,290 ,336 -,162 -,863 ,390
FAULTLINE ,517 ,464 ,097 1,115 ,267
R-squared ,425
Adjusted R-squared ,361
Standard error ,540
F-statistics 6,649 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
1
2
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
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Hypothesis 3 suggests that there is a negative relationship between Faultline and 
Tobin´s Q 2014, in that the higher the Faultline, the lower the Tobin´s Q 2014.  In 
Model 3, the estimated coefficient of Faultline was not statistically significant 
(p=0.267). This result did not support Hypothesis 3 in the Global sample.  
 
Apart from not being significant, the results proved contrary to our hypothesis, 
predicting a positive instead of a negative relation between Faultline and Tobin´s Q. 
The possible reasons for these contradictory findings will be discussed later in this 
section.  
 
Table 6.21. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 3, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline (Norwegian sample). 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) 1,648 ,503 3,277 ,002
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,322 ,093 ,346 3,477 ,001
FIRM SIZE ,000 ,000 -,005 -,043 ,966
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,131 1,278 ,206
BOARD SIZE -,014 ,034 -,046 -,415 ,679
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,816 ,420 -,587 -1,944 ,056
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,645 ,395 -,440 -1,633 ,107
GOODS -,506 ,437 -,285 -1,158 ,251
SERVICES -,581 ,435 -,361 -1,337 ,185
REAL ESTATE -1,098 ,463 -,433 -2,370 ,021
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,439 ,376 -,280 -1,168 ,247
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,212 ,065 ,336 3,265 ,002
R-squared ,437
Adjusted R-squared ,348
Standard error ,493
F-statistics 4,931 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) 1,848 ,610 3,029 ,003
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,314 ,094 ,337 3,336 ,001
FIRM SIZE -1,767E-07 ,000 -,002 -,015 ,988
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,135 1,308 ,195
BOARD SIZE -,024 ,038 -,079 -,633 ,529
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,794 ,423 -,572 -1,876 ,065
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,621 ,399 -,424 -1,557 ,124
GOODS -,502 ,439 -,282 -1,143 ,257
SERVICES -,558 ,439 -,346 -1,271 ,208
REAL ESTATE -1,043 ,475 -,412 -2,197 ,031
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,414 ,380 -,264 -1,089 ,280
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,207 ,066 ,327 3,128 ,003
FAULTLINE -,326 ,557 -,063 -,584 ,561
R-squared ,439
Adjusted R-squared ,342
Standard error ,495
F-statistics 4,506 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
1
2
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
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Hypothesis 3 suggests that there is a negative relationship between Faultline and 
Tobin´s Q 2014, in that the higher the Faultline, the lower the Tobin´s Q 2014.  In 
Model 3, the estimated coefficient of Faultline was not statistically significant 
(p=0.561). This result did not support Hypothesis 3 in the Norwegian sample. The 
results did not prove significant, but the direction of the relationship was in line with 
our prediction; that the higher the Faultline, the lower the Tobin´s Q.   
 
Table 6.22. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 3, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline (Spanish sample). 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that there is a negative relationship between Faultline and 
Tobin´s Q 2014, in that the higher the Faultline, the lower the Tobin´s Q 2014.  In 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,293 ,780 ,375 ,712
TOBIN´S Q 2012 1,042 ,185 ,764 5,627 ,000
FIRM SIZE -3,736E-06 ,000 -,141 -1,165 ,259
FIRM AGE ,003 ,004 ,126 ,906 ,377
BOARD SIZE ,021 ,064 ,049 ,331 ,744
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,564 ,822 -,209 -,685 ,502
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,655 ,677 -,379 -,968 ,346
GOODS -,363 ,710 -,167 -,511 ,616
SERVICES -,173 ,723 -,085 -,239 ,814
REAL ESTATE -,207 ,756 -,064 -,274 ,787
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,119 ,609 -,050 -,196 ,847
R-squared ,771
Adjusted R-squared ,643
Standard error ,500
F-statistics 6,044 (p-value=0,001)
(Constante) -,594 ,950 -,625 ,540
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,917 ,196 ,672 4,669 ,000
FIRM SIZE -3,370E-06 ,000 -,127 -1,086 ,293
FIRM AGE ,003 ,004 ,096 ,707 ,489
BOARD SIZE ,054 ,065 ,125 ,826 ,420
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,408 ,800 -,151 -,510 ,617
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,464 ,665 -,268 -,698 ,495
GOODS -,090 ,708 -,042 -,128 ,900
SERVICES ,135 ,726 ,067 ,186 ,855
REAL ESTATE -,256 ,730 -,079 -,350 ,730
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,069 ,588 -,029 -,117 ,908
FAULTLINE 1,354 ,885 ,241 1,530 ,145
R-squared 0,798
Adjusted R-squared 0,668
Standard error 0,482
F-statistics 6,117 (p-value=0,001)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
1
2
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
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Model 3, the estimated coefficient of Faultline was not statistically significant 
(p=0.145). This result did not support Hypothesis 3 in the Spanish sample.  As in the 
Global sample, the results of the Spanish sample proved contrary to our hypothesis, 
predicting a positive instead of a negative relationship. Although the relationship did not 
prove significant, it is interesting to see which reasons can be behind these contrary 
results.  
 
Relevant for this analysis is the fact that the faultline study only includes boards with 
two or more women directors. Faultline indicate the degree to which the two gender 
subgroups have in-group similarities and out-group differences. A positive relationship 
between Faultline and Tobin´s Q will therefore indicate that the higher the in-group 
similarity (and out-group difference), the higher the Tobin´s Q. This is contradictory to 
our proposal, as we predicted that a higher Faultline would lead to lower firm 
performance.  
 
A possible explanation, apart from causes not included in our model, can be found in 
the reality of having two or more women present on the same board. As proposed by 
Kanter (1977) tilted and balanced boards, in comparison to uniform and skewed boards, 
will have different internal dynamics, experiencing increased women´s influence upon 
information-elaboration and decision-making. As internal similarity within the female 
in-group increase (higher faultline), so will their in-group cohesion, support and in-sub-
group esteem. In this way, faultline will lead to stronger bonding and cohesion within 
the female in-group, which again is believed to lead to higher participation in the 
board´s information-elaboration and decision-making, and finally improved firm 
performance.   
 
In the Norwegian sample, no relationship between Faultline and Tobin´s Q is reported. 
The reality of women on boards of Norwegian firms is quite different from those on 
Spanish boards. The mean women ratio of Norwegian boards is 37.05%, and 89.4% of 
all boards are tilted and balanced. This indicate that women´s participation on boards´ 
information-elaboration and decision-making processes is quite ―normalized‖ and 
expected, and therefore in lesser need of in-group support from other female colleagues. 
Thus higher similarities between the women board directors (higher faultline) do not 
necessarily have any differential impact on firm performance. 
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With respect to the Global sample, being a combination of the Spanish and the 
Norwegian samples, the results are similar to the Spanish results, however with a lower 
impact of Faultline on Tobin´s Q.  
 
As no relationship between Faultline and Tobin´s Q 2014 was proved significant, the 
analysis of the two moderators of this relationship (1) Overlap Board Tenure and (2) 
Chair-board shared experience seems irrelevant. However, we include the next three 
regression analysis presented in Table 6.23, 6.24, and 6.25 (Global sample, Norwegian 
sample and Spanish sample) used to test Hypotheses 4:  
 
H4: The negative relationship between strong gender-based board faultlines and firm 
performance is less pronounced when overlapping board members tenure increases. 
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Table 6.23. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 4, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline, moderated by Overlap board tenure (Global sample). 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,835 ,498 1,679 ,096
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,542 ,088 ,515 6,168 ,000
FIRM SIZE -2,685E-06 ,000 -,071 -,814 ,418
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,013 ,167 ,868
BOARD SIZE ,031 ,026 ,115 1,224 ,224
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,784 ,384 -,480 -2,043 ,044
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,666 ,362 -,430 -1,837 ,069
GOODS -,376 ,399 -,196 -,941 ,349
SERVICES -,471 ,397 -,269 -1,187 ,238
REAL ESTATE -,801 ,432 -,289 -1,854 ,067
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,290 ,338 -,162 -,857 ,394
FAULTLINE ,517 ,466 ,097 1,110 ,270
OVERLAP BOARD TENURE -,001 ,023 -,003 -,034 ,973
R-squared ,425
Adjusted R-squared ,354
Standard error ,543
F-statistics 6,033 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,724 ,506 1,432 ,155
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,537 ,088 ,510 6,107 ,000
FIRM SIZE -4,220E-06 ,000 -,111 -1,190 ,237
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,015 ,190 ,850
BOARD SIZE ,027 ,026 ,100 1,056 ,294
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,875 ,391 -,535 -2,237 ,028
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,786 ,376 -,508 -2,090 ,039
GOODS -,495 ,411 -,258 -1,203 ,232
SERVICES -,582 ,407 -,332 -1,429 ,156
REAL ESTATE -,935 ,446 -,338 -2,096 ,039
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,393 ,349 -,220 -1,127 ,262
FAULTLINE 1,104 ,685 ,207 1,611 ,110
OVERLAP BOARD TENURE ,111 ,098 ,404 1,126 ,263
FAULTLINE x OVERLAP -,247 ,212 -,411 -1,166 ,246
R-squared ,433
Adjusted R-squared ,357
Standard error ,542
F-statistics 5,694 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
P-value
3
4
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
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Table 6.24. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 4, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline, moderated by Overlap board tenure (Norwegian sample). 
 
 
  
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) 1,895 ,614 3,084 ,003
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,315 ,094 ,339 3,339 ,001
FIRM SIZE -1,154E-06 ,000 -,010 -,097 ,923
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,134 1,299 ,198
BOARD SIZE -,026 ,038 -,084 -,667 ,507
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,786 ,425 -,566 -1,851 ,068
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,617 ,400 -,421 -1,544 ,127
GOODS -,474 ,442 -,266 -1,072 ,287
SERVICES -,532 ,441 -,330 -1,207 ,232
REAL ESTATE -1,010 ,478 -,399 -2,114 ,038
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,420 ,381 -,268 -1,101 ,275
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,203 ,066 ,321 3,048 ,003
FAULTLINE -,306 ,559 -,059 -,547 ,586
OVERLAP BOARD TENURE -,021 ,027 -,077 -,801 ,426
R-squared ,445
Adjusted R-squared ,338
Standard error ,496
F-statistics 4,187 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) 1,880 ,679 2,767 ,007
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,315 ,096 ,338 3,296 ,002
FIRM SIZE -1,257E-06 ,000 -,011 -,103 ,918
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,133 1,272 ,208
BOARD SIZE -,025 ,039 -,083 -,649 ,518
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,787 ,428 -,567 -1,838 ,071
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,621 ,409 -,424 -1,519 ,133
GOODS -,479 ,455 -,269 -1,053 ,296
SERVICES -,535 ,447 -,332 -1,197 ,236
REAL ESTATE -1,013 ,484 -,400 -2,095 ,040
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,423 ,388 -,270 -1,090 ,280
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,202 ,067 ,320 3,011 ,004
FAULTLINE -,270 ,860 -,052 -,314 ,754
OVERLAP BOARD TENURE -,012 ,166 -,045 -,075 ,940
FAULTLINE x OVERLAP -,018 ,333 -,034 -,055 ,957
R-squared ,445
Adjusted R-squared ,329
Standard error ,500
F-statistics 3,831 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
P-value
3
4
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
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Table 6.25. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 4, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline, moderated by Overlap board tenure (Spanish sample). 
 
 
The results did not support Hypothesis 4 in any of the three samples. 
 
  
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) -,585 ,914 -,639 ,532
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,885 ,190 ,648 4,650 ,000
FIRM SIZE -5,738E-06 ,000 -,216 -1,708 ,107
FIRM AGE ,002 ,004 ,069 ,526 ,606
BOARD SIZE ,038 ,063 ,088 ,598 ,559
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,403 ,770 -,149 -,523 ,608
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,570 ,643 -,329 -,885 ,389
GOODS -,208 ,685 -,095 -,303 ,766
SERVICES ,039 ,701 ,019 ,056 ,956
REAL ESTATE -,431 ,711 -,133 -,605 ,553
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,168 ,570 -,071 -,295 ,772
FAULTLINE 1,606 ,867 ,286 1,851 ,083
OVERLAP BOARD TENURE ,063 ,041 ,207 1,537 ,144
R-squared ,824
Adjusted R-squared ,692
Standard error ,464
F-statistics 6,253 (p-value=0,001)
(Constante) -,524 ,937 -,559 ,584
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,897 ,195 ,657 4,600 ,000
FIRM SIZE -6,407E-06 ,000 -,241 -1,785 ,095
FIRM AGE ,002 ,004 ,082 ,602 ,556
BOARD SIZE ,021 ,070 ,049 ,303 ,766
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,553 ,821 -,205 -,674 ,511
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,768 ,730 -,444 -1,053 ,309
GOODS -,381 ,752 -,175 -,506 ,620
SERVICES -,160 ,783 -,079 -,204 ,841
REAL ESTATE -,712 ,854 -,219 -,833 ,418
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,285 ,611 -,120 -,467 ,647
FAULTLINE 2,273 1,390 ,405 1,636 ,123
OVERLAP BOARD TENURE ,168 ,173 ,547 ,971 ,347
FAULTLINE x OVERLAP -,267 ,429 -,316 -,623 ,543
R-squared ,829
Adjusted R-squared ,680
Standard error ,473
F-statistics 5,581 (p-value=0,001)
Source: Prepared by the author
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
3
4
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
Model
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The next three regression analysis presented in Table 6.26, 6.27, and 6.28 (Global 
sample, Norwegian sample and Spanish sample) used to test Hypotheses 5:  
 
H5: The negative relationship between strong gender-based board faultlines and firm 
performance is less pronounced when chair-board members’ shared experience 
increase. 
 
Table 6.26. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 5, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline, moderated by Chair-board shared experience (Global sample). 
 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) ,838 ,495 1,694 ,093
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,533 ,088 ,507 6,077 ,000
FIRM SIZE -3,592E-06 ,000 -,095 -1,110 ,270
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,020 ,245 ,807
BOARD SIZE ,029 ,025 ,106 1,142 ,256
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,819 ,382 -,501 -2,141 ,035
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,698 ,361 -,451 -1,935 ,056
GOODS -,455 ,401 -,238 -1,136 ,259
SERVICES -,524 ,395 -,299 -1,326 ,188
REAL ESTATE -,862 ,430 -,312 -2,006 ,048
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,308 ,336 -,172 -,915 ,362
FAULTLINE ,498 ,464 ,094 1,074 ,285
CHAIR-BOARD SHARED EX ,027 ,026 ,087 1,038 ,302
R-squared ,431
Adjusted R-squared ,361
Standard error ,540
F-statistics 6,189 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) ,875 ,527 1,661 ,100
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,533 ,088 ,507 6,046 ,000
FIRM SIZE -3,333E-06 ,000 -,088 -,960 ,339
FIRM AGE ,000 ,001 ,020 ,246 ,806
BOARD SIZE ,029 ,026 ,106 1,129 ,262
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,801 ,393 -,490 -2,037 ,044
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,675 ,379 -,436 -1,782 ,078
GOODS -,434 ,415 -,227 -1,044 ,299
SERVICES -,503 ,409 -,287 -1,231 ,221
REAL ESTATE -,839 ,446 -,303 -1,882 ,063
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,286 ,353 -,160 -,812 ,419
FAULTLINE ,370 ,759 ,070 ,488 ,627
CHAIR-BOARD SHARED EX ,004 ,112 ,014 ,038 ,970
FAULTLINE x CHAIR-BOARD SHARED 
EX
,051 ,238 ,077 ,213 ,832
R-squared ,431
Adjusted R-squared ,355
Standard error ,542
F-statistics 5,661 (P-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
3
4
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
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Table 6.27. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 5, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline, moderated by Chair-board shared experience (Norwegian sample). 
 
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) 1,929 ,623 3,096 ,003
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,314 ,095 ,337 3,318 ,001
FIRM SIZE -1,220E-06 ,000 -,011 -,102 ,919
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,141 1,359 ,179
BOARD SIZE -,027 ,039 -,089 -,703 ,485
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,782 ,425 -,563 -1,838 ,070
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,623 ,400 -,425 -1,556 ,124
GOODS -,485 ,441 -,273 -1,098 ,276
SERVICES -,539 ,441 -,335 -1,223 ,226
REAL ESTATE -1,021 ,478 -,403 -2,139 ,036
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,420 ,382 -,268 -1,099 ,276
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS ,203 ,067 ,321 3,054 ,003
FAULTLINE -,346 ,560 -,067 -,618 ,539
CHAIR-BOARD SHARED EX -,025 ,035 -,068 -,702 ,485
R-squared ,443
Adjusted R-squared ,337
Standard error ,497
F-statistics 4,167 (p-value=0,001)
(Constante) 1,914 ,697 2,746 ,008
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,314 ,095 ,337 3,290 ,002
FIRM SIZE -1,243E-06 ,000 -,011 -,103 ,918
FIRM AGE ,001 ,001 ,140 1,309 ,195
BOARD SIZE -,027 ,039 -,089 -,694 ,490
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,782 ,429 -,563 -1,825 ,072
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,625 ,405 -,427 -1,542 ,128
GOODS -,488 ,449 -,274 -1,087 ,281
SERVICES -,540 ,445 -,335 -1,215 ,229
REAL ESTATE -1,023 ,482 -,404 -2,121 ,038
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,423 ,389 -,269 -1,087 ,281
STANDARDIZED RESUDUALS ,203 ,067 ,321 3,026 ,004
FAULTLINE -,312 ,893 -,060 -,350 ,728
CHAIR-BOARD SHARED EX -,016 ,183 -,043 -,086 ,932
FAULTLINE x CHAIR-BOARD SHARED 
EX
-,018 ,373 -,026 -,050 ,961
R-squared ,443
Adjusted R-squared ,327
Standard error ,500
F-statistics 3,813 (p-value=0,000)
Source: Prepared by the author
3
4
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
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Table 6.28. Regression analysis, Hypothesis 5, Relation between Tobin´s Q 2014 and 
Faultline, moderated by Chair-board shared experience (Spanish sample). 
 
 
The results did not support Hypothesis 5 in any of the three samples. 
 
  
Estandardized 
coefficients
B Standard error Beta t
(Constante) -,650 ,851 -,764 ,456
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,853 ,178 ,625 4,791 ,000
FIRM SIZE -6,215E-06 ,000 -,234 -2,043 ,058
FIRM AGE ,002 ,003 ,074 ,607 ,552
BOARD SIZE ,086 ,060 ,200 1,433 ,171
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,840 ,741 -,311 -1,134 ,273
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -,982 ,637 -,568 -1,543 ,142
GOODS -,890 ,724 -,409 -1,230 ,237
SERVICES -,420 ,694 -,207 -,605 ,553
REAL ESTATE -,839 ,701 -,259 -1,196 ,249
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,552 ,567 -,232 -,973 ,345
FAULTLINE 1,442 ,793 ,257 1,818 ,088
CHAIR-BOARD SHARED EX ,096 ,042 ,300 2,286 ,036
R-squared ,848
Adjusted R-squared ,734
Standard error ,431
F-statistics 7,436 (p-value=0,000)
(Constante) -,682 ,916 -,745 ,468
TOBIN´S Q 2012 ,851 ,185 ,623 4,600 ,000
FIRM SIZE -6,391E-06 ,000 -,241 -1,860 ,083
FIRM AGE ,002 ,003 ,077 ,601 ,557
BOARD SIZE ,086 ,062 ,200 1,385 ,186
OIL, GAS, ENERGY -,876 ,815 -,324 -1,074 ,300
CONSTRUCTION, ENGENEERING -1,031 ,761 -,596 -1,355 ,195
GOODS -,924 ,795 -,425 -1,163 ,263
SERVICES -,458 ,779 -,226 -,589 ,565
REAL ESTATE -,888 ,823 -,274 -1,079 ,298
TELECOM, TECHNOLOGY -,584 ,637 -,245 -,916 ,374
FAULTLINE 1,615 1,600 ,288 1,009 ,329
CHAIR-BOARD SHARED EX ,118 ,176 ,367 ,670 ,513
FAULTLINE x CHAIR-BOARD SHARED 
EX
-,049 ,388 -,073 -,126 ,901
R-squared ,848
Adjusted R-squared ,716
Standard error ,445
F-statistics 6,443 (p-value=0,001)
Source: Prepared by the author
3
4
Dependent variable: TOBIN´S Q 2014
Model
Non-standardized coefficients
P-value
Results 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A board´s composition, defined as the configuration of its members´ attributes (Levine 
and Moreland, 1990), is considered crucial for the board´s information-elaboration and 
decision-making (Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Harrison et al., 2002; van 
Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007). Diverse and complementary members contribute 
with differential experience, skills and knowledge (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), 
offering different ideas, viewpoints and perspectives, thus benefitting the complex 
decision-making (Sawyer et al., 2006).  
 
Within the general board diversity research, gender diversity is one of the most debated 
diversity aspects. Although research has concluded that women directors add a distinct 
and positive contribution to the boards, no consistent and all-inclusive relation between 
women directors and firm financial performance has been established. Different studies 
have come up with different conclusions; positive link, negative link and no link 
whatsoever. As an interesting observation; an all-inclusive consistent relation between 
men directors (male gender) and firm financial performance has neither been confirmed 
by research. 
 
In this dissertation we developed a theoretical model to test the impact of gender 
diversity and gender faultlines upon Tobin´s Q. We studied these relations under a new 
perspective, using the CEM as the underlying model, foreseeing and integrating both 
positive and negative consequences of gender diversity, based on the simultaneous 
effects of the information/decision-making perspective and the social categorization 
perspective.  
 
We tested our proposals using data from a comprehensive sample of public Norwegian 
and Spanish firms, and found a statistically significant positive relationship between 
women ratio and Tobin‘s Q, in both the Global and the Norwegian sample, moderated 
by a critical mass of women on boards in the overall Global sample. With respect to our 
proposals regarding gender faultlines and its moderators, we found no relation to 
Tobin´s Q. Below is a summary of the hypotheses and the results as reported for all 
three samples.  
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Table 7.1. Summary of Hypotheses and Results. 
 
 
7.2. WHY IS GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS SO IMPORTANT? 
 
“Fifteen years into the 21st century, gender equality appears to be the forefront of the 
global humanitarian agenda” (Joshi et al., 2015: 1459).  
 
In accordance with international laws and conventions declaring that "men and women 
have the same right to employment opportunities, promotion, and equal treatment in 
respect of work for equal value", most societies establish gender equality as an objective 
for its institutional settings; political., institutional and private organizations, as for the 
leadership of these organizations. 
 
An issue around women in top management is getting increased attention, both in 
research as well as in practice (Daily et al 1999; Dalton and Dalton, 2010; Terjesen et 
al., 2009; Vinnicombe et al., 2008). In 2014, United Nations recognized that women´s 
equal right to education and employment is not only a ―women´s issue‖ but a human 
right issue (UN Women, 2014).  
 
Women represent approximately half of the world´s population, and 50% of the total 
human capital available. However they are largely under-represented at the highest 
levels of organizations (Catalyst, 2011; UN Women, 2014).  
 
On general terms it is considered unethical to exclude certain groups from elite 
positions on the basis of gender or other individual traits or characteristics unrelated to 
their ability (Carver, 2002; Garratt, 1997; Singh et al., 2001; Terjesen and Singh, 2008). 
In spite of this, women remain a small minority on most corporate boards around the 
world, and seem not to get the same access to directorships as men (Brammer et al., 
FINDINGS
Hypothesis Independent Dependent Hypothetical Global Norwegian Spanish 
variable variable relationship sample  sample sample
1 Women Ratio Tobin´s Q 2014 Positive Positive Positive No relation
2 Women Ratio x  Critical Mass Tobin´s Q 2014 Significant moderation Significant moderation No moderation No moderation
3 Faultlines Tobin´s Q 2014 Negative No relation No relation No relation
4 Faultlines x Overlap Board tenure Tobin´s Q 2014 Significant moderation No moderation No moderation No moderation
5 Faultlines x Chair-Board Shared Ex. Tobin´s Q 2014 Significant moderation No moderation No moderation No moderation
Source: Prepared by the author
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2007; Hillman et al., 2007). In some countries, politicians and legislators, in order to 
improve the board gender diversity, have instituted quotas that require boards to include 
30–50% women representatives (Terjesen et al., 2014). In other countries large 
institutional shareholders and board rating systems seek to pressure companies to add 
diversity to the boardroom by rating positively diversity measures (Institutional 
Shareholder Services (Hillman, 2015). 
 
In 2013 EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding requested that large publicly held 
companies in Europe to voluntarily pledge to achieve a 30% level of women on boards 
by 2015, and although not all countries have fulfilled this request, some improvements 
have been recorded on the European scene. 
  
Figure 7.1. Representation of women and men on the boards of 610 large listed 
companies in the EU, Oct. 2013. 
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Figure 7.2. Representation of women and men on the boards of large listed companies 
in the EU, Oct. 2010 to Oct. 2013. 
 
Promoting gender diversity and achieving a better gender balance on corporate boards is 
thus of utmost importance as it signal that society fully accepts women in all spheres of 
public life.  
 
Complementary to these ethical issues concerning gender balance and equal rights, there 
are also other reasons why gender diversity on boards is so important; having female 
directors in top positions has proven crucial for facilitating and promoting other 
women´s employment opportunities, promotion, and equal treatment at work.  
 
Women directors are important role-models and are seen as positive examples for other 
women, inside and outside the organization (Bernardi, Bosco and Vassill, 2006; 
Thomson, Graham and Lloyd, 2005). They signal that career growth opportunities are 
available for women, and consequently contribute to the attraction and the retention of 
female talent (Sealy and Singh, 2006, 2010). On the contrary; the absence of women in 
top management and board positions may penalize the firms from acquiring and 
retaining the best female talent (Daily et al., 1999). In this way female directors function 
as champions for change on women‘s issues of recruitment, retention and advancement 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996), and carry symbolic value about upwardly mobility 
(Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Burke, 2000). 
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The consequences of having female board members was seen in Bilimoria´s study  
(2006) exploring the relationship between the presence of women on board and the 
presence of women at multiple levels in the company. She found a positive relationship 
between women board members and the number of women officers; the number of 
women officers holding line jobs; the presence of a critical mass of women officers; the 
number of women officers with high-ranking or ―clout‖ titles; and the number of 
women among the top corporate earners. These findings are in line with her earlier 
proposal that women on boards contribute to increased retention of women employees 
in the firm (Bilimoria, 2000). 
 
Researchers agree that the presence of women on boards communicate that, whatever 
barriers to advancement of women may exist in society, the culture of that specific firm 
is friendly to women and committed to female advancement at all levels (Bilimoria, 
2000, 2006; Daily et al., 2003). Where women occupy senior managerial positions, they 
have been found to focus more than men on the development and mentoring of their 
subordinates, both men and women; encouraging them to reach their full potential and 
rewarding them for good performance (Eagly et al., 2003).  
 
They are further seen as a signal that women´s concerns will be heard in the 
organization (Mattis, 1993). Thus, a woman has a good reason to believe that the 
presence of women in top management positions is a critical factor for her likely 
promotion in the company, and adjust her commitment and motivation accordingly. In 
this line Powell (1999) found that women directors contribute to higher motivation in 
female employees, as they see a better reflection of themselves at the board level.  
 
There are also important reasons for having women on board based on business and 
client criteria. When exploring the relationship between women on boards and 
stakeholder´s representation the word "market reciprocity" becomes relevant. This term 
implies that companies who sell goods and services to the public send positive signals 
to the consumers who might purchase their products. It is argued that board members 
who better reflect the corporation‘s consumer population have a better understanding of 
the consumers‘ needs and behavior, and will therefore make better strategic decisions 
about the company´s future (Arfken et al., 2004).  
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From this point of view, women should be represented on the corporate boards of 
consumer goods as women play a role in 80% of all consumer purchase decisions and, 
thus, women on the board would better represent the customer base (Wolfman, 2007).  
 
“Women have insight into our customers that no man—no matter how bright, no matter 
how hardworking— can match. That’s important when 85% of all consumer buying 
decisions made in our stores are made by women” (Natividad, 2005: 13, citing Larry 
Johnston, CEO of Albertsons grocery chain). 
 
Researchers have also noted that the growing numbers of women directors have led to 
increased attention to corporate social responsibility, such as charitable giving and 
community relationships (Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998; Williams, 2003; Fombrun, 
2004). Corroborating with this, Williams‘ (2003) study of Fortune 500 firms from 1991 
to 94 found a link between women on boards and the firm‘s charitable support of 
community and cultural activities. 
 
Based on all of these reasons, we believe that the issue elected for our dissertation is of 
utmost importance, as gender diversity on boards benefits not only the organization they 
represent, but society in general, consumers, charitable organizations and other women 
striving for equal opportunities and just treatment in their daily work.    
   
7.3. WHAT ARE THE THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR STUDY? 
 
This dissertation pretends to makes three main theoretical contributions:  
 
1. We built our dissertation model upon the CEM as we consider this model to 
represent a holistic view of the effects of diversity. We believe that in this way 
we contribute to the general gender diversity debate, including both the positive 
and the negative effects of having women directors on the board. Our theoretical 
model is complex, as it incorporates various moderating factors, but at the same 
time it contributes to understand the complex reality of board work.  
2. By integrating into the same model the concepts of gender diversity, critical 
mass and gender faultlines at the board level, we believe that we contribute to an 
original and realistic discussion of the factors involving gender diversity on 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
221 
 
corporate boards. Our results emphasize the importance of ―numbers‖ – how 
critical numbers of women directors enhance their effective influence on boards. 
3. Our study is cross-national., comparing two countries in Europe; Norway and 
Spain. These two countries represent radical opposites in terms of women´s 
participation on boards, in business and in society in general. Our comparative 
study contributes to the discussion on the importance of cultural contextual 
conditions upon the effect of gender diversity on firm´s performance. 
 
1. A model built on the CEM 
The underlying idea of this dissertation, in line with the CEM, is the recognition of 
diversity as a value-added factor for teams who deal with complex analysis and 
decision-making. We start out reviewing previous findings related to diversity, and the 
specific functions of the board of directors. Our conclusion is that diversity on boards is 
positive, principally due to the board´s processes of information-elaboration and 
decision-making.  
 
We present the Categorization-Elaboration Model (van Knippenberg et al 2004a); the 
model upon which we have built our study. We believe that by using this model, we 
contribute to a more holistic and credible elaboration on the effects of diversity upon 
performance, as we consider the simultaneous positive and negative effects of diversity. 
We include in our model both the information/decision-making and the social 
categorization perspectives, and in this way add to earlier developments by showing 
how these two perspectives are inter-related and interact with each other on the board 
level.  
 
A further theoretical contribution, in line with the CEM, is the fact that we do not 
classify gender only as a social category diversity attribute, but also as an informational 
diversity attribute, due to the fact that women contribute with specific insights, skills 
and leadership behaviors, on the basis of their gender. In this same line, we do not 
restrict social category diversity to give rise only to social categorization processes, nor 
informational diversity to give rise only to information/decision-making processes, but 
consider that both types of diversity can give rise to both processes.  
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We believe that the application of the CEM to our dissertation model will contribute to 
a broader and more sophisticated understanding of the information/decision-making 
processes, the social categorization processes and the intergroup bias, related to gender 
diversity on boards, and their effects on the firm performance. 
 
2. Integrating gender diversity, critical mass and gender faultlines. 
The underlying belief in our study is that women are different from men, thus their 
contribution to the board is different, specific and unique. We present the different 
contributions of women directors structured in the following way: (1) women director´s 
contribution to task relevant information, (2) women directors´ distinct leadership style 
and behavior, (3) women directors´ distinct contribution to board´s internal work-
processes, (4) women directors and board functions and (5) women directors and their 
contribution to firm´s financial performance. 
 
We elaborate on critical mass theory, proposing that critical mass of women directors on 
corporate boards moderate positively the relationship between women on boards and 
firm financial performance.  
 
We also elaborate on gender faultlines, based on social categorization and intergroup 
bias, and predict that faultline strength will affect firm financial performance in a 
negative way. Most previous faultline studies are laboratory studies. Presenting a 
faultline study based on gender faultlines on corporate boards of two countries is 
another important contribution of our study. 
 
Integrating gender diversity, critical mass and gender faultlines, three important aspects 
of diversity, specific but interrelated, we believe is an important and unique theoretical 
contribution of this dissertation. 
 
3. Cross-national empirical study integrating data from Norway and Spain   
For the empirical study we draw upon a novel data set covering two different European 
countries, Norway and Spain, representing two opposites in terms of participation of 
women in society in general., The study include a global and a comparative analysis of 
listed firms using data from 95 listed firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange, and 89 listed 
firms from the Madrid Stock Exchange (Mercado continuo), with a total number of 
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1528 board members, the data on women ratio, critical mass and gender faultline were 
tested towards the performance measure of Tobin´s Q 2014.  
 
We believe that an interesting theoretical contribution of our study lies in the prediction 
of the importance of the cultural context when studying gender diversity. National 
culture has proved to play a major role in managerial perceptions of gender, and is 
believed be an important antecedent for women´s representation on corporate boards 
(Carrasco et al., 2015; Terjesen et al., 2009). We believe that cultural context not only 
influence the representation of women directors, but also their effective influence on the 
board, as well as the perceptions of the firm on behalf of external agents, such as 
investors, consumers, customers, media, potential employees and the public in general.  
 
7.4. IN WHICH WAYS DO OUR EMPIRICAL RESULTS SUPPORT OUR 
THEORETICAL PROPOSALS? 
 
Previous studies relating women directors and firm´s financial performance have 
reported positive links, negative links and no links. So far no all-conclusive proof has 
been found in favor of the ―pure‖ business case for women directors on boards.  
 
Our empirical motivation comes from our interest in contributing to the conviction that 
women on boards contribute to firm´s performance in a positive way. In Europe, 
although women over the last decades have gained more in-pass in public 
administration and politics, the proportion of women who reach top positions in private 
corporations is still low. If it can be proven statistically that having more women on 
boards affects positively the firms´ financial performance, this could be a strong 
argument for incrementing the ratio of women to the board and to overall management 
in companies.  
 
Our empirical results supported two of our theoretical proposals, namely the positive 
relationship between gender diversity and firm financial performance, and the positive 
moderation of critical mass upon the relationship between gender diversity and firm 
financial performance. The last was only demonstrated over the overall Global sample. 
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Our first hypothesis predicted that gender diversity on corporate boards was positively 
related to firm performance. 
 
In our empirical study we found that the women ratio, in both the Global as well as in 
the Norwegian sample, was positively related to Tobin´s Q. The relationship between 
these two variables, in the Global sample, was indicated by a beta of 0.229, and in the 
Norwegian sample, by a beta of 0.371. This relationship was not confirmed for the 
Spanish sample; although the relation was positive, it was not statistically significant.  
 
Observing these results we ask: ―Why does an increased women ratio in Norway lead to 
a higher Tobin´s Q, while in Spain no?‖  
 
We believe that one possible explanation can be found in the interplay between the 
number of women on the board, and the national culture of the country.  
 
We propose that the actual number of women on each board is of utmost importance for 
their effective influence on board decisions, and therefore firm´s financial performance. 
We have previously seen that on boards with an unbalanced gender composition, 
women perceive that their minority status makes it harder for them to influence the 
board´s decisions, thereby resulting in a reduced contribution on their behalf (Ferreira, 
2010; Carter et al., 2010; Westphal and Milton, 2000). As the size of the female group 
increases to the point when it is no longer a token minority, the nature of the relations 
between the two gender groups changes qualitatively (Bear et al., 2010; Etzkowitz et al., 
1994), and the board benefits from the contributions of its female members (Kanter, 
1977).  
 
The board compositions in Norway and Spain show substantial differences in terms of 
numbers, as confirmed by the data obtained for both samples. The mean women ratio in 
Norway is 37.05%, only 1% have no women directors, and 9.47% have one woman on 
the board. The remaining 89.53% have two or more female directors. When comparing 
this to same ratios in the Spanish sample, we see a completely different reality; 33% of 
all Spanish boards have no women directors, 30% have only one woman director, and 
the mean women ratio is 12.64% (Table 5.5, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3). 
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These differences in the factual presence of women on boards indicate differences in the 
reality women face as board members. In Norway women´s participation on boards is 
―normalized‖, balanced in terms of numbers, and politically, legally and publicly 
supported. It is reasonable to believe that this influence their perceptions on their ability 
to effectively influence board processes and performance, as proposed by Konrad et al., 
(2008). On the contrary, in Spain women on boards represent a small minority and their 
presence is still questioned by many. This minority status will most likely affect their 
perception on their ability to effectively influence the dominant male group of board 
members, which again reduce their contribution (Konrad et al., 2008; Kanter, 1977). 
Furthermore, as the women directors do not ―fit‖ the stereotypic expectations in Spain 
for the male-dominated board position, they might meet bias, and although they display 
high levels of performance, their efforts may be discounted (Eagly and Karau, 1991).  
 
Furthermore, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the 30% of the Spanish 
boards with token representation of women do not contribute to our predicted positive 
relationship between women on boards and Tobin´s Q. Similar to our assumption, 
Carter et al., (2003) in their study of female board members in the US decided to 
exclude all firms with a token representation of women in order to discover the true 
relationship between women directors and Tobin´s Q. 
 
The small numbers of women on Spanish boards; their minority status and token 
representation, are possible contributors to the not-confirmed hypothesis of positive 
relation between women and firm financial performance.  
 
Initially we proposed as reasons an interplay between numbers and cultural contexts; we 
believe that contributing to the explanation why women ratio in Norway leads to higher 
Tobin´s Q, while in Spain not, can be found in the cultural context of the two countries.  
 
Previous research has proven that national-cultural context is an important antecedent 
for women´s appointment to boards (Carrasco et al., 2015; Grosvold and Brammer, 
2011). Further to affecting the appointment of women to boards, we believe that the 
cultural context also affect women´s effectiveness once they are members of the board.  
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We have earlier commented that boards are nested within a national context with 
common values and beliefs concerning gender. The Norwegian culture, as indicated in 
Table 5.7, project a cultural context where gender parity is high and male dominance is 
low. Women in countries with high gender parity, like Norway, are more likely to 
possess the right human capital required for board positions (Wright, Baxter and 
Birkelund, 1995). Furthermore, boards in countries with high gender parity are more 
likely to leverage on the knowledge, experience and leadership behavior that female 
directors bring to the board, thus allowing them to influence and contribute to firm´s 
financial performance. We believe that this cultural reality has contributed to the 
positive relationship between women ratio and Tobin´s Q in Norway. Spain, with a 
culture of lower gender parity and high male dominance, do not have the same 
receptiveness towards women´s participation on boards, and might not leverage equally 
on the knowledge, experience and leadership behavior of their female directors, thus 
leading to a reduced use of the female human capital.     
 
Furthermore, we also believe that this cultural reality affects external agents such as 
customers, banks and investors, in that these in Norway are more likely to have higher 
expectations to firms with higher women ratio, than their counterparts in Spain.  Our 
indicator of firm financial performance is the Tobin´s Q; a proxy estimate of investor 
perceptions and confidence as to how efficiently firms make use of their assets for a 
given accounting period (Gompers et al., 2003).  It is therefore likely to expect that 
investors in Norway have more confidence in the future earning potentials of companies 
with a higher women ratio, than investors in Spain, where an increased women ratio 
does not inspire the same confidence in investors. It therefore seems that the legitimacy 
of female directors is questioned in some cultural contexts more than in others. 
 
This is in line with a recent meta-analysis incorporating studies from 35 different 
countries, finding that female board representation is more positively related to firm 
financial performance in contexts with greater gender parity (Post and Byron, 2015). In 
their study they found that, although the relationship between women on boards and 
market performance was near zero, the relationship was positive in countries with 
greater gender parity and negative in countries with lower gender parity. In countries 
where gender parity was highest, like in Norway and Sweden, the women ratio was 
positively related to market performance.  
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Our second hypothesis predicted that a critical mass of women directors on corporate 
boards would moderate positively the relation between women on boards and firm 
financial performance 
 
This hypothesis was confirmed in the overall Global sample, indicated by a beta of 
0.615, but not in the two separate country samples.  
 
We believe that this confirm our proposal that the actual number of women directors on 
the board is of utmost importance for their effective influence on firm performance; as 
the size of the female group increases to the point when it is no longer a token minority, 
the nature of the relations between the two gender groups changes qualitatively (Bear et 
al., 2010; Etzkowitz et al., 1994), and the board benefits from the contributions of its 
female members (Kanter, 1977).  
 
An interesting question is why critical mass do not moderate the relationship between 
women ratio and Tobin´s Q in the two separate country samples. In the Spanish sample 
the answer is easy; as the principal relationship was not confirmed, no moderation is 
possible. Furthermore, the distribution of the women ratio in the sample is distributed in 
a way that the critical mass of 20% has no sense: 66 of the 89 firms (74%) is in the 
women ratio percentage below the critical point of 20%, and only 23 firms (26%) is 
situated above the critical point of 20%, making this sample very small and vulnerable.  
 
In the Norwegian sample, something similar happens, but contrary to the Spanish 
sample: 88 of the 95 firms (93%) is in the women ratio percentage above the critical 
point of 20%, and only 7 firms (7%) is situated below the critical point of 20%. 
 
It is with the Global sample, which is bigger and more equally distributed in terms of 
women ratio, that we see the moderation confirmed. In this sample 73 of the 184 firms 
(40%) is in the women ratio percentage below the critical point of 20%, and 112 firms 
(60%) is situated above the critical point of 20%. Looking at the mean women ratio of 
this sample we see that it is 25.25%, thus close to the critical point of 20%. The Global 
sample, offering sufficient reports both below and above the critical point, is the only 
sample which makes it possible to compare and appreciate differences in firm´s 
financial performance between women ratios below and above this critical point.  
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7.5. WHICH RESULTS DID NOT CONFIRM OUR THEORETICAL 
PROPOSALS?  
 
Our third hypothesis predicted that strong gender-based board faultlines would have a 
negative impact on firm performance due to social categorization and intergroup biases. 
This would ultimately result in increased relational conflict, reduced board cohesion and 
increased process losses, ultimately leading to decreased board performance (Li and 
Hambrick, 2005). 
Based on our results we cannot confirm this predicted relationship between faultlines 
and firm performance. In the Norwegian sample however, although not statistically 
significance, the negative beta of -0.063 confirmed the negative direction of the 
relationship, indicating that the higher the faultline, the lower the Tobin‘s Q. This is in 
line with our predictions that as gender-groups are more similar with their in-group 
members, and more different from their out-group members, a faultline can form 
dividing the board into two gender sub-groups, affecting cohesion, information 
exchange and relations in a negative way.  
 
The Global and the Spanish sample did not confirm these predictions. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, although not statistically significant, the beta indicated a positive direction 
of the relationship between gender faultlines and Tobin´s Q. We find this interesting to 
analyze, in spite of the fact that the results were not statistically significant. 
 
Four articles propose that faultlines have positive effects (Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003; 
Bezrukova et al., 2010; Hart and Van Vugt, 2006; Philips, Mannix, Neale and 
Gruenfeld, 2001). Two of these articles (Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003 and Bezrukova et 
al., 2010) seem relevant to our discussion. 
 
Gibson and Vermeulen (2003) relate faultlines with high levels of cooperation within 
subgroups. They found that there were reasons to believe that homogeneous subgroups, 
within the overall big group, could have a positive impact on the overall group´s 
performance, due to their function as supportive "cohorts" within the overall group 
(Asch, 1952, 1956). A cohort consists of people with a similar background and similar 
perspectives on things (Walsh, 1988). Asch proposed that within cohorts a rich 
exchange of information and constructive debate take place, and that without cohorts, 
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different perspectives would not be incorporated into the overall group's decision-
making.  
 
Based on this, and taking into account the earlier debate on gender parity and male 
dominance in Spain, we believe that when two or more women directors form a female 
subgroup within the board, sharing similar tenure, education level and education 
background, this serve as a stimuli and support for each of the women directors to 
express her opinion, and for it to be taken into account in the overall board decision-
making. Forming part of a subgroup, they feel that they have at least one in-group 
member who is likely to share their point of view, and/or to show support and 
understanding, and even though the majority may still disagree with their point of view, 
the board will be more receptive (from group research; Asch, 1952 and 1956; Stasser, 
Taylor and Hanna, 1989; Crott and Werner, 1994). In this way subgroups strengthen 
members' self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), and stimulates them to act upon and express 
their opinion. This has also proved to enhance the accuracy and quality of their input 
(Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), hence improving the overall board performance. 
 
Earlier research points to a higher salience of gender for women directors in token or 
minority status on the board, and in situations where they feel bias and discrimination 
(Mullen, 1991; Cadinu and Galdi, 2012).  Their natural reaction is to seek support and 
esteem in their gender subgroup.  In this line, Bezrukova et al., ´s study (2010) show 
that strong faultlines may help subgroup members cope with perceived injustice, and 
proposed that faultline subgroups may operate as networks in providing self-help; 
reducing interpersonal biases, stereotyping and discrimination.  
 
Based on this we have reason to believe, that in the Spanish sample, stronger faultlines 
contribute positively to women´s assertive way to influence board decisions, derived 
from their subgroup support, esteem and confidence, and that this is the reason why the 
direction of the relationship between gender faultlines and Tobin´s Q is positive. 
 
Our fourth and fifth hypothesis predicted that board overlap tenure and chair-board 
shared experience would moderate the negative relationship between Faultlines and 
Tobin´s Q. However, as no such relationship was demonstrated, there is no sense in 
discussing the moderations.  
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7.6. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE BOARDS? 
 
We recommend firms to expand their searches beyond the traditional talent pools, with 
the objective of appointing more women directors and gain in gender diversity.  Not 
only do our results confirm the business case for women on boards; a sufficient reason 
in itself  for promoting gender diversity, but also do our review of previous research 
confirms that there are great benefits in the incorporation of women, both for the 
internal board work, and for the relations with customers, investors and prospective 
employees. 
 
We proposed that the actual numbers of women on boards have an impact on the 
relationship between gender diversity and firm´s financial performance. A firm that do 
not believe in gender diversity, might decide to have a token women on the board, just 
for complying with recommended ―good board practices‖. However, this could lead to a 
―self- fulfilling-prophecy‖ - a negative circle- where tokens have less influence, make 
less contribution to the board´s decisions, and contribute less to the firm´s performance. 
This confirms the initial bias that women on boards do not improve firm performance. 
  
We believe however that a positive circle is possible; by appointing more women to 
board positions (above critical mass), women´s influence on boards increases and so do 
their contribution and impact on firm´s financial performance. Earlier we saw that 
having female board members have positive consequences on the presence of women at 
multiple levels in the company. Bilimoria (2006) found a positive relationship between 
women board members and the number of women officers; the number of women 
officers holding line jobs; the presence of a critical mass of women officers; the number 
of women officers with high-ranking; and the number of women among the top 
corporate earners.  
 
This is in line with our argument of an interplay between numbers and culture: a 
country with higher gender parity have higher women ratios, and higher women ratios 
influence culture (on medium or long term). However, as numbers are faster to change 
than culture, we suggest that companies start with increasing the numbers of women on 
corporate boards. In this respect, we recommend two main lines of actions. 
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The first verses around the implementation of policies that assure women´s access to 
corporate boards, and the second focuses on the development of board members´ 
positive integration of diverse members, thus avoiding negative circles and bias against 
women. 
 
Promoting policies that assure women´s access to corporate boards 
The fundamental reason why women are not getting access to boards is found in the 
tradition of how board members are nominated; board members have traditionally been 
chosen from the ranks of existing CEOs (Gutner, 2001). Since most CEOs are men, they 
engage in homosocial reproduction, selecting others similar to themselves. Executive 
directors (EDs) and non-executive directors (NEDs) are appointed in different ways. 
EDs gain their position through normal career progression, typically rising to the 
position of CEO or CFO. NEDs are appointed by an invitation from the board chairman 
or the nominating committee (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002).  For nominations to board 
positions, directors recommend and sponsor colleagues like themselves, whom they 
know are likely to fit the existing mold. Authors like Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and 
Ibarra, (1993) have recognized this tendency, and call it ―homophily.‖  
 
Thus, one important way to increase the percentage of women directors on boards, is by 
including woman directors in the nominating committee, and by increasing the ratio of 
women directors on boards to a critical mass of at least 20%.  
 
Four main measures have seemed to have contributed to the increased ratio of women 
on corporate boards where they have occurred around the world (Branson, 2012):  
 
1. Quota laws and pledge programs  
2. Mentoring programs 
3. Investor pressure 
4. Mandatory disclosure requirements of stock exchanges 
 
Quota laws and pledge programs can be efficient in improving women´s percentage on 
the boards. As earlier commented, Norway was the first nation to adopt a quota law in 
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2003, ordering full compliance by 2008, and setting the level at 40% of women 
representation on corporate boards.  
 
Mentoring programs where a former or present senior manager is assigned to a younger 
female manager with the objective of helping, counseling, guiding and orienting the 
mentee in her career path up through the organization, is another policy that can help 
women on their way to the board. Astute observers however, criticize mentoring 
programs on several grounds; mentors may disappear, be transferred to another location, 
or be the victim of downsizing. Furthermore, many mentors have been perceived to be 
over-protective of younger female managers, leading to the "office uncle" or "plastic 
bubble" phenomena in which mentors seek to shield mentees from obstacles, and 
roadblocks rather than working through them. 
 
Cox and Nkomo´s (1991) study showed that the main reason why managerial women 
leave organizations is the lack of career growth and opportunities, often referred to as 
the ―glass-ceiling‖. This is "a barrier so subtle that it is transparent, yet so strong, that it 
prevents women from moving up in the management hierarchy" (Morrison and von 
Glinow, 1990: 200). Male directors with conservative opinions about gender-
appropriate roles do frequently not offer women the same organizational rewards, such 
as training and development, nor promotion and pay. These directors have furthermore 
demonstrated to have expectations towards gender that bias the executive selection 
(Oakley, 2000).  
 
In some countries groups of institutional investors and other organizations have formed 
pressure groups in order to the push corporations to increase the percentage of women 
directors on the board. 
 
Mandatory disclosure requirements established by stock exchanges, include reporting 
on board composition as part of their agreement with public companies, and require that 
companies comply or explain, if they do not comply. A significant number of 
companies opt out of the diversity disclosure by reporting a simple one line disclosure, 
stating that there is no fixed policy within the company regarding candidate diversity for 
the board of directors. 
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Women tend to make career decisions from the standpoint of relationalism; before a 
decision is made they consider the impact on their family (Mainiero and Sullivan 2005; 
Guillaume and Pochic, 2009). The difficulty of combining career and family thus offer a 
threat to the advancement of women into positions of power. A higher position may 
require relocation, late-day and week-end meetings, frequent travel and office face time; 
higher earners work more hours than lower earners, and women are more willing than 
men to sacrifice wages and promotions for parenting (Wood, Corcoran and Courant, 
1993). Eliminating these more subtle forms of “de facto”, or second generation 
discrimination could be another action to eliminate barriers for women´s promotion to 
boards. These forms of second generation discrimination have a disproportionate effect 
on women as they move up through the ranks of middle and senior management, as 
persistent insistence on such practices causes women, especially those with children, to 
opt out of the work force, leading to a depletion of the pool from which women director 
candidates could be chosen ten years hence. 
 
Companies should also avoid "trophy directors"; women that are serving on four, five, 
six, or seven boards of directors. This contributes to a small number of very busy 
women directors, and a total number of women directors significantly smaller than the 
number of directorships held by women, crowding out other younger, deserving women 
candidates. 
 
Finally, appointing board members with less traditional views and with clear and 
manifested pro-diversity beliefs would also help eliminating barriers for women´s 
inclusion to boards of directors. 
 
Promote the development of board members´ positive integration of diverse members. 
To foster the development of board members´ positive integration of diversity, various 
recommendations are suggested: 
 
1. Chair´s commitment to diversity 
2. Diversity training programs and diversity awareness development 
3. Board composition planning 
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This research points to the importance of a careful selection process of directors by the 
chair and the nomination committees, ensuring improved gender balance and at the 
same time a board configuration that do not lend itself to strong gender faultlines. It also 
underlines the role for active leadership on boards, who should be aware of 
subgroupings possible intergroup bias and the relational conflicts this can create, and 
make sure that these negative effects do not out-weigh the benefits of diversity. 
Corporate boards should therefore commit to enhance pro-diversity beliefs among its 
members. This could be achieved through the chair´s example of showing his or her 
interest in hearing all members, and incorporate diverse information, ideas and 
perspectives into the elaboration/decision-making processes. As there is evidence from 
research that certain styles of leadership can help diverse groups to work effectively 
together (Kearney and Gebert, 2009), the chair´s pro-diversity beliefs may be an 
important aspect of the successful management of diversity. Likewise, it seems feasible 
that leadership can be an effective moderator of the faultline-performance relationship.  
 
Diversity training programs is another alternative to influence and train people in 
effective team collaboration. However, most diversity training programs have seemed to 
be limited to making people aware of their stereotypes about other groups, instead of 
welcoming people´s differences (Karp and Sammour, 2000; Rynes and Rosen, 1995). 
Homan et al., (2007) argue that it is also important to manage people‘s feelings about 
diversity itself (rather than about different others), and to make them aware of the 
potential value of being a member of a diverse team. It would, therefore, seem 
worthwhile to extend diversity training programs beyond the focus on stereotypes, and 
to include a focus on beliefs about, and attitudes toward diversity itself (van 
Knippenberg et al., 2007). 
 
7.7. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH?  
 
We acknowledge that there are important limitations in this study that need to be 
addressed, many of which may indicate fruitful avenues for future research.  
 
The first limitation has to do with reverse causality and endogeneity. This is a major 
methodological concern for management research (Addallah et al., 2015), as previous 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
235 
 
research state that one aspect that complicate the empirical analysis of boards is that 
many of the variables might be determined endogenously (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Boone et al., 2007; De Andrés and Vallelado, 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Johnson et 
al., 2013; Kwon and Adler, 2014). In our study we include a methodology to verify 
whether or not our data is affected by endogeneity, but in spite of a negative report, we 
cannot draw the conclusion that no endogeneity whatsoever is operating. 
 
The second limitation has to do with the validity of the results with respect to other 
countries. In our study two countries were included, Norway and Spain. Both these 
countries operate under specific circumstances, Norway, due to the law of 40% gender 
representation on boards and the required one-third employee elected board 
representatives, and Spain, being a country immersed in economic crises since 2008. 
Since these circumstances are specific for our sample, the conclusions drawn might not 
necessarily be valid for all countries emerged in different circumstances. 
 
Third, the sample is drawn from listed firms in both countries, most of which are 
relatively large in comparison to the average company size in each country. As the 
results might not apply to small and medium size firms, we believe that future research 
could address these issues for small, medium and family-owned companies. However, 
there are no apparent reasons why the results would differ; it could even be possible that 
diversity may report larger effects on smaller firms, as individual efforts are more 
noticeable. 
 
A fourth and important limitation is the lack of information on the mediating processes 
within the ―black box‖ - the behaviors and the relations between the board members. 
Due to our research methodology it is impossible to determine these internal dynamics, 
as the only variables controlled for are the ―inputs‖ (the composition of the board 
members) and the ―outputs‖ (the financial performance). Advancing in our knowledge 
about the mediating processes require a different research approach, based on 
qualitative research, incorporating interviews, questionnaires and/or participant 
observations. We believe that this is a promising field of research, and very interesting, 
especially in view of our unexpected findings of a positive relationship between 
faultline and Tobin´s Q. There is a lot to be learned about subgroup identification, 
minority support and effective influence within the black box.  
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Finally, in the CEM model (van Knippenberg et al., 2004a) two additional moderating 
variables of the relationship between diversity and firm performance were proposed, but 
not incorporated into our model. These are board tasks motivation and board task 
ability, and they are expected to affect the information/decision-making processes in 
that high levels of task motivation and high levels of task ability lead to superior 
performance in diverse groups. Highly motivated group members are expected to be 
more ready to interact with fellow group members that they perceive as being different. 
However, although understanding the importance of motivation, empirical research 
seldom include motivation as a moderating variable as it requires a highly complex and 
qualitative approach. In order to test its effects upon organizational performance, it 
would be necessary to assess board members‘ motivation, aggregate this to the board 
level, and to test interactions with dimensions of diversity. Because a lot of different 
factors may feed into motivation, e.g. leadership (van Knippenberg, D., van 
Knippenberg, B., De Cremer and Hogg, 2004b), goal-setting (Lock and Latham, 1990), 
organizational justice (Tyler, 1999), social exchange processes (Rhoades and 
Eisenberger, 2002) and individual differences in information-processing motivation (De 
Dreu and Carnevale, 2003) it is difficult to conceptualize the construct.  
 
The second additional moderator, board task ability, is proposed to moderate the 
relationship between diversity and performance in that high levels of task ability 
moderate group performance. To test the moderating role of ability one may assess the 
intelligence, or the level of the work-group´s formal education (Hunter and Schmidt, 
1996), aggregate this to the group level, and test interactions between these proxies to 
ability and diversity. In addition to general cognitive ability, task-specific knowledge, 
skills, and abilities may be important, as they provide the common ground and shared 
frame of reference that may help diverse groups in making sense of different 
information and perspectives. Incorporating these two moderators and explore the 
complete CEM model could be an interesting, however complex future research project. 
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